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MC 2M/ATE MOS Study: Final Report
September 1, 1999
This briefing summarizes the findings and conclusions resulting from the CNA Marine Corps Microminiature/Automatic Test Equipment Military Occupational Specialty Code (2M/ATE MOS) study. The purpose of the study was to analyze a number of alternative Circuit Card Assemblies (CCA) repair strategies for MC ground systems. The alternatives considered ranged from evacuating all CCA functions to repairing them all. We also considered varying the repairer workforce composition and repair location. We found that the current repair practices, assuming that the MC assigns the number of repairer man-years we estimate are needed, saves about $75 million a year over what it would cost of evacuate and replenish failed CCAs. More money could be saved if all CCAs were repaired at a central location (Electronic Maintenance Companies). The report also finds that 2M workload does not appear to warrant a primary MOS.
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MCRD Attrition and Comparisons with the Navy
July 1, 1999
This briefing examines bootcamp attrition in the Navy and the Marine Corps, comparing recent attrition rates, historical rates, and FY99 predictions. Recent bootcamp attrition in the Navy has been considerably higher than in the past; however, Marine Corps bootcamp attrition is well within the historical averages for both males and females. The briefing also examines Marine Corps bootcamp attrition for regulars and reserves, looking at the two Marine Corps Recruit Depots (MCRDs) in San Diego and Paris Island.
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FCC Baseline Subsidy Analysis
January 1, 1999
The DON is seeking to maximize the availability of child-care spaces within the available funding by adjusting the subsidies paid for different types of childcare. Military childcare is provided either in Child Development Centers (CDCs) or through the Family Child Care (FCC) program in private homes or bases. PDASN(M&RA) asked CNA to take a quick look at the subsidy program. The purpose of the study is to establish a baseline for FCC use and cost in the DON, with particular attention to initiatives to subsidize FCC. Recommendations include improving routine data collection and reporting, instituting regular parent and provider surveys, giving subsidies only to 0-3 year olds, and setting subsidies in line with local markets. In addition, we considered what an evaluation plan to monitor the effectiveness of FCC subsidies should include. Part of the report includes a suggestion for a follow-on study that would implement the evaluation plan. DTIC AD-B242825
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Training and Education Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance Operations
April 1, 1996
This briefing presents results from a study undertaken by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) at the request of Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). The primary objective of the study is to identify and analyze some alternatives the Marine Corps might consider in order to improve its ability to conduct humanitarian assistance operations (HAOs). To meet this objective, we have been (1) examining ways of conducting HAOs; (2) identifying changes in organization, training and education, doctrine, and equipment and supplies that will help the marine Corps better prepare for HAOs; and (3) assessing the relative costs of these changes. This briefing focuses on identifying and analyzing the training and education requirements for Marines assigned to HAOs and suggests ways the Marine Corps might meet those requirements.
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Planning Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance Operations
April 1, 1996
The Center for Naval Analyses conducted a study to identify and analyze alternative ways the Marine Corps might consider to improve its ability to conduct Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HAO). To achieve this objective we (1) examined how the military has conducted HAOs in the past; (2) identified alternative way the military can conduct these operations; and (3) assessed the relative costs of these alternatives in terms of changes in organizations, education and training, doctrine and documentation, and equipment and supplies. This paper addresses how the Marines and the military in general can improve their ability to plan an HAO. It is one of a series of papers on the U.S. Marine Corps and HAOs.
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Measures of Effectiveness for Humanitarian Assistance Operations
April 1, 1996
Assessing the effectiveness of an ongoing military Humanitarian Assistance Operation (HAO) is difficult. These operations tend to be less familiar to the military; the operation's objectives are often vague; and the initial available information on a humanitarian crisis is often incomplete or inconsistent. But such an assessment is important to provide insight into what strategies are working; where assets need to be shifted; whether more (or fewer) forces are required for specific tasks or the mission as a whole; and when the end of the operation (end state) has been reached. This paper uses lessons from past operations, exercises, and studies to contribute to the military s understanding of how to assess progress in an HAO. We discuss not only measures of effectiveness, but other measures that are useful. This analysis is provided in connection with a Center for Naval Analyses CNA study intended to help the Marine Corps improve its ability to conduct HAOs. The Marine Corps Combat Development Command and I Marine Expeditionary Force sponsored this study.
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The Role of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations in Humanitarian Assistance Operations
April 1, 1996
The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) conducted a study to identify and analyze alternative ways the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) might consider to improve its ability to conduct Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HAOs). To achieve this objective, we (1) examined how the military has conducted HAOs in the past; (2) identified alternative ways the military can conduct these operations; and (3) assessed the relative costs of these alternatives in terms of changes in organization, education and training, doctrine and documentation, and equipment and supplies. The study was co-sponsored by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). This briefing discusses the role of Civilian Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in HAOs, focusing on what this role means in terms of actual requirements. The briefing presents an overview of general U.S. CA and PSYOP capabilities. It discusses USMC CA and PSYOP capabilities and what these capabilities mean for the ability of the Marine Corps to conduct operations. It also suggests ways to integrate the capabilities of the other services with Marine Corps units to more effectively conduct operations.
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Logistics and Engineering Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance Operations
April 1, 1996

This paper presents results from a study conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses that identifies and analyzes alternative ways the Marine Corps might consider to improve its ability to conduct Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HAOs). To achieve this objective we are: (1) examining requirements needed to conduct HAOs; (2) identifying potential changes in the Marine's conduct of HAOs to meet the requirements; and (3) assessing the cost of changes in terms of organization, training and education, doctrine, and equipment and supplies. This paper is one of a series that documents military requirements and alternatives for HAOs. It specifically addresses logistics and engineering-related requirements and alternatives.

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Summary of Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance Operations
April 1, 1996
In this paper we summarize the results of a study conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses that identifies and analyzes how the Marine Corps might improve its ability to conduct Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HAOs). To achieve this objective, we (1) examined how the military has conducted HAOs in the past; (2) identified alternative ways the military can conduct these operations; and (3) assessed the relative costs of these alternatives in terms of changes in organization, training and education, doctrine and documentation, and equipment and supplies. This study is co-sponsored by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and I Marine Expeditionary Force. We developed this summary from earlier analyses which present detailed discussions of HAO requirements and alternatives in the areas of planning, training, civil affairs and psychological operations, legal affairs, and logistics and engineering. This summary presents key results from these analyses, and integrates them into a greater whole.
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Improving Marine Coordination with Relief Organizations in Humanitarian Operations
April 1, 1996
The purpose of military Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HAO) is to relieve the suffering of populations affected by a natural or man-made disaster. But the military rarely provides relief on its own throughout an operation. Civilian humanitarian relief organizations are often on the ground when the military deploys to an area, or they follow soon after. These relief organizations, many with significant resources and experienced staffs, specialize in providing relief. Whoever is in charge of an operation as a whole, the military and relief organizations usually develop the same relationship. The relief organizations provide the actual relief and the military supports their efforts by providing assets and conducting operations. This relationship make perfect sense, given the expertise of the relief workers and the resources of the military. To support these relief organizations, the military must coordinate its efforts with them. Past operations and exercises, however, have shown that military coordination with relief organizations has been vital, but difficult. This paper covers two types of HAOs -- those in response to a natural disaster and those that are a result of civil strife. The latter types of HAOs, which often cause, exacerbate, or do not allow the mitigation of starvation -- are called complex humanitarian emergencies.
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