Research for Twenty-First Century

This research memorandum is part of a study sponsored by the Commander, Seventh Fleet, to assess the security environment of the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) between now and 2010. It focuses on the most probable evolutionary trends for China during this period. China's emergence as a major regional power will be one of the principal factors affecting the security, politics, and economies of Asia and the Pacific between now and 2010. The forces shaping China's emergence are primarily internal, but include such important external factors as Beijing s perceptions of the intentions of its neighbors and of the United States. Much of the uncertainty about China's future course and impact on the region center on whether, and how, China accepts the norms of the international systems that have grown since World War II - norms that have not yet been tested by the rapid rise in national power of a large non-Western country. Alternative scenarios emerging from the rapid changes underway in China could have widely varying implications for this and other issues.

The Commander, Seventh Fleet, asked CNA to assess the security environment of the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) to the year 2010. In addition to an examination of the major countries of the region, of security trends in Asia (e.g., demographics and weapon development), and of future economic trends in the APR, this assessment warranted an evaluation of Chinese naval capabilities over the period of interest. This research memorandum presents the results of that evaluation. Much of the debate over China's future naval capabilities focuses on whether China will soon have a 'bluewater' navy. In this analysis, we argue that one of China's strategic objectives is to develop a regional navy. We define 'regional' or 'greenwater' navy as a navy capable of effectively achieving China's current regional aspirations (e.g., blockade of Taiwan, seizure of one or more islands in the Spratlys, sustainment of a naval force in the South China Sea, and the ability to inflict damage upon an intervening foreign navy).

The rapid decline of the defense budget since the fall of the Soviet Union has led to severely reduced procurement accounts for all the Military Services, and these declining budgets are likely to continue well into the next decade. For the Department of the Navy, with its many competing procurement demands, the declining budgets mean that (a) future shipbuilding must be scaled back, and (b) the question of quantity versus capability will become the paramount question as the Navy develops requirements for all new ships. In this paper, which was prepared prior to the start of the Cost and Operational Analysis of the next-generation surface combatant (SC21), I propose that one alternative that should be considered for the SC21 requirement is a set of two ships: a fully capable ship and a moderately capable ship, with the moderately capable design potentially having Coast Guard and foreign military sales application. For maximum standardization and affordability, the two ship types should be designed concurrently by one design team and introduced into the fleet at the same time in a mix consistent with fleet sizing requirements. To meet expected budgetary constraints, both ship types should be developed with firm design-to-cost constraints.

Using a two-phase approach, the Future Russian Navy study -- commissioned by the Director of Naval Intelligence -- examined the individual factors that will compete with one another to drive the force posture and capabilities of the 21st-century Russian Navy. Phase I evaluated as discrete entities historical, economic, security, and foreign policy interests as well as politico-sociological and economic constraints. Phase II then evaluated these competing interests and constraints, and derived a range of potential force postures and capabilities for the Russian Navy of the year 2013. The result describes a Russian Navy dependent principally on the success or failure of Russian national economic reform.