Research for Submarines

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February 1, 1981
This paper deals with the relationship between general purpose forces force levels and capabilities and the nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine security issue from the Soviet point of view.
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June 1, 1974
Analytic expressions for the probability that a single aircraft carrier, opposed by submarines, can remain on station for a specified length of time are discussed in this research contribution. The threat from both torpedo and cruise-missile submarines is considered, but the threat from aircraft is not. Expressions for expected submarine losses are derived. Expressions are also developed to show how the probability of remaining on station improves as the carrier's resistance to damage increases. A wide variety of ASW force compositions and tactics can be represented in the parameters of the model. Appendix C presents an alternative way to formulate the problem and derive the quantities mentioned above. The two methods produce results that are in excellent agreement. The intention of the authors is to provide a tool that can be used to improve carrier effectiveness through the study of tactics and force interactions.
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June 1, 1974
This report on Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) represents a compromise between two major aims, to produce a unified summary of the events and problems of the antisubmarine war on the one hand, and to illustrate the scientific evaluation of naval operations on the other. The approach is fundamentally historical on both accounts.
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June 1, 1974
This study presents an analysis of the effectiveness of binoculars as an aid to visual search for submarines. The analysis is based on a comparison of sweep widths with the naked eye and sweep width using 7 times 50 binoculars. If meteorological visibility is less than 20 miles, the use of binoculars offers no theoretical advantage over naked eye search. Although binoculars do not increase the visual search effectiveness, they should be available and used for the identification of targets initially detected by the naked eye.
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April 1, 1954
Examination of the War Diary of the German Communication Submarines (ComSubs) has made it possible to estimate the character and extent of intelligence obtained by the decryption of Allied radio messages pertaining to convoy operations in the North Atlantic during World War II, and to determine the effect of such intelligence on the capability of the U-Boats to contact convoys and sink ships. It is estimated that the availability of timely usable decryption intelligence increased the contact rate twofold over that which they would have obtained without it; probably over 60 sinkings in excess of the expected number if they had been deprived of decryption intelligence. These calculations help in estimating a valid measure of effectiveness of current and future submarines in anti-convoy operations when decryption intelligence is not available.
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