Research for Strategic Defense Initiative

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A Potential Soviet Compromise on Ballistic Missile Defense
November 1, 1989
The body of this research memorandum was written before the Baker-Shevardnadze meeting in Wyoming. It presented evidence suggesting that the Soviet Union might agree to a compromise at the Wyoming meeting that defers the issue of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) negotiations to a later stage in arms reductions, thus facilitating a first-stage cut in offensive arms without an explicit Soviet endorsement of the Strategic Defense Initiative. In this approach, Wyoming, then, was expected to be only a first move in the Soviet negotiating strategy for a grand compromise on strategic defense. As explained in the afterword added to this paper, the actual events at Wyoming seem consistent with this interpretation.
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The Soviet Military on SDI
August 1, 1987
Since March 1983 when President Reagan unveiled his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the Soviet political military rhetoric has been overwhelmingly negative. This paper analyzes the three major Soviet arguments against SDI: (1) that it is offensive; (2) that it is a catalyst to the arms race; and (3) that it is destabilizing.
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The Soviet Leadership On Nuclear War
April 1, 1987
Throughout the last decade, the Soviet politico-military leadership has provided startling evidence of a new Soviet doctrine on nuclear war. Leading Soviet military thinkers have themselves traced the origin of this phenomenon to evolving technological developments in both nuclear and conventional arms. This paper reviews the Soviet politico-military writing since 1977 in order to document these changes, which have grown more and more explicit since General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev's 1977 address at Tula.
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Strategic Defense, Deterrence, and Arms Control
August 1, 1986
The development of nuclear weapons created a watershed in the history of military strategy. Heretofore, the ability to deter war had depended on the ability to defend oneself against attack and to defeat an aggressor. As nuclear weapons became increasingly powerful, and their means of delivery more unstopable, this relationship was shattered. This paper explores the development of nuclear deterrence from both the U.S. and Soviet perspectives, and discusses the effect of strategic defense on arms control.
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Implications of the Strategic Defense Initiative for ABM Treaty
February 1, 1986
The Reagan Administration has made a marked departure from recent American administrations in its emphasis on strategic defense. This article examines the effect of this new direction in U.S. defense policy on strategic arms control. It focuses particularly on questions raised for the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
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