Research for Soviet

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November 1, 1986
A review of Marshal N.V. Ogarkov's writings from 1977-85 reveals that the former Chief of the Soviet General Staff has consistently augured that phenomenon which General William Odom recently dubbed the 'third revolution' in Soviet military affairs. Far from signally the slightest attenuation of his public views, Ogarkov's 1985 book indicates that he has in fact intensified his drive to galvanize awareness of the altered military utility of nuclear weapons, the qualitatively new combat characteristics of conventional means, and the need to adapt the forms and methods of combat action accordingly. His latest 'operation in a TVD' may indeed reflect a 'revolutionized' Soviet military science, and his own activities since September 1984--its formal debut.
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November 1, 1986
Reviews Marshal N.V. Ogarkov's writings from 1977 to 1985 which reveal that Ogarkov has long been the prophet of what General William Odom has dubbed the 'third revolution' in Soviet military affairs. Ogarkov's recurrent message encapsulates the changes in Soviet doctrine and capabilities that constitute the new revolution: the diminishing military utility of nuclear weapons and new combat characteristics of conventional means require that the forms and methods of combat action be adapted accordingly. Like Ogarkov, most prominent Soviet military figures have concluded that nonnuclear weapons outfitted with emerging technologies will furnish conventional solutions to nuclear problems in a future war. But Ogarkov's 1985 theater operation may well be the first official acknowledgement of the new, all-conventional dimension in Soviet strategy for a war on the European continent.
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October 1, 1986
This reader supplements other CNA papers about the future directions in the Western Alliance, by presenting the Soviet perspective on developments in Britain. Particular attention is given to recent Soviet writings on the United Kingdom, especially: its security aspirations, policies and debates, its roles in international affairs and arms control; its military forces; and its domestic politics.
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September 1, 1986
A plausible Soviet approach to the problem of securing control of the Arctic Ocean Theater of Military Operations (TVD) during a war fought entirely with conventional weapons is laid out in this research memorandum. The focus is primarily on the strategic aspects of the problem. Those aspects of the Soviet solution which may appear unorthodox, but which effectively compensate for some of the Soviet Navy's main weaknesses are highlighted.
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September 1, 1986
In January 1977, General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev delivered an address in the city of Tula whose impact on Soviet doctrine and capabilities continues to this day. By rejecting the possibility of a means of defense against nuclear weapons, or a damage-limiting capacity in nuclear war, Brezhnev closed the door on a debate that had lasted over a decade in Soviet military thought. Since Tula, the Soviet politico-military leadership has presented a consensus on the reality of 'Mutual Assured Destruction' in present-day conditions. The Soviet debate on the viability of nuclear war as an instrument of policy was likewise resolved by a consensus: nuclear war is so unpromising and dangerous that it remains an instrument of policy only in theory, an instrument of policy that cannot be used. While the Soviet consensus on the diminishing military utility of nuclear weapons represents a ground-breaking shift in doctrine since the heyday of Marshal Solokovskiy, there is scant evidence of any dispute on the new correlation of war and policy in a nuclear age. Marshal N.V. Ogarkov and other hard-minded military figures have themselves emerged as the architects of the Soviet shift away from a nuclear war-fighting and war-winning strategy, while General Secretary Gorbachev has fashioned a corresponding arms control agenda.
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August 1, 1986
The development of nuclear weapons created a watershed in the history of military strategy. Heretofore, the ability to deter war had depended on the ability to defend oneself against attack and to defeat an aggressor. As nuclear weapons became increasingly powerful, and their means of delivery more unstopable, this relationship was shattered. This paper explores the development of nuclear deterrence from both the U.S. and Soviet perspectives, and discusses the effect of strategic defense on arms control.
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April 1, 1986
While much attention is paid in the United States to Soviet perspectives on U.S. security policy, less is known about contemporary Soviet thinking about European security issues. This memorandum is a collection of original translations of the more authoritative Soviet journals, newspapers and monographs. The selections provide an overview of how the Soviets have analyzed European security issues, with special emphasis on the French role in European security.
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February 1, 1986
The Reagan Administration has made a marked departure from recent American administrations in its emphasis on strategic defense. This article examines the effect of this new direction in U.S. defense policy on strategic arms control. It focuses particularly on questions raised for the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
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November 1, 1985
The evolution of the mission and capabilities of Soviet aviation assigned to maritime roles from the days of the Tsarist Navy to the present is reviewed. The author addresses the mission priorities revealed in the Soviet literature, the hardward developed in response to those priorities, and the trends that can be identified from the literature and these developments.
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May 1, 1985
The 'bible' of Soviet strategic thinking in the 1960s was the work edited by Marshal V.D. Sokolovskiy. Although the question of the work's obsolescence was raised in the 1970s, it was with the appearance of a recent book by Deputy Chief of the General Staff Gareev that the issue could be definitively settled. According to Gareev, Sokolovskiy is now out of date with respect to the specific features of modern war, and it is necessary to restore all the old strategic principles and categories that had been rejected or revised by Sokolovskiy.
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