Research for Soviet

In 1991, separatist forces seeking independence have become active across the USSR. In one of the most important regions, the Soviet Far East, such a trend is visible, although it has received scant attention compared to movements in the Baltic states, Moldavia, and other areas. The struggle for change in the Soviet Far East pits the conservative forces, consisting of mid-level Communist Party personnel, senior military, and some members of the defense industrial and intelligence community, against virtually everyone else. The encroachments that this powerful coalition hopes to block include opening Vladivostok, the creation of free economic zones with the participation of foreigners, the conversion of the defense industry, and the emergence of non-communist political figures and ideas (including a plan to create an independent Far Eastern Republic). This research memorandum examines recent trends in the region -- political, military, and economic -- and looks ahead to possible outcomes. AD-A238033

In an effort to address the most compelling issues surrounding the Soviet Navy in the era of Perestroika, ONI and CNA brought together more than 35 specialists on the Soviet Union from both inside and outside the government. Their views are recorded in this report and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CNA or the United States Navy.

National security decision-making in the Soviet Union has changed radically under Gorbachev. A key aspect of this change is the emergence of the institutchiki, or civilian academicians from the Soviet Academy of Sciences, as influential experts on defense issues. Previously these civilians had scant impact on the defense decision-making process, which was dominated by the General Staff and professional military cadre. Three developments point in this direction: the increased representation of the civilian experts in state and Party institutions dealing with foreign and security policy; the special role these civilians seem to be playing in developing and promoting Gorbachev's 'new thinking' in foreign and security policy; and, recent decisions that mark a sharp departure from earlier policies and reflect proposals originating with or developed by the institutchiki. This paper documents these trends, chiefly on the basis of articles that have appeared in the Soviet press. It also describes the resistance of the military to some of the new thinking and resultant proposals. The main actors in this unfolding drama include the top military leaders, principally the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, and the most visible of the institutchiki: those employed by the Institute of the USA and Canada (IUSAC) and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO).

The Soviet Union might choose to operate a small number of nuclear-powered attack submarines in U.S. coastal waters during a war with the United States. The effects of such operations on U.S. public opinion could require the U.S. Navy to redeploy Navy assets away from forward operations to augment coastal defenses. During past conflicts, American military forces have, in fact, been diverted from other missions precisely to counter perceived threats to the Continental United States (CONUS). In some instances, the diversion was driven less by a public outcry for reassuring defensive measures. This paper examines the U.S. experience with threats to CONUS or coastal waters during four wars (the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II). It attempts to place real, present concerns about the public's possible future reaction to Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarine operations off the U.S. coasts within a broader historical context.