Research for Southeast Asia

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CNA Maritime Asia Project: Workshop Two: Naval Developments in Asia
August 31, 2012

On August 9, 2012, CNA hosted a workshop examining trends in Naval developments in Asia. As the PLA Navy demonstrates genuine competence and professionalism on distant sea operations, despite being oriented to peacetime missions, this is, ironically, raising concerns among littoral states of the Indo-Pacific over the security implications of a PLA navy that is becoming more expeditionary. Clearly the introduction of modern amphibious ships, and, shortly, an aircraft carrier force, provides the PLAN with a credible power-projection capability. This emerging capability is, in turn, creating a demand by littoral states for area-denial capabilities such as submarines and land-based aircraft with anti-ship cruise missiles. This workshop explored this interaction.

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Regional Naval Developments and Deployments—A Perspective from the United States
May 1, 2010

The commentary "Regional Naval Developments and Deployments—A Perspective from the United States" by RADM Michael McDevitt (Ret.) vice president and director of CNA Strategic Studies published in the book Southeast Asia and the Rise of Chinese and Indian Naval Power (Routledge 2010)

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Islam in Indonesia's Political Future
September 1, 2002
Indonesia, the largest Muslim-majority country in the world, has experienced an unprecedented Islamic resurgence since the 1980s, as more Indonesians displayed their piety publicly and became more religiously observant. The predominant disposition among Muslims remained moderate and tolerant, committed to a pluralist government and to democracy. Beginning in the 1990s, however, former President Soeharto courted extremist Muslim groups to protect his power base. After his fall in 1998, hardline Islamists, including paramilitary militias, gained a level of influence far greater than their numbers would warrant, and today represent a serious challenge to the stability of Indonesia and to U.S. interests. They are not likely to gain power through elections, but will be able to influence some government policies and actions. Among the extremists, a relatively small number of Muslims, many of Yemeni ancestry, are prime candidates for al Qaeda links. U.S. assistance in critical areas, including media skills and outreach, to the two mainstream Islamic mass organizations can help the moderate mainstream regain its voice and influence
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Indonesia's Political Evolution Over the Next 5-10 Years
September 1, 2002
Abstract:D6866 Although the initial burst of reformist energy that followed Soeharto's fall in 1998 has largely dissipated, the long-term prognosis for Indonesia remains basically positive. Expectations for democratic reform should be kept modest for the foreseeable future. President Megawati Sukarnoputri's opponents in the 2004 elections do not have strong political bases, and she appears likely to win re-election, but will probably govern with a shaky coalition. Political and government institutions, the judicial system, the police, and political parties are weak, and will gain strength only slowly. Parliament is unable to deal with more than a fraction of the legislation before it. The armed forces are not likely to take over, but will exercise considerable influence despite their formal removal from politics. Islamic-agenda political parties are divided: they may win up to 20% of the vote, but are not likely to coalesce around a single leader. The resilience of the Indonesian people is likely to prevent popular anger at government's failings from exploding.
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The Future of Indonesia as a Unitary State: Separatism and Decentralization
September 1, 2002
Indonesia's ability to deal with separatist pressures in Aceh and Papua is limited by weaknesses of leadership, vision, and institutional development. Even so, Indonesia is not likely to disintegrate. Policy toward separatist movements lacks coherence and consistency. Neither the insurgents nor the government appear able to achieve their goals through military action. Stalemate could lead to a quagmire for government troops, particularly in Aceh. Both the independence movement and the armed forces in that province have been responsible for a level of violence that compares with the worst periods in the 1990s. The government under President Megawati appears to be heading toward a renewed effort at a military solution, although talks with the insurgents continue. The separatist movement in Papua is weaker and poorly armed. Papuan leaders have united in a "Presidium" with which the government could negotiate, although the murder of a Papuan leader in November 2001-reportedly by army elements-has undercut the political track. Effective implementations of special autonomy laws for both regions could, over time, result in willing continuation of these territories as parts of Indonesia. The United States has only a limited ability to foster solutions in Aceh and Papua.
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