Research for Shore

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January 1, 2009
The overall goal of this study is to determine if there are areas in the Navy’s shore manpower that have seen increases relative to the overall decrease in Navy shore manpower, and to develop an understanding of those relative increases. From 1993 to a 2012 projection, the Navy’s shore manpower (military and civilian combined) has decreased by 37.5 percent. There are categories of shore manpower that have increased relative to this 37.5 percent drop. In some cases these increases can be justified by increases in the workload drivers for the category of shore manpower; in other cases they cannot.
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January 1, 2008
The large size and cost of the Navy’s shore establishment make it imperative that the Navy have an effective and efficient shore man¬power requirements determination process (SMRDP). Such an SMRDP implies having both the right number and right mix of shore personnel. N12 asked CNA to develop recommendations for how to make the Navy’s SMRDP more effective and efficient. The Navy’s current SMRDP has several serious problems, including poor management oversight and lack of accountability, little to no standardization between (and possibly within) Budget Submitting Offices (BSOs), unqualified staff with major roles in SMRDP, overstaffing and staffing with incorrect personnel, and failure to give good incentives to BSOs. In this study, CNA developed several recommendations, including: building a set of SMRDP guidelines for all BSOs to follow, not applying the sea requirements process to shore require¬ments, making all “Rotation” and “Career Progression” billets subject to cost analysis and review, taking a harder look at all billets ineligible for competition by tra¬dition or DoD decision, aligning incentives of BSOs and Navy for use of military manpower, using activity-based costing or similar methodology to calculate actual (not estimated) cost of activities, and increasing training for staff involved in shore manpower requirements determination.
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November 1, 2007
The Aegis Fire Controlman FC(A) community is currently undermanned at sea. This is largely because the Navy accessed Sailors to fill total FC(A) billets, which were too few due to a shortage of FC(A) shore billets. The Navy wants to have enough shore billets to accommodate projected sea-shore rotation needs. However, the Navy is concerned that adding non-FC related shore billets will decrease readiness and retention. In this study, CNA studied the effects of shore billets on retention and promotion of FC(A) sailors. We found that those who served in CONUS non-instructor, non-high-skill billets had relatively poor retention to 123 months and promotion to E-6 by 109 months. Instructors and recruiters tended to have higher promotion and retention rates, while those in non-instructor high-skill billets did not show significantly higher promotion and retention rates than those in CONUS non-instructor, non-high-skill billets. From these results, we recommend that the Navy remilitarize instructor billets when possible and continue to aggressively pursue sea duty incentives like Sea Duty Incentive Pay (SDIP). The Navy should also allow willing FC(A) Sailors to serve in recruiter, OCONUS, or non-FC instructor billets.
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