Research for Sea-Shore Rotation

Syndicate content
January 1, 1999
The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower, and Personnel asked CNA to analyze ways to transform the size and shape of the enlisted force to better meet the Navy's future requirements at an affordable cost. In this research, we analyze how the Sea Tour Extension Program (STEP) could improve sea/shore balance in the Navy. We discuss who would be eligible and how many sailors would likely extend their sea tours in response to STEP. We also examine how much STEP would improve sea manning, the cost of the program, and how large of a bonus would be effective. We found that a STEP bonus of about $250 per month would eliminate manning differential in the undermanned ratings and improve sea/shore rotation in ratings targeted solely for sea/shore ratio reasons. Such a STEP would have a program cost of about $23 million.
Read More | Download Report
June 1, 1998
This study examines potential manpower costs of outsourcing Navy jobs that result from more Sailors having to work out-of-skill. To examine these costs, we estimated the effects on retention and advancement of working in billets related to one's skill and in instructor billets. Focusing on E5 and E6 billets, we then compare the quantifiable costs of outsourcing military billets to the expected savings. Currently, 49.6 percent of E5 and E6 Sailors are assigned to rating-specific NECs on their shore tours. The analysis finds that if more than 49.6 percent of the outsourced billets are rating-specific, there would be fewer opportunities to work in-skill and lower retention, which would lead to costs to offset. We recommend that, when determining what billets to compete, the Navy start with general skill billets and other out-of-skill billets. Furthermore, if the Navy were to compete in-skill billets, we recommend that it compete low-training billets before high-training and instructor billets.
Read More | Download Report
June 1, 1998
The purpose of this study is to help the Navy identify the costs imposed on the Navy manpower system when military billets are outsourced. In particular, this paper examines how competition will affect the Navy's ability to achieve its objectives with respect to sea-shore rotation and homebasing. It provides, by community, estimates of how different outsourcing options would affect these military manpower decisions. The paper concludes that personnel policy constraints, especially the goal of providing an adequate base of shore billets for rotation, place significant limits on the number of military billets entered into A-76 competitions. Given the magnitude of manpower constraints, the Navy has two policy options: reduce the number of military billets to be competed or loosen the number of constraints. Loosening the constraints would involve: more carefully defining sea/shore ratios, allowing some A-76 competitions with high expected savings to be completed even if exceptions must be made to personnel policy goals, examining overseas shore billets that count as sea duty as good outsourcing candidates, and reexamining some of the IBR exclusions, especially for shore-intensive ratings. DTIC AD-B239314
Read More | Download Report
April 1, 1998
The Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel asked CNA to analyze ways to transform the size and shape of the enlisted force to better meet the Navy's future requirements at an affordable cost. This research analyzes alternatives to the existing sea pay structure that generate voluntary extensions of sea duty, reduce crew turnover, and improve retention. The briefing discusses three options: an accelerated phase-in of sea pay table, an expanded sea pay premium, and a mixture of phase-in and sea pay premium. It compares them with maintaining the existing structure of the sea pay table and simply scaling it up by the rate of inflation and also assesses their effectiveness in reducing enlisted crew turnover and increasing sea duty and retention among the enlisted sailors. An accelerated phase-in option, which generates more first-term retention and helps with sea/shore balance, is recommended.
Read More | Download Report
December 1, 1995
How does a change in the manning of ships and squadrons at sea affect the Navy's shore-based manning? This question, while hardly new, has arisen recently in several different contexts. One involves cost-effectivness analyses of arsenal ships - which require relatively small crews - as alternatives to traditional surface combatants. The purpose of this paper is to provide a set of empirical estimates of the response of ashore manning to changes in manning of ships and squadrons - hereafter called afloat manning - based on the most recent time-series information available. Over the past six or seven years, the drawdowns in budgets, force structure, and manning have been substantial. Inclusion of that experience in the database from which cost-estimating relationships are developed is essential to the validity of the relationships for use in assessing the cost consequences of decisions presently or soon to be at hand. The analytical construct adopted here is a model that posits delayed adjustment of shore manning to changes in afloat manning.
Read More | Download Report
May 1, 1994
N1's Sponsor Program Proposal of 12 April 1994 recommended paying sailors to stay in sea duty beyond five years. In this briefing, we analyze that proposal as well as a modified proposal that we present as an alternative. Our modified proposal offers two fine-tuning changes to what we believe is a good and workable original proposal by N1. We think of these proposal as experiments because until such a program is instituted, we have no estimates of how many sailors would extend their sea duty in exchange for a bonus. Thus, the early stages of any such program would be experimental in nature.
Read More | Download Report
March 1, 1994
CNA has studied the relationship between various dimensions of time at sea and retention over many years. In general, we have found that more time at sea produces lower retention, but the magnitude of the effects is more modest than many Navy officers expected. We have also found that higher pay (military relative to civilian) increases retention. Given the relative magnitudes of the sea duty and pay effects, we have concluded that modest increases in pay could be cost effective in offsetting the negative effects of increased sea duty. As the Navy has considered the implications of our past studies and has wrestled with difficult downsizing choices, three questions remained about the applicability of the results of our previous studies for Navy planning: (1) Does quality of life during turnarounds affect retention? (2) What is the cost to maintain retention if time at sea is increased? and (3) Are Navy Retention/Separation Surveys consistent with previous CNA analyses? This briefing addresses these questions. We start by summarizing our answers to the three questions. Explanations of how we reached the conclusions follow.
Read More | Download Report
June 1, 1993
As the Navy shrinks, it is likely that the ratio of sea duty to shore duty will rise and advancement opportunities will fall for enlisted personnel. This research memorandum investigates the relationships of sea duty, advancement, and reenlistment at the end of the first term. We explore these relationships with a variety of statistical models while controlling for economic variables, personal characteristics, fiscal year, and rating group. With regard to sea duty, we support the evidence found in other studies: sea duty has a negative but small effect on retention for first-term sailors. For advancement, we are unable to separate an advancement effect independent of such variables as pay and ability. We do not conclude that advancement does not effect retention -- rather that pay and ability, which are closely linked to advancement, capture the main impact of advancement on retention.
Read More | Download Report
September 1, 1988
This research memorandum examines one of the major constraints on skill utilization for Navy enlisted personnel: the requirements for sea/shore rotation. It presents a simple model of the relationship between the rotation policy for a skill community and the utilization rate for that skill. The model can be used to calculate the number of people needed to keep requirements filled while maintaining the prescribed rotation patterns. The model is applied both to ratings and to Navy Enlisted Classification codes (NECs).
Read More | Download Report
October 1, 1983
Examines the impact of changing social, economic, and demographic factors on the manpower market, evaluates the cost effectiveness of compensation policies for meeting requirements; suggests ways to measure personnel productivity; and develops policy options for balancing enlisted manpower requirements and resources.
Read More | Download Report