Research for Russian

Despite current political and socio-economic uncertainties, the Russian leaders continue to develop new concepts regarding the role and capabilities of the future Russian Navy. This study examines three likely parameters of future Russian naval development: current implementation of the 'reasonable sufficiency' concept, the Russian image of future war, and Russia's new military doctrine. On both the nuclear and conventional levels, the application of 'reasonable sufficiency' to future naval development continues to generate a significant degree of civil-military divergence. On the other hand, a strong civil-military consensus underlies Russian views on the role of naval forces in future war. Like their Soviet predecessors, Russian military and civilian experts view Operation Desert Storm as the paradigm of future war in strategy, operational art, and tactics. Finally, Russia's new military doctrine and surrounding discussions provide evidence regarding Russia's 'vital' national interests, threats to these interests, and the role of the Russian Navy in Russian national security policy.

This research memorandum is one in a series of papers stemming from CNA's Future Russian Navy project, which was requested by the Director of Naval Intelligence. In this paper, we examine the evolving maritime interests of the former Soviet Union and those of Russia, its principal heir. Until the 1960s, the Soviet Union acted as a coastal state, protecting its own territorial waters. It then built up its forces and emerged as a significant global maritime power in the late 1960s. Now Russia is returning to a coastal focus. We look at the reasons for this latest shift in focus -- namely, problems in Russia's oil and fishing industries -- and the way in which the Russian Navy's missions will likely change to reflect the nation's new economic imperatives.

In this research memorandum, we present the findings of one portion of CNA's Future Russian Navy project, which was requested by the Director of Naval Intelligence. We examine what Russians commonly call 'the human factor' in naval affairs, or the set of issues concerned with attracting and retaining personnel and creating conditions that enable and encourage them to perform their missions. We look at three aspects of the human factor in turn: personnel procurement policy, day-to-day military economics, and the navy's relationship with society and local civilian officials. We discuss how the former Soviet Union traditionally approached each challenge and why the old approaches are failing today. We also describe the way the navy is functioning today, living with the residue of the old system, and adapting to cope with the changed environment. We conclude with an assessment of possible remedies to the Navy's human factor problem, and a discussion of current and prospective trends.

This research memorandum is one element of a comprehensive examination by CNA of the evolving Russian Navy for the Office of Naval Intelligence. It examines the likely paths of Russian foreign policy as the country moves into the 21st century and suggests that Russia's ability to conduct foreign policy in the future will be limited by the extent to which the nation advances in its ongoing economic and political reforms. The more successful the reforms, the greater will be Russia's capacity for an influential and vigorous foreign policy. In contrast to the communist period, the size and prominence of Russia's military will be inversely related to the scope of its foreign policy, i.e., the more activist Russia's foreign policy is, the more subordinate the military component will be in relation to other foreign policy resources. Thus, a militarized foreign policy will signal a failed domestic reform process and a weakened Russian state.