Research for retention

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February 1, 2012

An assessment of the costs and benefits that would result if the Navy were it to substitute lump-sum Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (LSSRBs) for its current program of anniversary payment SRBs (APSRBs). The principal argument in favor of this policy change is to capitalize on sailors’ preferences for receiving payment in the here and now: in front-loading payments, the Navy could offer smaller SRBs without reducing the value that Service member’s place on these bonuses. The principal argument against paying out lump-sum SRBs is that the prospect of receiving anniversary payments acts as an incentive for sailors to remain in the Navy during their term of reenlistment, and eliminating these would increase losses from the Service. Our analysis suggests that adopting LSSRBs would likely result in significant savings over the long term, even accounting for the possibility of increased losses (these savings would be especially great for smaller SRBs that are offered for shorter reenlistments). We also find that the policy change could have substantial non-monetary costs and benefits: adopting LSSRBs would result in the SRB program being easier to manage when the economy is contracting, but more difficult to manage when the economy is expanding.

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October 1, 2008
The Global War on Terror has become the Long War, and the increase in operational tempo that enlisted Marines and Marine officers have experienced since 9/11 is expected to continue. Although the Corps exceeded its aggressive FY07 endstrength goal, we continue to monitor the relationship between deployment tempo and retention. We analyze how deployment tempo, measured by deployed days and number of deployments, influences reenlistment and retention. We look at the reenlistment decisions of enlisted Marines between FY04 and FY07 and the retention decisions of Marine officers between December 2006 and December 2007. We find that additional deployments to the Iraq/Afghanistan country groups decreased first-term reenlistments during the FY04-FY07 period. Focusing just on FY07, we find that additional deployments to the Iraq/Afghanistan country groups are predicted to increase reenlistment for Marines with dependents and decrease reenlistments for Marines without dependents. For FY04-FY07 and just FY07, we find that an additional 100 days deployed in non-crisis areas has no statistically significant effect on reenlistments for first-term Marines with dependents but decreases reenlistments for Marines without dependents. Among career Marines and Marine officers, we find that additional deployed days have either no effect or a small positive effect on retention.
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December 1, 2007
As the U.S. and coalition forces prosecute the Global War on Terrorism and support other contingency operations around the world, the demand for Navy manpower to augment deployed forces from all Services has increased dramatically. These manpower augmentation requirements represent unfunded, unplanned, but necessary allotments of Navy personnel to augment existing units and organizations so that Navy and Combatant Commanders can effectively perform their assigned missions. Active duty Servicemembers who are pulled from their current commands and sent on TAD orders to fill these requirements are known as Individual Augmentees (IAs). With this increased demand has come concern about the Navy’s ability to continue to effectively provide manpower to support these requests. To help the Navy address these concerns, CNA examined two issues. The first was whether Servicemembers with particular characteristics were more likely to be selected for IA assignments. Some characteristics, such as paygrade and occupation, may be explicit requirements of the IA request, while others, such as race/ethnicity and marital status, are not. The second issue was whether IA assignments have affected the career progression of active duty Servicemembers. Of particular interest are the effects on retention, promotion, and sea/shore rotation for active duty enlisted Sailors and officers.
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November 1, 2007
The Aegis Fire Controlman FC(A) community is currently undermanned at sea. This is largely because the Navy accessed Sailors to fill total FC(A) billets, which were too few due to a shortage of FC(A) shore billets. The Navy wants to have enough shore billets to accommodate projected sea-shore rotation needs. However, the Navy is concerned that adding non-FC related shore billets will decrease readiness and retention. In this study, CNA studied the effects of shore billets on retention and promotion of FC(A) sailors. We found that those who served in CONUS non-instructor, non-high-skill billets had relatively poor retention to 123 months and promotion to E-6 by 109 months. Instructors and recruiters tended to have higher promotion and retention rates, while those in non-instructor high-skill billets did not show significantly higher promotion and retention rates than those in CONUS non-instructor, non-high-skill billets. From these results, we recommend that the Navy remilitarize instructor billets when possible and continue to aggressively pursue sea duty incentives like Sea Duty Incentive Pay (SDIP). The Navy should also allow willing FC(A) Sailors to serve in recruiter, OCONUS, or non-FC instructor billets.
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September 1, 2007

The Commandant of the Marine Corps wants to ensure that Marines reflect the racial and ethnic characteristics of society. This paper examines the accession, representation, success, and retention of black and Hispanic Marines in the Corps’ active component. We find that black Marines’ accession and representation shares have fallen and currently are below the relevant black shares of the U.S. population. In contrast, the accession and representation shares of Hispanic Marines have generally increased over time. We also assess the occupational distribution of black and Hispanic Marines and find that they are more likely to be concentrated in support occupations. Next, we examine retention and Quality of Life for black enlisted Marines. We find that their retention behavior indicates that they have found satisfying careers in the Corps. The Corps offers black Marines steady jobs with good economic security, and black male Marines are as likely to be married as their white counterparts. Finally, we determine the prevalence of leadership and promotion opportunities for black and Hispanic Marines. We find that black and Hispanic Marines constitute a larger share of the Corps’ top enlisted ranks than suggested by their accession shares and they have done very well in officer promotions.

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July 1, 2007
Since September 11th, 2001, the Marine Corps has involuntarily activated considerable numbers of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) to support Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This presidential mobilization of the Reserves represents the longest period of involutary activations since the formation of the All-Volunteer Force. In this paper, we examine how this increase in operational tempo has affected the composition of and retention in the SMCR. We take two approaches in our analysis. First, we use descriptive statistics to understand changes in the SMCR between September 2001 and September 2006. Second, we use survival analysis to determine the effect of activation on a reservist’s decision to stay affiliated with the SMCR.
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July 1, 2007
If selection and classification policies do not provide a solution, where else should the Navy turn? Interviews of SWOs conducted by the Naval Postgraduate School have suggested that cultural factors and the difficulty to maintain a life-work balance are critical motivators of female SWO retention. The Navy has proposed pilot programs, such as sabbaticals and other off-on ramps, to ease the difficulty of maintaining a life-work balance. However, such proposals need broader approval from the Department of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget.
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January 1, 2007
The Navy would like to control its reenlistments using a timely and responsive process that allows it to meet endstrength, encourage qualified Sailors to lateral into undermanned skills and retain the highest quality Sailors. In March 2003, the Navy implemented its Perform-To-Serve (PTS) program as one step toward achieving this goal. PTS is a centrally controlled, application-driven reenlistment system for Zone A Sailors. In this study, done at the request of Director, Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (N13), we analyze how the PTS program contributes to the Navy’s overall system of reenlistment policies and processes.
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January 1, 2007
The Navy is intent on maintaining and improving retention of its most qualified Sailors. As part of this effort, the Director, Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (N13) requested an analytical review of the reenlistment program. The objective of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of the current program and to identify changes that would result in a more responsive and cost-effective system. We begin our evaluation by specifying goals and criteria that a good reenlistment system should meet. We then analyze the extent to which current reenlistment policies and processes meet these goals. Finally, where deficits are found we recommend policy changes that may improve the reenlistment system.
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November 1, 2006

The Navy has two pays designed to help attract and retain aviation officers: Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) and Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP). In principle, these tools provide the Navy with the capability to offer compensation to aviators in order to meet its requirements. This study examines the empirical relationship between financial incentives and retention of aviation officers, as well as the relationship between civilian labor market conditions and aviator retention. Our analysis suggests that increases in relative military pay do lead to increases in pilot retention. Responsiveness to compensation is highest for propeller pilots and lowest for helicopter pilots. In contrast, we do not find any statistical evidence of a relationship between pay and Naval Flight Officer retention. We suspect that this is due to the lack of variation in retention over the time period on which we focus, rather than to the absence of a behavioral response. We also observe a negative relationship between civilian labor market conditions and pilot retention. In principle, increases in ACCP can offset the deleterious effect of a healthy civilian airline industry on pilot retention. For Naval Flight Officers, we do not find any statistical evidence of this relationship.

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