An assessment of the costs and benefits that would result if the Navy were it to substitute lump-sum Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (LSSRBs) for its current program of anniversary payment SRBs (APSRBs). The principal argument in favor of this policy change is to capitalize on sailors’ preferences for receiving payment in the here and now: in front-loading payments, the Navy could offer smaller SRBs without reducing the value that Service member’s place on these bonuses. The principal argument against paying out lump-sum SRBs is that the prospect of receiving anniversary payments acts as an incentive for sailors to remain in the Navy during their term of reenlistment, and eliminating these would increase losses from the Service. Our analysis suggests that adopting LSSRBs would likely result in significant savings over the long term, even accounting for the possibility of increased losses (these savings would be especially great for smaller SRBs that are offered for shorter reenlistments). We also find that the policy change could have substantial non-monetary costs and benefits: adopting LSSRBs would result in the SRB program being easier to manage when the economy is contracting, but more difficult to manage when the economy is expanding.
The Commandant of the Marine Corps wants to ensure that Marines reflect the racial and ethnic characteristics of society. This paper examines the accession, representation, success, and retention of black and Hispanic Marines in the Corps’ active component. We find that black Marines’ accession and representation shares have fallen and currently are below the relevant black shares of the U.S. population. In contrast, the accession and representation shares of Hispanic Marines have generally increased over time. We also assess the occupational distribution of black and Hispanic Marines and find that they are more likely to be concentrated in support occupations. Next, we examine retention and Quality of Life for black enlisted Marines. We find that their retention behavior indicates that they have found satisfying careers in the Corps. The Corps offers black Marines steady jobs with good economic security, and black male Marines are as likely to be married as their white counterparts. Finally, we determine the prevalence of leadership and promotion opportunities for black and Hispanic Marines. We find that black and Hispanic Marines constitute a larger share of the Corps’ top enlisted ranks than suggested by their accession shares and they have done very well in officer promotions.
The Navy has two pays designed to help attract and retain aviation officers: Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) and Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP). In principle, these tools provide the Navy with the capability to offer compensation to aviators in order to meet its requirements. This study examines the empirical relationship between financial incentives and retention of aviation officers, as well as the relationship between civilian labor market conditions and aviator retention. Our analysis suggests that increases in relative military pay do lead to increases in pilot retention. Responsiveness to compensation is highest for propeller pilots and lowest for helicopter pilots. In contrast, we do not find any statistical evidence of a relationship between pay and Naval Flight Officer retention. We suspect that this is due to the lack of variation in retention over the time period on which we focus, rather than to the absence of a behavioral response. We also observe a negative relationship between civilian labor market conditions and pilot retention. In principle, increases in ACCP can offset the deleterious effect of a healthy civilian airline industry on pilot retention. For Naval Flight Officers, we do not find any statistical evidence of this relationship.