Research for Reserves
July 1, 2007
Since September 11th, 2001, the Marine Corps has involuntarily activated considerable numbers of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) to support Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This presidential mobilization of the Reserves represents the longest period of involutary activations since the formation of the All-Volunteer Force. In this paper, we examine how this increase in operational tempo has affected the composition of and retention in the SMCR. We take two approaches in our analysis. First, we use descriptive statistics to understand changes in the SMCR between September 2001 and September 2006. Second, we use survival analysis to determine the effect of activation on a reservist’s decision to stay affiliated with the SMCR.
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May 1, 2006
In 2005, the Navy implemented changes to the Selected Reserve incentive program. The likely retention effects of these changes are not known, so we estimate the retention effect of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses to help the Navy determine the most efficient allocation of Selected Reserve Bonuses. In a companion document, CRM D0013385, we provide a discussion of how those parameters were estimated, our main findings, and the policy implications of our findings. In this memorandum, we list the full regression results.
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April 1, 2006
In 2005, the Navy implemented changes to the Selected Reserve incentive program. The likely retention effects of these changes are not known, so we estimate the retention effect of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses to help the Navy determine the most efficient allocation of Selected Reserve Bonuses. Reenlistment bonus eligibility increases reenlistment rates and the share of Sailors who decide to obligate for at least a 6-year reenlistment contract. Thus, reenlistment bonus eligibility can be used to target personnel to reenlist and obligate for longer contracts. Receiving a reenlistment bonus does not significantly influence the decision to stay in the Selected Reserves; however, continuation rates among bonus recipients and nonrecipients are relatively high. Consequently, if the Navy is considering lump sum payments, we recommend it first be piloted to reenlistment bonuses. Targeted enlistment bonuses can be used to improve Selected Reserve continuation rates. For prior-service and non-prior-service enlistments, receiving a bonus increases the likelihood of completing the first 12 or 24 months of service. Further, the continuation rates of non-prior-service entrants who did not receive a bonus were similar to the rates of prior-service entrants, suggesting that an increase in the pool of non-prior-service accessions would not decrease overall manning levels.
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March 1, 2006
This study hopes to improve the Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP) and to help the Marine Corps Reserve (MCR) to better understand Selected Reserve (SelRes) attrition. First, we document the legislative authorities for the payment of SelRes unit bonuses and bonus offerings across the Guard/Reserve components. Next, we document findings from focus groups held with Marines in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The study also describes recommended changes to the current SRIP that could help improve its ability to recruit and retain Marines in SMCR units. Finally, we present our analysis of SelRes attrition and the effect of SRIP bonuses on retention.
March 1, 2006
The Department of Defense (DoD) is considering ways to increase voluntary participation in the Reserves. One such proposal, the Continuum of Service (CoS), recognizes that people differ in their willingness and ability to accept activation and deployment. DoD asked CNA researchers to examine potential changes to the compensation system that would support voluntary participation in a CoS. Researchers concluded that policy-makers can use compensation tools to effectively implement a CoS, but that across-the-board compensation changes would not encourage participation. They also found no evidence to support the idea that implementing a CoS, or increasing compensation to support a CoS, would significantly increase reserve retention. Researchers say a cost-effective CoS will rely on targeted compensation.
August 1, 2002
Abstract:D6584 The latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) tasked the Department of Defense to perform a Comprehensive Review of Active/Reserve Force Mix, organization, priority missions, and associated resources. To support the review, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (Reserve Affairs, Manpower and Personnel) asked CNA to identify and develop examples of concepts that could improve capabilities and/or alleviate high-demand/low-density constraints in the Navy and Marine Corps. The concepts could be ones that the Navy is already experimenting with-as long as they highlight the contributions that the Reserves can potentially make to overall capabilities. This report describes seven concepts for using reservists and reserve units to extend the capabilities of the Navy; one also applies to the Marine Corps. The seven concepts are (1) augmenting selected carrier flight deck and ordnance ratings, (2) augmenting carrier aviation intermediate maintenance within the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD), (3) using reservists to increase ship's time in areas of operations (AORs), (4) staffing ships during nondeployed periods, (5) having the reserve EA-6B squadron train with Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), (6) moving workload off ships, and (7) filling emerging skill niches. The report discusses each concept's feasibility and the need for further research.
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August 1, 2002
This white paper analyzes and draws conclusions about Department of Defense (DOD) support for homeland security (HLS) and homeland defense (HLD) in general, and maritime homeland defense (MHLD) specifically. It was requested by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD/RA) as part of that office’s comprehensive review of the reserve component (RC) as directed by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). OASD/RA’s original question was, “What is the appropriate mix of forces between the active component (AC) and the RC to accomplish the MHLD mission?” However, initial research quickly revealed that as yet there are no official definitions of HLS, HLD, or MHLD, no definitions of service MHLD roles and missions, and no official organizational structure in which to manage the HLS missions and forces. These issues are being considered in ongoing discussions about the establishment of U.S. Northern Command (NORCOM). Until official decisions are made, there is no way to determine the appropriate AC/RC force mix. Those limitations notwithstanding, this paper presents a general overview of the HLS and HLD missions, and provides a framework and a methodology for determining the appropriate AC/RC mix in the MHLD mission area when key decisions are reached.
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December 1, 1992
This research memorandum summarizes CNA's analysis of Marine Corps forces for the congressionally mandated Active and Reserve Force Structure and Mix Study. It discusses the historical use of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean and Persian Gulf Wars, legislation pertaining to Marine Corps force structure, the Marine Corps' implementation of Total Force Policy, development of alternative force structures, and preparation of reserve forces for war. It also discusses ten alternative force structures. The analysis of alternative force structures considers the capability to respond to future contingencies, peacetime forward-presence/rotation capability, reserve force sustainability, total number of personnel in active forces and the Selected Marine Corps Reserve, transition costs, and steady-state costs. See also 27 920161, 27 920168, 27 920180, and 27 920185.
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December 1, 1992
This research memorandum is the third in a set of five volumes addressing Marine Corps active and reserve force structure and mix. This volume develops an inclusive set of options that are analyzed in detail in volume IV. It also makes detailed estimates of the post-mobilization training time needed by reserve units. See also 27 920161, 27 920168, 27 920180, and 27 920182.
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December 1, 1992
This research memorandum is the fourth in a set of five volumes addressing the Marine Corps Active and Reserve Force Structure and Mix Study. This volume addresses the following aspects for each of the force mixes studied: capability to respond to future contingencies, capability to provide peacetime forward presence/rotation, reserve force sustainability, total number of personnel in active forces and the Selected Marine Corps Reserve, transition costs, and steady-state costs. The roles of the Individual Ready Reserve are also discussed. See also 27 920168, 27 920180, 27 920182, and 27 920185.
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