Research for Reenlistment
October 1, 2008
The Global War on Terror has become the Long War, and the increase in operational tempo that enlisted Marines and Marine officers have experienced since 9/11 is expected to continue. Although the Corps exceeded its aggressive FY07 endstrength goal, we continue to monitor the relationship between deployment tempo and retention. We analyze how deployment tempo, measured by deployed days and number of deployments, influences reenlistment and retention. We look at the reenlistment decisions of enlisted Marines between FY04 and FY07 and the retention decisions of Marine officers between December 2006 and December 2007. We find that additional deployments to the Iraq/Afghanistan country groups decreased first-term reenlistments during the FY04-FY07 period. Focusing just on FY07, we find that additional deployments to the Iraq/Afghanistan country groups are predicted to increase reenlistment for Marines with dependents and decrease reenlistments for Marines without dependents. For FY04-FY07 and just FY07, we find that an additional 100 days deployed in non-crisis areas has no statistically significant effect on reenlistments for first-term Marines with dependents but decreases reenlistments for Marines without dependents. Among career Marines and Marine officers, we find that additional deployed days have either no effect or a small positive effect on retention.
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January 1, 2007
The Navy would like to control its reenlistments using a timely and responsive process that allows it to meet endstrength, encourage qualified Sailors to lateral into undermanned skills and retain the highest quality Sailors. In March 2003, the Navy implemented its Perform-To-Serve (PTS) program as one step toward achieving this goal. PTS is a centrally controlled, application-driven reenlistment system for Zone A Sailors. In this study, done at the request of Director, Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (N13), we analyze how the PTS program contributes to the Navy’s overall system of reenlistment policies and processes.
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January 1, 2007
The Navy is intent on maintaining and improving retention of its most qualified Sailors. As part of this effort, the Director, Military Personnel Plans and Policy Division (N13) requested an analytical review of the reenlistment program. The objective of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of the current program and to identify changes that would result in a more responsive and cost-effective system. We begin our evaluation by specifying goals and criteria that a good reenlistment system should meet. We then analyze the extent to which current reenlistment policies and processes meet these goals. Finally, where deficits are found we recommend policy changes that may improve the reenlistment system.
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May 1, 2006
We examine the relationship between sea duty and first-term reenlistment decisions from FY95 through FY04. Once we control for other factors, we find that Sailors with 4 and 5-year initial obligations are more likely to reenlist if they are rotating to shore rather than rotating to sea over the entire time period examined. Recently, however, there has been a convergence between these reenlistment rate trends that is not explained by any factors in our model. From FY99 to FY03, Sailors with 6-year initial obligations going to sea duty had higher first-term reenlistment than those going to shore duty even controlling for other factors. For Sailors with 4, 5, or 6-year initial obligations we find that a marginal increase in the amount of time expected to be spent on sea duty in the second term does not have a large negative effect on reenlistment. Finally, we find that increasing deployment spells reduces retention, especially since FY00. While we find that marginal changes in sea duty or deployments will not have large negative retention effects, significant changes may. Thus, we discuss how different compensation tools could be used to address any negative retention effects related to sea duty.
March 1, 2006
Despite high deployment tempo in FY05, the Marine Corps successfully met its FY05 enlisted reenlistment goals and the retention rate for officers was even higher than predicted. But as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues, there is concern as to how increasing deployment time (DEPTEMPO) will affect Marines’ continuation in the Corps. This study statistically analyzes this issue.
July 1, 2004
In the pre-1986 period, long deployments were not necessarily associated with crises, whereas the extra-long deployments from the post-1986 period were typically associated with crises. Anecdotally, Sailors identified such deployments as important and worth the extra hardships. Because of this, we expect that high PERSTEMPO in the 1990s has not been associated with lower reenlistments. This paper investigates this hypothesis. We conclude, in the post-1986 period, deployment lengths have not been a driver of reenlistment rates. However, quick turnarounds (length of time between deployments) do have negative consequences on reenlistments. Non-deployed time underway and extended periods of ship maintenance also decrease reenlistments. The longer deployments are not likely to lower reenlistments unless the missions continue for so long that the morale-boosting effect of the mission fades. If the extra-long deployments begin to appear routine, long deployments may adversely affect reenlistment rates. We suggest that the Navy monitor Sailors’ quality of life and reenlistments carefully and be prepared to compensate them if retention does slip.
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Cost-Benefit Analysis of Lump Sum Bonuses for Zone A, Zone B, and Zone C Reenlistments: Final Report
May 1, 2004
The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program is the primary tool for shaping the career force. The first-term, or Zone A, SRB is key because it is the only point at which recommended and eligible Marines can be denied reenlistment in a skill area (PMOS) if their numbers would exceed requirements. In this paper, we find that SRB multiples have a large effect on reenlistment rates by occupation. Additionally, lump-sum SRBs have a larger effect on reenlistment rates than those paid in timed installments. We estimate a model that includes factors influencing the reenlistment decision separately for Zones A, B, and C. Results suggest that SRBs significantly raise reenlistment rates in all zones. Furthermore, the switch to lump-sum SRBs had fairly dramatic effects on program costs. We estimate the Marine Corps saved $8 million in Zone A and $10.4 to $25.7 million in Zone B by offering lump-sum rather than timed bonuses in FY03. We estimate predicted reenlistment rates by occupational field and bonus level and a decision model that strength planners can use to set Zone A SRB levels by PMOS. Finally, we compare the relative costs and benefits of SRBs versus lateral moves for filling boatspaces in undermanned areas.
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March 1, 2002
An understanding of the relationship between changes in compensation and changes in reenlistment behavior is crucial to shaping the force. A common measure of this relationship is the pay elasticity of reenlistment, the percentage change in reenlistment associated with a 1-percent increase in pay. The literature on Navy enlisted personnel has produced widely varying estimates of this relationship; with changes in both analytic approach and in the Sailors being studied, the reasons for these differences are unclear. Our analysis suggests that most of the variation in these estimates can be explained by the use of different analytic models. Different specifications yield different estimates that span the range found in previous research. Because each specification uses the same data, these different estimates reflect differences in the degree to which these models attribute differences to pay, not differences in the behavior of enlisted personnel. In contrast, there is little variation in the pay elasticity over time; the only significant changes occur during the drawdown. We choose a preferred specification by examining its ability to accurately predict reenlistment behavior. For both in-sample and out-of-sample predictions of reenlistment, our baseline model, with a pay elasticity of 1.5, provides the best fit of the data.
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November 1, 2001
This survey represents a survey of enlisted retention models and findings. It includes discussion of: the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model; panel prohibit models; conditional logit models; multinomial logit models; reverse causation between bonuses and the reenlistment rate; joint models of attrition and retention; elasticity computation; elasticity estimates; estimation of discount rates; and, effects of variables other than pay.
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October 1, 1997
In the fall of 1995, CNA began working with personnel in the Bureau of Medicine (BuMed), Bureau of Personnel (BuPers), and Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC) on an experiment to conduct active Navy recruiting on community college campuses. This research memorandum summarizes the first 11 months of this initiative.
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