Research for Recruits

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November 1, 2011

Although in recent years non-citizens have made up only a small share of enlisted accessions (roughly 4 percent), they are a potentially valuable pool for enlisted recruiting

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December 1, 2001
Over the past several years, the military has faced mounting recruiting, reenlistment, and manning difficulties. One perceived reason for these difficulties is increased competition for skilled personnel from the private sector, particularly through its incentive pay and benefit offerings. Although the recent softening of the economy may help to ease some of these competitive pressures, other less cyclical trends -such as a smaller high-school graduate recruiting pool and lower propensity to enlist in the military-persist. These trends suggest that a careful survey of the private-sector incentive pay and benefits landscape is needed. In this paper, we compare and contrast the incentive pay and benefit offerings of large, private-sector firms to those of the military. In doing so, we assess whether these offerings differ significantly in their provision, scope, or structure. We also consider whether these offerings have played a role in the military's recent recruiting, reenlistment, and manning difficulties. Finally, we describe the offerings of several private-sector companies that are likely to compete with the military for skilled personnel. We find significant differences in military and private-sector incentive pay and benefit provision of incentive-based pay, health care and retirement benefits, education and training services, child care, workforce flexibility measures, and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR)/other quality-of-life programs. In most cases, military benefits are broader in scope, differ in structure, and involve less choice than those offered by the private-sector. Taken together, these trends suggest several recommendations that could help the military in its recruiting, retention, and manning efforts.
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August 1, 2001
In FY 98, the Navy failed to meet its enlisted recruiting goal by 7,000 recruits, or 12 percent. Early in FY99, it appeared that the recruiting difficulties would continue. All of the military services were facing a tight recruiting market because of such factors as low unemployment, a decreased propensity of youth to enlist, and increasing college enrollments. The Secretary of the Navy responded in February 1999 by increasing the cap on the recruitment of non-high school diploma graduates (NHSDGs) from 5 to 10 percent of enlisted accessions. Although NHSDGs are less costly to recruit than high-school-diploma graduates (HSDGs), both in terms of recruiter time and in marketing, the military services limit the number of NHSDG recruits because they have much higher attrition than high school graduates. Because the Navy was concerned about how the increased numbers of NHSDGs would affect overall recruit survival, it initiated the following two programs: Navy recruiting modified the Compensatory Screening Model (CSM), the screen used to determine NHSG eligibility-the new screen, called the High Performance Predictor Profile (HP3), was implemented with new contacts durine February 1999; and the Commander, Navy Education and Training (CNET) developed a 1-week course for NHSDG recruits called Academic Capacity Enhancement (ACE), which began in March 1999, discontinued during the summer surge, and returned as a fully revised course in October 1999. Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC) asked CNA to analyze (a) the survival of NHSDGs under these two new policies and (b) the overall cost-effectiveness of the policy to increase the cap on NHSDG accessions. This annotated briefing presents our findings.
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July 1, 2001
The Navy expects to enlist about 55,000 sailors each year in the near future, and faces the challenge of training and delivering these recruits to operational billets. Accordingly, policy-makers wish to monitor the fraction of recruits who complete training, as well as the time it takes them to reach the fleet. In this report, we track sailors "from street to fleet, " analyzing factors that influence attrition from the Navy during the period of initial skills training. A companion report describes street-to-fleet trends and focuses on the time it takes recruits to reach the fleet. The Director, Assessment Division (N81) requested this study as part of the Navy's Manpower and Personnel Integrated Warfare Architecture (IWAR). The IWAR is a planning vehicle that uses analyses to shape long-range goals and policies. This study examines prefleet attrition from the Navy; it does not investigate losses from the fleet, attrition from specific courses, or transitions between training programs. CNA conducted a regression analysis to define patterns in attrition as they relate to gender, rating, and training time.
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May 1, 2001
As part of the Navy's Manpower and Personnel Integrated Warfare Architecture (M&P IWAR), N81 asked CNA to examine trends in the training recruits receive before their first fleet assignments. The Navy expects to enlist approximately 55,000 sailors each year in the near future. The Navy's system of training and delivering these recruits to operational billets must be an efficient one. The flow of sailors into the fleet depends on two things: the number of sailors who get there and the amount of time it takes. Accordingly, policy-makers are concerned with both the attrition of recruits during the period of initial training and the lengths of the training pipelines themselves. To examine these trends, we tracked recruits' early career histories from "street-to-fleet." This report updates a 1999 CNA analysis, adding recent accessions and reflecting training reengineering that the Navy has undertaken since then. We also examine initial skills training in more detail, looking at all contract lengths (2-, 3- and 5Yos, as well as 4- and 6YOs) and at ratings.
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September 1, 2000
Early in FY00, the U.S. Army asked each of the other services to consider joining it in proposing, through the Unified Legislative and Budgeting (ULB) process, legislation that would change the military's personnel target from an end-strength goal to a goal based on average strength, calculated across the fiscal year. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower and Personnel (N1) asked CNA to evaluate the average-strength scheme to help the U.S. Navy formulate its response to the Army. We provided the N1 staff an earlier draft of this report that raised concerns about the scheme (as this final version of the report continues to do). The Navy shared the draft report with the Army, which decided not to continue pursuing the proposal.
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August 1, 2000
In this choice-based conjoint (CBC) study, CNRC tasked CNA to explore three questions: which attributes of an enlistment package do potential recruits consider most important; what are the tradeoffs among various elements of a possible enlistment package; and, what elements of an enlistment package are most likely to help the Navy in its efforts to expand beyond its traditional recruiting base? The relationship between enlistment propensity and recruitment incentives was analyzed. The data show that respondents with different enlistment propensities have different preferences for the various incentives in the survey. The results of this study indicate that CNRC must investigate ways, most specifically by focusing on college-related incentives such as the Navy College Fund (NCF) and college credit for Navy training, to make serving in the Navy competitive with the alternative path of attending college and seeking employment in the private sector after having spent some time in college.
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July 1, 2000
This briefing on attrition was presented to the Navy Human Resources Board of Directors in June 2000. While one of its purposes was to raise the awareness level of the attrition problem among the Navy's senior leadership, we concentrated on how the Navy can change its system so that the attrition issue is raised in importance at lower levels in the command structure, even when the senior leadership is focused on other issues. We organized our suggestions/recommendations into two categories-improving accountability within the system and incentives.
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July 1, 1999
This briefing examines bootcamp attrition in the Navy and the Marine Corps, comparing recent attrition rates, historical rates, and FY99 predictions. Recent bootcamp attrition in the Navy has been considerably higher than in the past; however, Marine Corps bootcamp attrition is well within the historical averages for both males and females. The briefing also examines Marine Corps bootcamp attrition for regulars and reserves, looking at the two Marine Corps Recruit Depots (MCRDs) in San Diego and Paris Island.
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May 1, 1999
This briefing examines bootcamp attrition, including predictions for FY99 rates, subsequent fleet attrition, and the role of recruit quality. We project an FY99 Navy bootcamp attrition rate of 20 percent, up 4 percent from FY98. We found holding down bootcamp attrition did not result in increased fleet attrition for these accession cohorts, as measured by 33-month attrition rates for accessions from FY90-FY95. Finally, we observed changes in recruit quality explain only a small part of attrition increase, as measured by high school diploma graduates, AFQT, and Delayed Entry Program (DEP).
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