Research for Recruiting

In FY 98, the Navy failed to meet its enlisted recruiting goal by 7,000 recruits, or 12 percent. Early in FY99, it appeared that the recruiting difficulties would continue. All of the military services were facing a tight recruiting market because of such factors as low unemployment, a decreased propensity of youth to enlist, and increasing college enrollments. The Secretary of the Navy responded in February 1999 by increasing the cap on the recruitment of non-high school diploma graduates (NHSDGs) from 5 to 10 percent of enlisted accessions. Although NHSDGs are less costly to recruit than high-school-diploma graduates (HSDGs), both in terms of recruiter time and in marketing, the military services limit the number of NHSDG recruits because they have much higher attrition than high school graduates. Because the Navy was concerned about how the increased numbers of NHSDGs would affect overall recruit survival, it initiated the following two programs: Navy recruiting modified the Compensatory Screening Model (CSM), the screen used to determine NHSG eligibility-the new screen, called the High Performance Predictor Profile (HP3), was implemented with new contacts durine February 1999; and the Commander, Navy Education and Training (CNET) developed a 1-week course for NHSDG recruits called Academic Capacity Enhancement (ACE), which began in March 1999, discontinued during the summer surge, and returned as a fully revised course in October 1999. Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC) asked CNA to analyze (a) the survival of NHSDGs under these two new policies and (b) the overall cost-effectiveness of the policy to increase the cap on NHSDG accessions. This annotated briefing presents our findings.

Quality of life (QOL) satisfaction surveys are one of many tools the Navy can use to target resources toward increased retention. The effectiveness of the Selective Reenlistment Bonus and other monetary rewards is well documented. Despite the potential retention value of surveys, less is known about their effectiveness. The focus of this year's Manpower and Personnel IWAR is on increasing retention and the appeal of naval service. As part of this effort, N813 asked CNA to look at a specific set of tools for recruiting and retention: surveys. In this annotated briefing, we assess the way the Navy keeps track of members' attitudes about Navy quality of life and quality of service.

Early in FY00, the U.S. Army asked each of the other services to consider joining it in proposing, through the Unified Legislative and Budgeting (ULB) process, legislation that would change the military's personnel target from an end-strength goal to a goal based on average strength, calculated across the fiscal year. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower and Personnel (N1) asked CNA to evaluate the average-strength scheme to help the U.S. Navy formulate its response to the Army. We provided the N1 staff an earlier draft of this report that raised concerns about the scheme (as this final version of the report continues to do). The Navy shared the draft report with the Army, which decided not to continue pursuing the proposal.

Since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, the military personnel system has shown a remarkable ability to deal with a diverse range of challenges. The purpose of this paper is to examine the challenges ahead and propose how the military personnel system will have to adapt to continue to prosper. We start our discussion with a review of four potential problem areas in the future: demographic, economic, and social change; new military concepts and missions; the revolution in business affairs; and technology. Within these broad areas, we focus on specific issues and the challenges they could present for the current military personnel system. The paper also identifies four areas that need major reforms to meet these challenges: recruiting, career management, compensation, and training.