Research for Quality

In FY 98, the Navy failed to meet its enlisted recruiting goal by 7,000 recruits, or 12 percent. Early in FY99, it appeared that the recruiting difficulties would continue. All of the military services were facing a tight recruiting market because of such factors as low unemployment, a decreased propensity of youth to enlist, and increasing college enrollments. The Secretary of the Navy responded in February 1999 by increasing the cap on the recruitment of non-high school diploma graduates (NHSDGs) from 5 to 10 percent of enlisted accessions. Although NHSDGs are less costly to recruit than high-school-diploma graduates (HSDGs), both in terms of recruiter time and in marketing, the military services limit the number of NHSDG recruits because they have much higher attrition than high school graduates. Because the Navy was concerned about how the increased numbers of NHSDGs would affect overall recruit survival, it initiated the following two programs: Navy recruiting modified the Compensatory Screening Model (CSM), the screen used to determine NHSG eligibility-the new screen, called the High Performance Predictor Profile (HP3), was implemented with new contacts durine February 1999; and the Commander, Navy Education and Training (CNET) developed a 1-week course for NHSDG recruits called Academic Capacity Enhancement (ACE), which began in March 1999, discontinued during the summer surge, and returned as a fully revised course in October 1999. Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC) asked CNA to analyze (a) the survival of NHSDGs under these two new policies and (b) the overall cost-effectiveness of the policy to increase the cap on NHSDG accessions. This annotated briefing presents our findings.

As the military health system (MHS) evolves to meet the managed care environment of the peacetime benefit mission, Navy Medicine in particular, and DOD in general, must continue to concern themselves with three principles: (1) Navy Medicine will attract and access quality individuals; (2) the medical department will retain the best of the people accessed; and (3) the best people will want to remain in the military because of the challenge, training, professional ism, and overall environment of Navy Medicine. DOD implemented TRICARE to maximize the quality of healthcare while minimizing the cost of that care. To meet this goal, military medicine must continue to attract and retain quality personnel under this changing work environment. Given these challenges and concerns, the Navy Surgeon General asked CNA to evaluate physicians' job satisfaction within the existing climate to determine whether major problems exist that adversely affect relation of specialists. We have examined Navy physician retention and compensation patterns over the past decade, and find that there has been a decline in retention for the majority of specialists, but the cause and extent of the decline are difficult to quantify. We have attempted to identify the main drivers behind this decline, including compensation, work environment, and promotion opportunity. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, there has been no decline in promotion opportunity] however, we do find that the military- pay gap has been widened by 4 to 24 percent for most specialties during the 1990s.

Early in FY00, the U.S. Army asked each of the other services to consider joining it in proposing, through the Unified Legislative and Budgeting (ULB) process, legislation that would change the military's personnel target from an end-strength goal to a goal based on average strength, calculated across the fiscal year. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower and Personnel (N1) asked CNA to evaluate the average-strength scheme to help the U.S. Navy formulate its response to the Army. We provided the N1 staff an earlier draft of this report that raised concerns about the scheme (as this final version of the report continues to do). The Navy shared the draft report with the Army, which decided not to continue pursuing the proposal.

This briefing on attrition was presented to the Navy Human Resources Board of Directors in June 2000. While one of its purposes was to raise the awareness level of the attrition problem among the Navy's senior leadership, we concentrated on how the Navy can change its system so that the attrition issue is raised in importance at lower levels in the command structure, even when the senior leadership is focused on other issues. We organized our suggestions/recommendations into two categories-improving accountability within the system and incentives.