Research for Productivity

Abstract: D5206 The Navy determines the number of sailors it needs on board ships through a complex and demanding process. To those not directly involved, it is a black box. This study describes the Navy's methods and compares them to practices used by private-sector firms. It identifies assumptions that drive the number of people needed, or "manpower requirements," and quantifies the impact of those assumptions on billets and costs. The study concludes that the Navy's manpower requirements process is thorough, accountable, and meets the Navy's stated goals. However, it does not adequately consider manning alternatives. In setting requirements, the Navy takes technology as given and uses decades-old assumptions about work hours, labor productivity, and the paygrade mix of the crew. Such assumptions, which are "hard-wired" into the Navy's requirements computation model, are costly and merit revalidation. Other problems include limited cost incentives and a lack of performance metrics with which to assess different manning configurations. The study recommends that the Navy (a) make the costs (and benefits) of requirements more visible (b) shift the focus from workload validation toward innovation and improvement; and (c) charge an agent or organization with identifying avenues for manpower savings, through methodological, technological, or organizational changes.

Using a sample of Naval Reserve recruiters for its analysis, this research memorandum estimates the effects of recruiting-duty experience and other personal characteristics on recruiter productivity. A Poisson probability model and multinomial model are estimated. The results are intended for use in calculating the number of recruiters required to meet Selected Reserve recruiting goals.

The research reported here examines overall training effectiveness for U.S. Naval personnel; the measure of effectiveness comes from the survey responses of the supervisors of first-term enlisted Naval personnel. These supervisors were asked about the productivity of 'typical' first-term personnel who were schooled in the classroom or trained on the job for 12 Navy occupational categories. Overall, these specialties characterize a broad cross-section of Navy jobs that vary considerably in technical complexity and formal school length. Comparisons are drawn between the two training methods. Finally, the usefulness of research on training effectivenes in other areas of military manpower research is discussed.

This report describes a proposed system that could be used by senior management personnel to monitor the performance of Naval Air Rework Facilities (NARF's). Quantitative indicators are introduced for gauging performance in eight key subject areas: quantity, quality, timeliness, backlog, cost, productivity, efficiency, and overhead. These indicators are displayed for each major product line by means of control charts that depict historical performance, performance goals, and lower limits of acceptable performance. Actual performance data for the second quarter of FY 1984 are used to illustrate the proposed system.