Research for Planning

The end of the Cold War has led to a major reexamination of the requirements fir medical personnel and other resources necessary to care for Department of Defense (DoD) beneficiaries. Despite large numbers of peacetime beneficiaries, the primary need for medical resources remains the wartime mission. During the Cold War, the requirement for wartime medical providers was high and could easily justify large numbers of active duty personnel. Today's defense guidance is based on fighting two major regional contingencies (MRCs), and the required number of medical providers has fallen sharply. Determining the number and types of medical resources needed to treat casualties of future conflicts is an important and complicated issue. To help shed light on the process of determining wartime medical requirements, N-931 asked CNA to examine the methods and models that are currently in use or may be used in the near future. The current process is in flux. The models used today are being changed. The use of one model was discontinued recently when the Joint Staff changed to a new command-and-control system. The Joint Staff has proposed a replacement, but the new model is still being developed and there is some concern about its adequacy in determining service medical requirements. In this memorandum, we examine the current and proposed theater-level requirements models.

In this briefing we examine issues for the U.S. Marine Corps to consider in organizing and conducting Military Support for Civil Authorities (MSCA) operations - or, more simply, domestic operations. This briefing is part of the documentation from a CNA study that examined USMC issues in conducting Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HAOs). The Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and the Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force, requested that CNA conduct the study. We focused on how HAOs differ from traditional warfighting operations and on the implications of these differences for requirements in Marine Corps doctrine, organization, training, and equipment. The briefing does not cover all aspects of domestic operations, nor does it cover every role of Marine forces in these operations. With this background in mind, it focuses on some of the ways in which domestic operations differ from operations conducted outside the United States, and the implications of these differences for the Marine Corps.

COMSIXTHFLT received several requests from littoral nations for training and interaction in maritime law enforcement, maritime interception, search and rescue, fisheries protection, and other coastal patrol operations. In response, COMSIXTHFLT requested that a U.S. Coast Guard cutter deploy to the Mediterranean and Black Sea from 29 May through 28 August 1995. USCGC DALLAS (WHEC 716) subsequently visited seven nations: Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Tunisia, Slovenia, Italy, and Albania. COMSIXTHFLT requested that a CNA analyst be embarked on USCGC DALLAS to assess the cutter's regional engagement role vis-a-vis U.S. Navy units and to identify analytic issues regarding USCG-USN interpretability. This report examines USCGC DALLAS's operational role during battle-group operations and identifies a number of issues that affect USCG-USN interoperability.

In December 1992, the U.S. Central Command formed Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia to conduct military operations in southern Somalia. The purpose of the operation, designated Operation RESTORE HOPE, was to establish a secure environment for Humanitarian Relief Organizations (HROs) to provide famine relief services. From November 1992 through March 1993, six analysts from the Center for Naval Analyses provided analytic support to JTF Somalia. Five analysts were on-scene in Somalia at various times. At the request of the CJTF, the analysts studied planning, the execution of the JTF concept, logistics, the transition to the UN-led operation, and certain aspects of operations, including rules of engagement and interactions between the military and the HROs. Documentation of these analyses is contained in a series of research memoranda. This summary report draws together some of the results of the individual analyses and puts them in the context of the overall operation. Its scope is limited by the issues addressed by the on-scene representatives. Thus, neither our study nor this summary report purports to be a comprehensive compilation of the military operations conducted during RESTORE HOPE, or of the lessons that the military has learned from the operation. See also CRMs 93-96, 93-114, 93-148, 93-126, 93-120, and 93-140.