Research for PERSTEMPO

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July 1, 2004
In the pre-1986 period, long deployments were not necessarily associated with crises, whereas the extra-long deployments from the post-1986 period were typically associated with crises. Anecdotally, Sailors identified such deployments as important and worth the extra hardships. Because of this, we expect that high PERSTEMPO in the 1990s has not been associated with lower reenlistments. This paper investigates this hypothesis. We conclude, in the post-1986 period, deployment lengths have not been a driver of reenlistment rates. However, quick turnarounds (length of time between deployments) do have negative consequences on reenlistments. Non-deployed time underway and extended periods of ship maintenance also decrease reenlistments. The longer deployments are not likely to lower reenlistments unless the missions continue for so long that the morale-boosting effect of the mission fades. If the extra-long deployments begin to appear routine, long deployments may adversely affect reenlistment rates. We suggest that the Navy monitor Sailors’ quality of life and reenlistments carefully and be prepared to compensate them if retention does slip.
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July 1, 2003
CNA has been analyzing the retention implications of the post-9/11 period. This annotated briefing summarizes our findings and some ways to mitigate adverse effects, should they occur. Data from Desert Shield/ Desert Storm (DS/DS) show that attrition dropped during the conflict, particularly for ships deployed to the region, and then spiked following DS/DS. A previous CNA statistical analysis indicates that reenlistment rates dropped for sailors who experienced extra-long deployments before the Navy formalized its PERSTEMPO limits in 1986. Anecdotally, long deployments before 1986 were more routine in nature and not necessarily morale-boosting. Based on this analysis, we estimate that sailors may require between $220 and $345 per month to offset the retention effects of long deployments if PERSTEMPO rules continue to be broken. To offset any retention repercussions, we recommended two pays: Sea Pay Plus and a restructuring of the High Deployment Per Diem (or ITEMPO pay). Sea Pay Plus would compensate sailors for extra-long deployments. Our recommended restructuring of ITEMPO would compensate sailors for extra-long deployments and excessive cumulative time away. We recommend that the Navy (1) use Sea Pay Plus should retention drop in the near term, and (2) push for a legislative revision of the ITEMPO pay.
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August 1, 1998
This annotated briefing summarizes the results of an investigation of perstempo levels, trends and implications conducted for the Personnel Readiness Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This paper looks at indicators, short of personnel losses, of the impact of perstempo on enlisted personnel readiness, with the aim being to shed light on the level of perstempo that can be tolerated before the negative effects of excessive perstempo show up in declining retention rates. We found some evidence of increased dissatisfaction with military pay and military life, as well as some increases in use of family service programs that help with stress, as perstempo increases. Marines, who had the largest role in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, showed the strongest indication of stress from deployment to that environment. The report also provides charts of perstempo trends for selected occupational specialties in each of the services.
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March 1, 1994
CNA has studied the relationship between various dimensions of time at sea and retention over many years. In general, we have found that more time at sea produces lower retention, but the magnitude of the effects is more modest than many Navy officers expected. We have also found that higher pay (military relative to civilian) increases retention. Given the relative magnitudes of the sea duty and pay effects, we have concluded that modest increases in pay could be cost effective in offsetting the negative effects of increased sea duty. As the Navy has considered the implications of our past studies and has wrestled with difficult downsizing choices, three questions remained about the applicability of the results of our previous studies for Navy planning: (1) Does quality of life during turnarounds affect retention? (2) What is the cost to maintain retention if time at sea is increased? and (3) Are Navy Retention/Separation Surveys consistent with previous CNA analyses? This briefing addresses these questions. We start by summarizing our answers to the three questions. Explanations of how we reached the conclusions follow.
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February 1, 1992
This research memorandum documents analyses of the relationship between Personnel Tempo of Operations (PERSTEMPO) and enlisted retention. CNA's ship employment history files were used to reconstruct the PERSTEMPO experience of each surface ship since the mid-1970s. This PERSTEMPO information was added to the personnel records of sailors making retention decisions while aboard surface ships in the FY 1979 through FY 1988 period. Finally, information on pay, civilian employment opportunities, and bonuses was added to each sailor's record. A statistical regression technique was used to explore the relations between PERSTEMPO and retention. A by-product of the study is updated estimates of the relationship and relative military pay, unemployment rates, and selective reenlistment bonuses.
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