Research for Personnel Attrition

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August 1, 2001
In FY 98, the Navy failed to meet its enlisted recruiting goal by 7,000 recruits, or 12 percent. Early in FY99, it appeared that the recruiting difficulties would continue. All of the military services were facing a tight recruiting market because of such factors as low unemployment, a decreased propensity of youth to enlist, and increasing college enrollments. The Secretary of the Navy responded in February 1999 by increasing the cap on the recruitment of non-high school diploma graduates (NHSDGs) from 5 to 10 percent of enlisted accessions. Although NHSDGs are less costly to recruit than high-school-diploma graduates (HSDGs), both in terms of recruiter time and in marketing, the military services limit the number of NHSDG recruits because they have much higher attrition than high school graduates. Because the Navy was concerned about how the increased numbers of NHSDGs would affect overall recruit survival, it initiated the following two programs: Navy recruiting modified the Compensatory Screening Model (CSM), the screen used to determine NHSG eligibility-the new screen, called the High Performance Predictor Profile (HP3), was implemented with new contacts durine February 1999; and the Commander, Navy Education and Training (CNET) developed a 1-week course for NHSDG recruits called Academic Capacity Enhancement (ACE), which began in March 1999, discontinued during the summer surge, and returned as a fully revised course in October 1999. Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC) asked CNA to analyze (a) the survival of NHSDGs under these two new policies and (b) the overall cost-effectiveness of the policy to increase the cap on NHSDG accessions. This annotated briefing presents our findings.
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August 1, 2001
When the Navy's downsizing ended in the 1990s, undermanning in the fleet became evident. By the end of the decade, fewer than 90 percent of the enlisted billets were filled. Problems with recruiting, distributing, and retaining sailors all contributed to the undermanning difficulties. In response, the Navy fought to reverse the trend by instituting initiatives to alleviate attrition. As part of the Navy's efforts to increase manning through reduced attrition, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower and Personnel (N1B) asked CNA to analyze the causes of fleet attrition-that is, early separations among sailors who make it to a full-duty billet, both on shore and at sea. Because most fleet attrition occurs soon after arrival in the fleet, we focused on first term attrition. First, we studied the patterns of fleet attrition losses in the Navy. Then we investigated the causes of attrition and how those factors changed in the 1990s. We conducted an analysis of yearly cohort attrition for first-term sailors on both sea and shore duty. Then, restricting our analysis to sailors on surface ships, we explored how the deployment cycle influences attrition, Finally, because attrition is costly, we explored strategies aimed at reducing it and keeping it low.
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July 1, 2001
The Navy expects to enlist about 55,000 sailors each year in the near future, and faces the challenge of training and delivering these recruits to operational billets. Accordingly, policy-makers wish to monitor the fraction of recruits who complete training, as well as the time it takes them to reach the fleet. In this report, we track sailors "from street to fleet, " analyzing factors that influence attrition from the Navy during the period of initial skills training. A companion report describes street-to-fleet trends and focuses on the time it takes recruits to reach the fleet. The Director, Assessment Division (N81) requested this study as part of the Navy's Manpower and Personnel Integrated Warfare Architecture (IWAR). The IWAR is a planning vehicle that uses analyses to shape long-range goals and policies. This study examines prefleet attrition from the Navy; it does not investigate losses from the fleet, attrition from specific courses, or transitions between training programs. CNA conducted a regression analysis to define patterns in attrition as they relate to gender, rating, and training time.
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May 1, 2001
As part of the Navy's Manpower and Personnel Integrated Warfare Architecture (M&P IWAR), N81 asked CNA to examine trends in the training recruits receive before their first fleet assignments. The Navy expects to enlist approximately 55,000 sailors each year in the near future. The Navy's system of training and delivering these recruits to operational billets must be an efficient one. The flow of sailors into the fleet depends on two things: the number of sailors who get there and the amount of time it takes. Accordingly, policy-makers are concerned with both the attrition of recruits during the period of initial training and the lengths of the training pipelines themselves. To examine these trends, we tracked recruits' early career histories from "street-to-fleet." This report updates a 1999 CNA analysis, adding recent accessions and reflecting training reengineering that the Navy has undertaken since then. We also examine initial skills training in more detail, looking at all contract lengths (2-, 3- and 5Yos, as well as 4- and 6YOs) and at ratings.
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March 1, 2001
CAB D0003425.A1/Final On January 2, 2001, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Vernon Clark visited the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) to hear a series of briefings on contemporary issues of interest to the Navy. Research Staff members of the Workforce, Education and Training (WET) Team presented three of these briefings on Recruiting Issues, Navy Enlisted Education Policy, and the Quality and Quantity of Attrition. During this session, Admiral Clark received a copy of a paper on Compensation Strategy. Shortly thereafter, he requested a follow-up briefing on this issue. This document provides annotation of these four briefings.
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October 1, 1999
Historically, the level of fleet manning has varied over the course of the year. Arrivals to and departures from the sea fleet have not coincided well, resulting in significant understaffing at certain times of the year. The objective of this report is to recommend policy options to bring about better matching of enlisted sea gains and losses to reduce the seasonal variation in sea manning. We first document the pattern of seasonal variation. We then decompose the transitions to and from the sea fleet to determine the sources of the variation. Finally, we offer an initial look at certain policies that aim to reduce the seasonal variation. We find substantial variation in sea manning over the course of the year for both E1-E4 and E5-E9 sailors. The main contributor to the seasonal variation in E1-E4 net gains is strength losses at End of Active Obligated Service dates (EAOSs). We construct several policy options that aim to reduce seasonal variation by shifting these EAOSs dates so that they match sea gains more closely.
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July 1, 1999
This briefing examines bootcamp attrition in the Navy and the Marine Corps, comparing recent attrition rates, historical rates, and FY99 predictions. Recent bootcamp attrition in the Navy has been considerably higher than in the past; however, Marine Corps bootcamp attrition is well within the historical averages for both males and females. The briefing also examines Marine Corps bootcamp attrition for regulars and reserves, looking at the two Marine Corps Recruit Depots (MCRDs) in San Diego and Paris Island.
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May 1, 1999
This briefing examines bootcamp attrition, including predictions for FY99 rates, subsequent fleet attrition, and the role of recruit quality. We project an FY99 Navy bootcamp attrition rate of 20 percent, up 4 percent from FY98. We found holding down bootcamp attrition did not result in increased fleet attrition for these accession cohorts, as measured by 33-month attrition rates for accessions from FY90-FY95. Finally, we observed changes in recruit quality explain only a small part of attrition increase, as measured by high school diploma graduates, AFQT, and Delayed Entry Program (DEP).
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March 1, 1999
The Deputy of Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower and Personnel asked CNA to study various issues related to maintaining fleet readiness while expanding the role of women in the operating forces. First, we studied the pattern of losses of personnel from ships by gender and explored policies aimed at reducing them. Second, we updated a CNA planning model that links women's accession plans, bunk plans, and a variety of personnel policy parameters. Recommendations include maintaining a presence of female Chief Petty Officers of a least 5 percent of the female crew in order to reduce the level of unplanned losses of junior women, and increasing A-School proportion of female accessions in order to improve retention of female personnel.
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August 1, 1998
The Personnel Readiness Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J1) asked CNA to look into why people are leaving the services, particularly if there has been any change in the reasons personnel cite for leaving the services, and the quality of people who are leaving. The analyses presented here are based on the results form surveys for the Navy, Army, and Air Force. Across the services, we found evidence of increased dissatisfaction with different aspects of military compensation, including pay, advancement opportunities, and retirement benefits. But trends in retention through the first quarter of 1997 show no immediate alarms. Army trends seem to show long-term improvement, Navy data indicates that declines may be leveling off, and Air Force retention rates are erratic and reveal no real trends.
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