Research for Pay

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December 1, 2002
Abstract:D7147 The Navy has long faced difficulties in manning certain billets. To alleviate its problems, it has used a patchwork of assignment incentives. Then, if all else fails, the Navy orders sailors involuntarily into hard-to-fill billets. In this study, we consider the costs of the current system and determine how the Navy might encourage sailors to volunteer for hard-to-fill billets cost-efficiently. We find that an incentive pay for hard-to-fill billets (such as Assignment Incentive Pay) is a promising way of moving the Navy toward a more voluntary, efficient assignment system if designed as a flexible, market-based pay. For overseas shore billets that currently use sea-duty credit as an incentive, AIP will almost certainly be cost-effective. The cost of getting volunteers for OCONUS billets would probably be below $25 million annually using an efficiently designed AIP. Sea duty credit is at least three times more costly. AIP, however, may not be cost-effective for CONUS shore billets. Our best estimate is that sailors may volunteer for traditionally difficult-to-fill billets for an AIP of about $125 per month on average-about the same cost as the savings generated from AIP. For these billets, great care must be taken in designing a cost-effective bonus.
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December 1, 2001
Over the past several years, the military has faced mounting recruiting, reenlistment, and manning difficulties. One perceived reason for these difficulties is increased competition for skilled personnel from the private sector, particularly through its incentive pay and benefit offerings. Although the recent softening of the economy may help to ease some of these competitive pressures, other less cyclical trends -such as a smaller high-school graduate recruiting pool and lower propensity to enlist in the military-persist. These trends suggest that a careful survey of the private-sector incentive pay and benefits landscape is needed. In this paper, we compare and contrast the incentive pay and benefit offerings of large, private-sector firms to those of the military. In doing so, we assess whether these offerings differ significantly in their provision, scope, or structure. We also consider whether these offerings have played a role in the military's recent recruiting, reenlistment, and manning difficulties. Finally, we describe the offerings of several private-sector companies that are likely to compete with the military for skilled personnel. We find significant differences in military and private-sector incentive pay and benefit provision of incentive-based pay, health care and retirement benefits, education and training services, child care, workforce flexibility measures, and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR)/other quality-of-life programs. In most cases, military benefits are broader in scope, differ in structure, and involve less choice than those offered by the private-sector. Taken together, these trends suggest several recommendations that could help the military in its recruiting, retention, and manning efforts.
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March 1, 2001
The level and composition of military pay is crucial to the success of the all-volunteer force (AVF). Most analyses of the "adequacy" of military compensation focus on comparability with earnings offered in civilian labor markets, but an effective compensation system needs to address other goals as well. An important goal is that military pay be sufficient to meet the basic needs of all personnel. This research memorandum focuses on the standard of living that the military compensation system provides its enlisted personnel and their families. The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) reviewed the common methods, both objective and subjective, used to measure standard of living in the literature. We then used these different concepts to evaluate the standard of living of enlisted personnel. Our results suggest that relatively few enlisted personnel have incomes below the poverty lines.
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January 1, 2001
As the longest economic expansion in history continues, the competition between the private sector and the military for able personnel intensifies. This competition has prompted renewed interest in the benefit and incentive pay programs that large, private-sector firms offer. As part of the Navy's FY 2000 Manpower and Personnel Integrated Warfare Architecture (IWAR), the Director of the Assessment Division (N81) has asked CNA to examine the provision of various benefit and incentive pay programs in the civilian sector. Of particular interest is the provision of such programs among large, private-sector firms that are considered strong competition in the market for skilled labor. This annotated briefing provides some context for the discussion by describing the current recruiting and retention difficulties of both the military and large, private-sector firms, and explains our choice of research methodology for assessing benefit and incentive programs currently offered to workers in large, private-sector firms.
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September 1, 2000
The Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower and Personnel (N1B) requested that CNA analyze the Navy's compensation system in view of current recruiting and manning shortfalls and anticipated future changes in the Navy's workforce. This study will help the Navy implement an effective, market-based compensation system that will give it the ability to attract, retain, and motivate a high-quality workforce in a competitive, dynamic labor market. The intent is to take a strategic look at Navy compensation policy and practices. The starting point is to consider what the Navy wants to accomplish with its compensation system. What goals, in terms of managing human resources, can be met through compensation policies and practices? We consider human resources management system approaches, as well as approaches suggested by economics literature, and arrive at a succinct set of strategic goals.
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September 1, 2000
Early in FY00, the U.S. Army asked each of the other services to consider joining it in proposing, through the Unified Legislative and Budgeting (ULB) process, legislation that would change the military's personnel target from an end-strength goal to a goal based on average strength, calculated across the fiscal year. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower and Personnel (N1) asked CNA to evaluate the average-strength scheme to help the U.S. Navy formulate its response to the Army. We provided the N1 staff an earlier draft of this report that raised concerns about the scheme (as this final version of the report continues to do). The Navy shared the draft report with the Army, which decided not to continue pursuing the proposal.
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September 1, 2000
One of the biggest issues of concern to military personnel is the military "pay gap". Many are troubled by the possibility that the level of military pay has declined significantly relative to that of civilian wages. A common concern is that a civilian-military wage differential will quickly lead to retention and recruiting problems for the military. Furthermore, many in the Navy believe that the differentials are more prevalent in some ratings than in others-specifically, that the highly technical ratings are having the largest retention and recruiting problems as a result of relatively high civilian pay. Given these concerns, the objective of this study is to examine the correlation between manning shortfalls in various Navy enlisted ratings and the relative earnings of enlisted personnel in these occupations. We also examine differences in military compensation from one rating to another and compare these differentials with those in the civilian sector. In addition, we examine the relationship between military compensation and the propensity to reenlist, using our mew measure of occupation-specific relative military compensation. This analysis yields estimates of the responsiveness of reenlistment rates to changes in relative pay, which can be used to estimate the change in compensation necessary to achieve manning level targets on a rating-by-rating basis.
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August 1, 1998
The Personnel Readiness Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J1) asked CNA to examine the earnings of enlisted personnel and to compare them with the earnings of similar people in the civilian labor market. We used multiple regression to estimate civilian earnings of non-college-graduates and used these models to predict the earnings potential of enlisted military personnel. We found that earnings in the civilian and military sectors are similar and that both fell, when adjusted for inflation, between 1992 and 1996 (the year for which the most recent civilian data were available).
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April 1, 1998
The Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel asked CNA to analyze ways to transform the size and shape of the enlisted force to better meet the Navy's future requirements at an affordable cost. This research analyzes alternatives to the existing sea pay structure that generate voluntary extensions of sea duty, reduce crew turnover, and improve retention. The briefing discusses three options: an accelerated phase-in of sea pay table, an expanded sea pay premium, and a mixture of phase-in and sea pay premium. It compares them with maintaining the existing structure of the sea pay table and simply scaling it up by the rate of inflation and also assesses their effectiveness in reducing enlisted crew turnover and increasing sea duty and retention among the enlisted sailors. An accelerated phase-in option, which generates more first-term retention and helps with sea/shore balance, is recommended.
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February 1, 1997
In recent years, the maximum bonus paid to Navy aviators has not yielded the desired increase in continuation in some aviation subcommunities. Furthermore, Navy planners anticipate future shortfalls as the small, drawdown-era year groups approach the ends of their obligations. In response to these past and projected shortfalls, BURPERS has recommended increasing the current maximum annual award. N1 tasked CNA to analyze the effectiveness of the current legislated maximum bonus award under the Navy's Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) program and to estimate bonus levels needed to induce adequate continuation of Navy aviators in the near future. The program's purpose is to ensure sufficient continuation to meet squadron department head requirements.
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