Research for Officials

This seminar report provides a brief overview of a seminar held at the Center for Naval Analyses.

National security decision-making in the Soviet Union has changed radically under Gorbachev. A key aspect of this change is the emergence of the institutchiki, or civilian academicians from the Soviet Academy of Sciences, as influential experts on defense issues. Previously these civilians had scant impact on the defense decision-making process, which was dominated by the General Staff and professional military cadre. Three developments point in this direction: the increased representation of the civilian experts in state and Party institutions dealing with foreign and security policy; the special role these civilians seem to be playing in developing and promoting Gorbachev's 'new thinking' in foreign and security policy; and, recent decisions that mark a sharp departure from earlier policies and reflect proposals originating with or developed by the institutchiki. This paper documents these trends, chiefly on the basis of articles that have appeared in the Soviet press. It also describes the resistance of the military to some of the new thinking and resultant proposals. The main actors in this unfolding drama include the top military leaders, principally the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, and the most visible of the institutchiki: those employed by the Institute of the USA and Canada (IUSAC) and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO).

This paper tries to identify significant current trends that may continue into the 21st century and shape Soviet military strategy. An arms control trend, stemming from the Soviet concept of 'reasonable sufficiency,' seems slated to handicap the USSR severely in options for fighting and winning large-scale conventional and theater-nuclear wars. Moscow evidently feels the strategic nuclear sphere will be the key arena of military competition in the future. The USSR now shows a greater commitment to offensive counterforce than was true of the period before 'reasonable sufficiency.' Moscow's interest in the strategic nuclear sphere will be reinforced in the future by a long-term trend toward space warfare. However, it may be possible to soften the competition in this sphere through arms control. Prominent Soviets have already begun to suggest that, if the U.S. will limit its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) ambitions to a 'thin' defense, Moscow might actually prefer mutual comprehensive Antiballistic Missile (ABM) deployments to continued adherence to the 1972 ABM Treaty.

Throughout the last decade, the Soviet politico-military leadership has provided startling evidence of a new Soviet doctrine on nuclear and conventional wars. According to Soviet military writers, the changes in doctrine that constitute the new revolution in Soviet military affairs were generated by evolving technological developments in both nuclear and conventional arms. This paper provides evidence from Soviet military literature that changes in strategy, operational art, and tactics have in turn generated changes in force structure and weapons modernization that indicate a downgrading of nuclear contingencies and a preference for conventional warfare.