Research for Officers

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May 3, 2011

On June 29, 2010, at 2:15 a.m., the Tampa Police Department (TPD) suffered a tragic loss when two officers were shot and killed during a traffic stop. The suspect fled the scene on foot and evaded immediate arrest. The subsequent law enforcement response and multijurisdictional manhunt involved 22 law enforcement agencies and over 1,000 personnel during a 96-hour deployment that culminated in the arrest of the suspect. TPD established a multi-agency, Unified Command using the Incident Command System (ICS) to plan, coordinate, and manage the complex response, which included volunteers and donations from the community.

CNA conducted an objective, independent review of Tampa’s ICS operations to identify strengths and areas for improvement. Using event data, media reports, and interviews with personnel from the Tampa Police Department, the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and other local and federal agencies, CNA identified lessons learned that have applicability for law enforcement professionals nationwide.

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October 1, 2008
As the Marine Corps continues its growth toward an active-duty endstrength of 202,000, it needs to reduce the rate of separations (including end-of-active-service (EAS) and non-EAS separations) for enlisted Marines and officers. In this document, we examine separation rates over the FY00 to FY07 period and assess their patterns. We find that, despite high operational tempo, average separation rates for enlisted personnel, warrant officers, and commissioned officers were actually lower in FY07 than in FY00. There were, however, small increases in separation rates for some subgroups, including females, retirement-eligible aviators, and ground officers with 7 to 10 years of completed service. Still, the overall pattern of separation rates indicates no worrisome trend.
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March 1, 2008
CNA conducted a study for the Chief of Naval Personnel in support of the development of an Education Strategy for the Navy. One major issue is the undergraduate education of officers, in particular, the need for a technical education background. This paper reports on analysis directed at looking for empirical evidence that a technical education has an impact on tactical proficiency. Using 1) a sample of laser-guided bomb (LGB) data on combat operations during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and 2) a sample of destroyers and submarines that either won a “Battle E” Award or did not, we find no evidence that a tactical education enhances tactical performance. Officers with technical educations did not hit more targets in OEF/OIF than their counterparts with nontechnical educations. Similarly, destroyers and submarines that won a “Battle E” did not have a higher percentage of officers with technical education backgrounds.
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March 1, 2008
This study provides analysis in support of development of an education strategy for URL officers. The primarily focus is graduate education, but we also consider undergraduate education. For graduate education, we conclude that the Navy should have a strategic goal of providing advanced education that meets Navy goals and needs, without sacrificing warfare proficiency or officer and family quality of life. We find there are many reasons for graduate education and every officer should have an opportunity for graduate education that is focused on Navy needs. Officer careers are varied and contain little time for graduate education. In addition, career paths inhibit graduate education utilization. So, the Navy should examine the timing of education and expand varied education delivery options, including resident, non-resident, online and short certificate programs, to provide education that fits into officer careers and facilitates education utilization. The Navy should expand PME to broaden officers’ knowledge of the Navy beyond their communities. Finally, the Navy should take steps to remove institutional barriers, such as commands having no incentives to support graduate education.
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July 1, 2007
Since September 11th, 2001, the Marine Corps has involuntarily activated considerable numbers of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) to support Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). This presidential mobilization of the Reserves represents the longest period of involutary activations since the formation of the All-Volunteer Force. In this paper, we examine how this increase in operational tempo has affected the composition of and retention in the SMCR. We take two approaches in our analysis. First, we use descriptive statistics to understand changes in the SMCR between September 2001 and September 2006. Second, we use survival analysis to determine the effect of activation on a reservist’s decision to stay affiliated with the SMCR.
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October 1, 2005
1000 and 1050 coded billets are Unrestricted Line (URL) billets not assigned to a particular community. Thirty percent of all URL shore, non-student billets are 1000 or 1050 coded billets. The Navy needs the flexibility of 1000/1050 billets for control grade detailing. CNA has identified about 600 1000/1050 billets that do not support URL core competencies and should be realigned. The Navy needs to establish URL core competencies, and the 1000/1050 billet base is dependent on these core competencies. The current distribution of 1000/1050 billets needs to be validated annually. Lastly, the Navy needs to ensure that 1000/1050 billet assignment is based on necessary competencies, skills, as identified in the Navy Officer Billet Classification (NOBC), Additional Qualifying Designators (AQDs), and subspecialty codes.
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October 1, 2005
The goal of this study is to provide the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Manpower and Personnel) with empirical information on loss patterns in the Selected Reserves (SelRes) since September 11, 2001. Of particular interest is how activation affected the loss behavior of SelRes members. We created a longitudinal database that follows SelRes members from September 2001 to January 2005. The database consists of records from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) Reserve Component Common Personnel Data System (RCCPDS) merged with extracts from DMDC’s Contingency Tracking System. We use the database to compare the loss behavior of recently deactivated SelRes members with that of other SelRes members. For Reserve officers, we found that post-9/11 officer loss rates were higher than SelRes loss rates in FY 2000, a year with a low number of activations. Loss rates are higher for those who were activated but not deployed (remained in CONUS) compared with those who deployed (outside CONUS). However, SelRes officer loss rates are the lowest among the never activated. Finally, for some components, loss rates increase with the length of activation.
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September 1, 2002
Abstract:d6693 This report describes the development of CNA's Officer Street-to-Fleet (OSTF) database and reports changes in time-to-train for the aviation, surface warfare, submarine, and supply corps communities. OSTF is a longitudinal database designed for use in descriptive, statistical and evaluative studies of Navy training. It combines the the Defense Manpower Data Center's Officer Master Files with extracts from the Navy Integrated Training Resources Administration System (NITRAS). The result is a complete account of officers' training histories from accession to first operational assignment. OSTF includes all officers who started training between October 1992 and September 2001. For each officer, it reports courses taken, start and end dates of each course, course outcomes, and time-to-train prior to first assignment. It also covers officer characteristics such as race, gender and accession source and records career events such as pipeline completion, attrition, and lateral transfer. In general, there has been a decline in average TTT to first assignment for successive accession cohorts throughout the 1990s for officers who complete training. Where possible, we break down average TTT into average time under instruction (UI), time not under instruction (NUI), and stash time. Changes in average NUI and stash time over the period have been mixed.
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March 1, 2002

Health care personnel are expensive to educate and train. Retaining them is critical for any health care system. This study considers the impact of special pays and bonuses in helping recruit and retain qualified doctors, dentists, and other health care providers.

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December 1, 2001
Are the most senior enlisted service members adequately compensated? Given the varying levels of responsibility assigned to them, is the compensation sufficient to ensure that we retain the talent we require? Because these senior enlisted personnel are more apt to be retirement-eligible, are the best retiring too early? Are there sufficient incentives to induce the most competitive to remain in service? Service members in grade E-9 usually fall into two categories: the technical or duty expert of a certain occupational field; or the senior enlisted advisor to the commanding officer of a given unit, usually a unit with its own organizational colors. In discussing these issues, this paper starts with a short history of non-commissioned officers, concentrating on the most senior grade. Then we'll present a current overview of the E-9s in each of the services and describe what we see as the challenges facing the E-9 community today. We'll turn then to the current experience distribution of E-9s, promotion timings, and the pattern of retirements. Finally, we'll return to the question of incentives for E-9 retention and a proposal for an E-10grade.
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