Research for Nuclear Weapons

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July 1, 1995
This CNA-sponsored study identifies implications of nuclear possession between 1994 and 2003 in distant Third World areas. It identifies policies and programs affecting the design, organization, location, and employment of future U.S. forces. After exploring potential paths for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, we examined how five notional political crises (North Korea, Iran, Syria/Libya, India/Pakistan, and Algeria) evolved into nuclear confrontations. Then we analyzed what U.S. interests were relevant for each case, what political and military instruments were available, and how well they worked. Also highlighted are what the successes and failures in these cases imply for policy, strategy, and force development. We analyzed the following questions: (1) Why would some state or other party want nuclear weapons, how would it acquire them, and how fast? (2) What U.S. interests were at stake in each crisis? (3) Could nuclear use or threat of use be deterred, and how? (4) Was preemption possible, and did it make sense? (5) What kind of retaliation was feasible and justifiable? (6) How, and to what extent, did third parties participate? (7) How does the prospect of nuclear use (the nuclear shadow) affect military operations? and (8) What was the relative importance of various force components in the notional crises.
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March 1, 1992
The former Soviet nuclear weapons complex has undergone dramatic changes in the months since the failed August coup and the dissolution of the USSR. Strategic and tactical nuclear weapons once under Moscow's control are now in the possession of several member states of the new Commonwealth of Independent States. Some of these Republics have adopted a clear denuclearization policy, but others have not. Addressing a recent seminar at the Center for Naval Analyses, Dr. Rose Gottemoeller of the RAND Corporation and Mr. George Perkovich, Director of the Secure Society Program at the W. Alton Jones Foundation, discussed issues relating to the disposition, control, and clean-up of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal and the implications for U.S. policy.
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July 1, 1990
Most examinations of proliferation issues concern controlling the spread of weaponry; this report goes further to delve into the potential military responses to proliferation. The objectives of this report are to raise awareness of this evolving problem, examine trends in proliferation to give a broad overview of this issue, frame the issues in a manner conducive to thoughtful analysis, consider scenarios for involvement by the U.S., and suggest several possible U.S. responses.
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January 1, 1987
When the Soviets accepted 'Mutual Assured Destruction' as a reality in present-day conditions, the Soviet debate on the viability of nuclear war as an instrument of policy was resolved by a consensus: nuclear war is so unpromising and dangerous that it remains an instrument of politics only in theory, an instrument of politics that cannot be used. A growing body of evidence thus indicates that in 1977, coincidentally with Marshal N.V. Ogarkov's elevation to Chief of the General Staff, the Soviets adopted an independent conventional war option as a long-term military development goal. Ogarkov and others now speak of a new revolution in Soviet military affairs that involves changes in Soviet doctrine generated by the so-called emerging technologies and the trend toward new, conventional means. The most prominent Soviet military figures now equate the new conventional means with nuclear weapons in terms of tasks, ranges, and target sets. A review of Soviet military writings in the 1980s further indicates that the new conventional means will be used in a war that involves neither the territories nor the nuclear forces of the superpowers.
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November 1, 1986
Reviews Marshal N.V. Ogarkov's writings from 1977 to 1985 which reveal that Ogarkov has long been the prophet of what General William Odom has dubbed the 'third revolution' in Soviet military affairs. Ogarkov's recurrent message encapsulates the changes in Soviet doctrine and capabilities that constitute the new revolution: the diminishing military utility of nuclear weapons and new combat characteristics of conventional means require that the forms and methods of combat action be adapted accordingly. Like Ogarkov, most prominent Soviet military figures have concluded that nonnuclear weapons outfitted with emerging technologies will furnish conventional solutions to nuclear problems in a future war. But Ogarkov's 1985 theater operation may well be the first official acknowledgement of the new, all-conventional dimension in Soviet strategy for a war on the European continent.
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November 1, 1980
In this paper, the acoustic disturbance due to underwater nuclear explosions is examined from the viewpoint of the tactical analyst.
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