Research for Nuclear Warfare

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The Impact of Nuclear Proliferation: Final Report
July 1, 1995
This CNA-sponsored study identifies implications of nuclear possession between 1994 and 2003 in distant Third World areas. It identifies policies and programs affecting the design, organization, location, and employment of future U.S. forces. After exploring potential paths for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, we examined how five notional political crises (North Korea, Iran, Syria/Libya, India/Pakistan, and Algeria) evolved into nuclear confrontations. Then we analyzed what U.S. interests were relevant for each case, what political and military instruments were available, and how well they worked. Also highlighted are what the successes and failures in these cases imply for policy, strategy, and force development. We analyzed the following questions: (1) Why would some state or other party want nuclear weapons, how would it acquire them, and how fast? (2) What U.S. interests were at stake in each crisis? (3) Could nuclear use or threat of use be deterred, and how? (4) Was preemption possible, and did it make sense? (5) What kind of retaliation was feasible and justifiable? (6) How, and to what extent, did third parties participate? (7) How does the prospect of nuclear use (the nuclear shadow) affect military operations? and (8) What was the relative importance of various force components in the notional crises.
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Arms Control and the New Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs
August 1, 1987
Throughout the last decade, the Soviet politico-military leadership has provided startling evidence of a new Soviet doctrine on nuclear and conventional wars. According to Soviet military writers, the changes in doctrine that constitute the new revolution in Soviet military affairs were generated by evolving technological developments in both nuclear and conventional arms. This paper provides evidence from Soviet military literature that changes in strategy, operational art, and tactics have in turn generated changes in force structure and weapons modernization that indicate a downgrading of nuclear contingencies and a preference for conventional warfare.
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The Soviet Leadership On Nuclear War
April 1, 1987
Throughout the last decade, the Soviet politico-military leadership has provided startling evidence of a new Soviet doctrine on nuclear war. Leading Soviet military thinkers have themselves traced the origin of this phenomenon to evolving technological developments in both nuclear and conventional arms. This paper reviews the Soviet politico-military writing since 1977 in order to document these changes, which have grown more and more explicit since General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev's 1977 address at Tula.
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Marshal Ogarkov and the New Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs
January 1, 1987
When the Soviets accepted 'Mutual Assured Destruction' as a reality in present-day conditions, the Soviet debate on the viability of nuclear war as an instrument of policy was resolved by a consensus: nuclear war is so unpromising and dangerous that it remains an instrument of politics only in theory, an instrument of politics that cannot be used. A growing body of evidence thus indicates that in 1977, coincidentally with Marshal N.V. Ogarkov's elevation to Chief of the General Staff, the Soviets adopted an independent conventional war option as a long-term military development goal. Ogarkov and others now speak of a new revolution in Soviet military affairs that involves changes in Soviet doctrine generated by the so-called emerging technologies and the trend toward new, conventional means. The most prominent Soviet military figures now equate the new conventional means with nuclear weapons in terms of tasks, ranges, and target sets. A review of Soviet military writings in the 1980s further indicates that the new conventional means will be used in a war that involves neither the territories nor the nuclear forces of the superpowers.
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Marshal Ogarkov on Modern War: 1977-1985
November 1, 1986
A review of Marshal N.V. Ogarkov's writings from 1977-85 reveals that the former Chief of the Soviet General Staff has consistently augured that phenomenon which General William Odom recently dubbed the 'third revolution' in Soviet military affairs. Far from signally the slightest attenuation of his public views, Ogarkov's 1985 book indicates that he has in fact intensified his drive to galvanize awareness of the altered military utility of nuclear weapons, the qualitatively new combat characteristics of conventional means, and the need to adapt the forms and methods of combat action accordingly. His latest 'operation in a TVD' may indeed reflect a 'revolutionized' Soviet military science, and his own activities since September 1984--its formal debut.
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Marshal Ogarkov on the Modern Theater Operations
November 1, 1986
Reviews Marshal N.V. Ogarkov's writings from 1977 to 1985 which reveal that Ogarkov has long been the prophet of what General William Odom has dubbed the 'third revolution' in Soviet military affairs. Ogarkov's recurrent message encapsulates the changes in Soviet doctrine and capabilities that constitute the new revolution: the diminishing military utility of nuclear weapons and new combat characteristics of conventional means require that the forms and methods of combat action be adapted accordingly. Like Ogarkov, most prominent Soviet military figures have concluded that nonnuclear weapons outfitted with emerging technologies will furnish conventional solutions to nuclear problems in a future war. But Ogarkov's 1985 theater operation may well be the first official acknowledgement of the new, all-conventional dimension in Soviet strategy for a war on the European continent.
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Changing Soviet Doctrine on Nuclear War
September 1, 1986
In January 1977, General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev delivered an address in the city of Tula whose impact on Soviet doctrine and capabilities continues to this day. By rejecting the possibility of a means of defense against nuclear weapons, or a damage-limiting capacity in nuclear war, Brezhnev closed the door on a debate that had lasted over a decade in Soviet military thought. Since Tula, the Soviet politico-military leadership has presented a consensus on the reality of 'Mutual Assured Destruction' in present-day conditions. The Soviet debate on the viability of nuclear war as an instrument of policy was likewise resolved by a consensus: nuclear war is so unpromising and dangerous that it remains an instrument of policy only in theory, an instrument of policy that cannot be used. While the Soviet consensus on the diminishing military utility of nuclear weapons represents a ground-breaking shift in doctrine since the heyday of Marshal Solokovskiy, there is scant evidence of any dispute on the new correlation of war and policy in a nuclear age. Marshal N.V. Ogarkov and other hard-minded military figures have themselves emerged as the architects of the Soviet shift away from a nuclear war-fighting and war-winning strategy, while General Secretary Gorbachev has fashioned a corresponding arms control agenda.
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THE FRENCH STRATEGIC DILEMMA
April 1, 1984
This paper identifies a basic strategic dilemma for France - on the one hand, French leaders identify the political purpose of nuclear weapons as the defense of French territory; on the other hand, a number of external pressures are inducing a need for France to provide a more explicit definition of the role of French nuclear weapons in the West European security system.
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FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE 1980S AND 1990S
November 1, 1983
This paper examines France's tactical and strategic nuclear policies, and analyzes the changes which French nuclear forces are likely to undergo in the 1980s and 1990s.
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THE SOVIET SHIFT IN EMPHASIS FROM NUCLEAR TO CONVENTIONAL; THE LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE
August 1, 1983
Examines shifts in the Soviet perspective on long-term military development, and discusses the doctrinal realization of these shifting perspectives in the course of successive five-year plans.
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