Research for North Atlantic Treaty Organization

This report describes the force structures and dispositions of major navies since World War II. Included are computer-generated 40-year order-of-battle tables for NATO and ANZUS countries, Japan, and the Soviet Union. Geographic charts are also provided that show fleet dispositions in five-year snapshots and during specified crises. Line graphs illustrate trends in both force structures and dispositions over time. These products draw on a 700,000-entry data base created by a joint Naval Intelligence-CNA research effort. The data base will be updated as of July 1 of every year with current information and whenever pertinent crises warrant inclusion.

The leadership of the U.S. Navy has recommended that the United States seriously consider the option of attacking Soviet ballistic missile submarines during the conventional phase of a major war. While the vocal debate rages on in the United States, the allies of the U.S. in Europe and elsewhere have been publically silent. This paper addresses some of the questions which might be at the center of the debate. Its purpose is not to seek conclusive answers, but to clarify--for example to point out that the U.S. has no interest in attacking Soviet missile-carrying submarines except on behalf of the security and integrity of the Alliance.

The role of the Pacific theater in a NATO-Warsaw Pact War is considered. The paper argues that the Pacific theater has been neglected in such a conflict because most war scenarios envision a struggle lasting no more than 30 to 60 days. As a result, the conflict is over too quickly in most scenarios for the interrelationships between the NATO and Pacific theaters to develop conceptually. However, in a long-war scenario, the Pacific theater's importance in the course and outcome of such a conflict becomes apparent. The military, industrial, and technological potential of the Pacific nations, especially China and Japan, combined with the U.S., constitute a reserve of strength capable of containing or reversing any Soviet success in a conventional conflict in Europe. This paper concludes that (a) current strategy or doctrine based on the refusal to repudiate the 'first use' of nuclear weapons has lost much of its credibility as a deterrent, and (b) the tacit or explicit adoption of a long-war strategy to counter Soviet capabilities in a short war should be considered.

This paper examines the current force procurement plans of each of the Western European and NATO navies as of the end of 1981 and estimates their impact on future force structure.