Research for Naval Forces

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December 1, 1998

This paper looks at the history of the U.S. Navy forces and their involvement in smaller-scale contingency (SSC) operations, drawing from both earlier naval history, called its 'Deep Legacy', and the Cold War experience. The goal being to organize the history of naval involvement in SSC and, to a lesser extent, in operations other than war, to help identify the spectrum of policy options available to today's naval planners when they are thinking about SSC. It identifies patterns in how the Navy has reacted and adapted to its environments, including changing its procurement, organization, deployment and employment policies and structures. In addition to adapting to the environment, the paper examines the development of new technologies and the Navy's culture and attitudes driving decisions. DTIC AD-A360116

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August 1, 1998
This report is the product of a CNA self-initiated project to explore the evolution of the notions of military deterrence and influence in the new era after the Cold War. Deterrence during the Cold War was global, focused on the Soviet Union and on nuclear balances and threats; however, a new perspective on deterrence is needed in this new era. The report concludes that the task of military deterrence and influence in the post-Cold War period is to contribute to a stable world system so that the economic world can function and prosper. The role of military forces is to foster the stability in which economies can thrive. U.S. military forces do this by organizing and extending both bilateral relations with key countries and sustaining and extending broad collective security arrangements, and by walling off the few rogues that aspire to mount aggressions against their neighbors.
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February 1, 1995
With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new era, many of the overarching concepts behind U.S. defense policy are open to questioning. In the Cold War, deterrence was perhaps the key concept. The thinking about deterrence--both theoretical and policy-related consideration--focused on nuclear deterrence issues. In the new era, deterrence remains a key issue but the focus turns to 'conventional' deterrence. Key associated concepts in this emerging new world order are compulsion and reassurance. This paper provides some perspectives on the role of naval forces in deterrence, compulsion, and reassurance in the post-Cold War era. In addition to a brief overview of some of the theoretical issues surrounding deterrence, this paper focuses on some concrete examples of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps actions in response to or amidst international crises over the past 40 years. It discusses the ways these actions might have compelled an opponent to stop or reverse some action, deterred a potential adversary from taking some action, and/or reassured an ally to take some type of action.
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September 1, 1994

The Naval Doctrine Command asked the Center for Naval Analyses to examine the command and control doctrine and practice of U.S. naval forces. The purpose of this effort is to help the Command (1) refine naval doctrine and (2) participate more effectively in the development of joint doctrine. CNA's Naval Command and Control for Joint Operations project examines how current Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) and Amphibious Warfare concepts can better integrate with the command and control of joint and combined operations. One of the objectives of this study is to understand how the dynamics that drive command and control for joint and combined operations differ from those that drive the Navy's use of the CWC structure. To do this, we need to examine the following questions: (1) How did our current joint and combined command structures evolve? (2) Why did these structures take the forms that they have? and (3) What are the implications for naval forces? This research memorandum focuses on the origins and evolution of U.S. doctrine for joint, combined, and amphibious warfare. First, we discuss how doctrine developed from the initial U.S. experience at modern coalition warfare in World War I, and then through the development of techniques and doctrine for operations between the wars. Second, we examine how current doctrine arose out of World War II. Finally, we discuss some of the implications for today's naval forces.

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September 1, 1993
Using a two-phase approach, the Future Russian Navy study -- commissioned by the Director of Naval Intelligence -- examined the individual factors that will compete with one another to drive the force posture and capabilities of the 21st-century Russian Navy. Phase I evaluated as discrete entities historical, economic, security, and foreign policy interests as well as politico-sociological and economic constraints. Phase II then evaluated these competing interests and constraints, and derived a range of potential force postures and capabilities for the Russian Navy of the year 2013. The result describes a Russian Navy dependent principally on the success or failure of Russian national economic reform.
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December 1, 1992
This memorandum, a part of CNA's Pacific Fleet Basing Study sponsored by CINCPACFLT, describes the history of shore support and operating conditions of U.S. naval forces in the western Pacific from the 19th century to World War II. It discusses the rationale, force structure, and shore support of U.S. naval forces during three time periods: pre-Spanish-American War, post-Spanish-American War to World War I, and World War I to World War II. Key advantages and disadvantages of shore support for each of these periods are highlighted.
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August 1, 1992
In the 15-year period of 1977 through 1991, U.S. military forces responded to international crises or incidents in 83 cases. This information memorandum presents key findings from historical data in three studies on U.S. military activity since World War II. It examines the questions of whether there is a baseline global demand for U.S. crisis response activity and what impact the Soviet collapse had on the level of U.S. activity. More specifically, the memorandum discusses the role of naval forces in U.S. crisis response activity, focusing on the steady frequency of naval responses over time, the important role played by carriers and the Marine Corps in those responses, the participation of naval forces in all cases involving terrorism, and the increasing concentration of naval crisis response activity in the Middle East during the 1980s.
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December 1, 1991
This volume of the Desert Storm Reconstruction Report summarizes the reconstruction of the operation of U.S. Navy forces during Operation Desert Storm. Because those forces were so heavily involved in the broader aspects of the war, as well as the preliminary operations during Desert Shield, some aspects of that broader involvement are also treated here. In particular, the Navy's contributions to building the Coalition through its work with the maritime interception force are discussed at length, as are the planning and conduct of Marine Corps amphibious operations. By means of a historical and analytical review, this paper seeks to identify the broader themes that should influence the critical decisions the Navy must take in the coming years of rethinking and retrenching U.S. defense policy and procurements. The paper does not, however, make any attempt to summarize Marine Corps operations ashore. See also 27 910178 thru 27 910190.
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December 1, 1990
In an effort to address the most compelling issues surrounding the Soviet Navy in the era of Perestroika, ONI and CNA brought together more than 35 specialists on the Soviet Union from both inside and outside the government. Their views are recorded in this report and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CNA or the United States Navy.
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July 1, 1989
This research memorandum considers the foundation of post-World War II force levels of the Navy's offensive components: fleet carriers, amphibious lift, and attack submarines. It compares the forces planned versus the actual forces of the postwar era. The force levels of the three components are compared with each other and their time variations examined. The report isolates those factors that influenced postwar force levels. Changes in any of these factors could mean changes in future force levels.
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