Research for NATO

CNAC has had a program of seminars with its Russian counterparts since 1991. We have discussed a range of issues, from strategic nuclear matters to naval cooperation. For the seminar we are planning in Russia in the summer or fall of 2001, one of the prime agenda items will be the long-term future of the relation of Russia to European security (assuming the United States has a long-term future relation in Europe as well). As part of our preparations for the seminar, we organized a workshop to discuss the issues of Russia and European security. It was held at CNA on 13 April 2001. The format of the workshop involved five speakers, each addressing one of five scenarios chosen to raise a full range of issues. The scenarios, described in this paper, are: 1) NATO expansion to Russia's borders; 2) bringing Russia into NATO; 3) Russia and Europe gradually converging in matters of security; 4) Europe creates a security infrastructure separate from U.S. and from Russia; and 5) drift in European security arrangements.

The purpose of this paper is to document the chronological account of the air operation, Operation Deliberate Force, for the historical record. This was NATO's first extended air operation. From August 30 until September 19, 1995, allied forces flew a total of 3,515 sorties by nine countries, with losses of only one aircraft and no crew. This chronological account demonstrates the process required to shift from a UN military peacekeeping operation to a NATO peace-enforcement operation and offers a lesson for the future.

Examines the U.S. public's attitude toward Europe and NATO, and what this may portend for future U.S. security policy. This paper specifically discusses where American public opinion stands in the mid-1980s in light of shifting American trade patterns and demographics, and whether these shifts have had any discernable influence on the American public's view of the world.

The role of the Pacific theater in a NATO-Warsaw Pact War is considered. The paper argues that the Pacific theater has been neglected in such a conflict because most war scenarios envision a struggle lasting no more than 30 to 60 days. As a result, the conflict is over too quickly in most scenarios for the interrelationships between the NATO and Pacific theaters to develop conceptually. However, in a long-war scenario, the Pacific theater's importance in the course and outcome of such a conflict becomes apparent. The military, industrial, and technological potential of the Pacific nations, especially China and Japan, combined with the U.S., constitute a reserve of strength capable of containing or reversing any Soviet success in a conventional conflict in Europe. This paper concludes that (a) current strategy or doctrine based on the refusal to repudiate the 'first use' of nuclear weapons has lost much of its credibility as a deterrent, and (b) the tacit or explicit adoption of a long-war strategy to counter Soviet capabilities in a short war should be considered.