Research for National Military and Defense Policies

Throughout the last decade, the Soviet politico-military leadership has provided startling evidence of a new Soviet doctrine on nuclear and conventional wars. According to Soviet military writers, the changes in doctrine that constitute the new revolution in Soviet military affairs were generated by evolving technological developments in both nuclear and conventional arms. This paper provides evidence from Soviet military literature that changes in strategy, operational art, and tactics have in turn generated changes in force structure and weapons modernization that indicate a downgrading of nuclear contingencies and a preference for conventional warfare.

A review of Marshal N.V. Ogarkov's writings from 1977-85 reveals that the former Chief of the Soviet General Staff has consistently augured that phenomenon which General William Odom recently dubbed the 'third revolution' in Soviet military affairs. Far from signally the slightest attenuation of his public views, Ogarkov's 1985 book indicates that he has in fact intensified his drive to galvanize awareness of the altered military utility of nuclear weapons, the qualitatively new combat characteristics of conventional means, and the need to adapt the forms and methods of combat action accordingly. His latest 'operation in a TVD' may indeed reflect a 'revolutionized' Soviet military science, and his own activities since September 1984--its formal debut.

In January 1977, General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev delivered an address in the city of Tula whose impact on Soviet doctrine and capabilities continues to this day. By rejecting the possibility of a means of defense against nuclear weapons, or a damage-limiting capacity in nuclear war, Brezhnev closed the door on a debate that had lasted over a decade in Soviet military thought. Since Tula, the Soviet politico-military leadership has presented a consensus on the reality of 'Mutual Assured Destruction' in present-day conditions. The Soviet debate on the viability of nuclear war as an instrument of policy was likewise resolved by a consensus: nuclear war is so unpromising and dangerous that it remains an instrument of policy only in theory, an instrument of policy that cannot be used. While the Soviet consensus on the diminishing military utility of nuclear weapons represents a ground-breaking shift in doctrine since the heyday of Marshal Solokovskiy, there is scant evidence of any dispute on the new correlation of war and policy in a nuclear age. Marshal N.V. Ogarkov and other hard-minded military figures have themselves emerged as the architects of the Soviet shift away from a nuclear war-fighting and war-winning strategy, while General Secretary Gorbachev has fashioned a corresponding arms control agenda.

In the 1960s, French defense policy emphasized the protection of French territory rather than the collective security of France and her European allies. This began to change in the late 1970s. The French contribution to European security is now a matter of considerable debate within France. This memorandum examines the issues and the options that are involved.