Research for Military Presence

With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new era, many of the overarching concepts behind U.S. defense policy are open to questioning. In the Cold War, deterrence was perhaps the key concept. The thinking about deterrence--both theoretical and policy-related consideration--focused on nuclear deterrence issues. In the new era, deterrence remains a key issue but the focus turns to 'conventional' deterrence. Key associated concepts in this emerging new world order are compulsion and reassurance. This paper provides some perspectives on the role of naval forces in deterrence, compulsion, and reassurance in the post-Cold War era. In addition to a brief overview of some of the theoretical issues surrounding deterrence, this paper focuses on some concrete examples of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps actions in response to or amidst international crises over the past 40 years. It discusses the ways these actions might have compelled an opponent to stop or reverse some action, deterred a potential adversary from taking some action, and/or reassured an ally to take some type of action.

The Navy, like any military organization, exists to employ force in the service of national policy--in short, to wage war. Peacetime operations have influence precisely because they carry with them a constant reminder of the ability of the Navy and the nation to use force to compel or protect. The Navy must not neglect its warfighting heritage. But the demands of the post-Cold War world require greater attention to the use of the Navy to influence other nations in conditions short of war or crisis. As we enter the twenty-first century, the Navy must accept new responsibilities to keep our friends friendly, to keep our adversaries deterred and quiescent, to draw uncommitted states closer to the United States, and to either restore stability to unstable regimes or mitigate the consequences of instability. Despite its reputation as a conservative organization, one of the great strengths of the Navy is its ability to adapt. It adapted to the dominance of the carrier in 1942. It adapted to the needs of inshore warfare in Vietnam. It adapted to the challenge of a seagoing Soviet superpower in the final decades of the Cold War. Now it must adapt to the need to use the tools of war to gain peacetime influence in an uncertain age.

This research memorandum explores the political effects of U.S. military presence in the Asian-Pacific region. It proposes a framework that outlines the goals of presence and the process through which political effects develop. It then uses this conceptual framework to examine the political effects of presence in the region. This paper surveys U.S. policy objectives in the future security environment in Asia and explores the direct contribution of presence to U.S. policy objectives and the indirect support it gives through bolstering stability. Finally, it notes some implications of the analysis for future U.S. force options in the region. See also 96 005100, 96 005200, and 55 000506.

Since the end of World War II, U.S. Naval forces have played a major role in at least 207 U.S. responses to international incidents and crises, exclusive of the Korean and Vietnam wars. This research memorandum summarizes these U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps crisis management operations. Updates 27 890315.