Research for Maritime Strategy

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October 1, 1993
The Navy, like any military organization, exists to employ force in the service of national policy--in short, to wage war. Peacetime operations have influence precisely because they carry with them a constant reminder of the ability of the Navy and the nation to use force to compel or protect. The Navy must not neglect its warfighting heritage. But the demands of the post-Cold War world require greater attention to the use of the Navy to influence other nations in conditions short of war or crisis. As we enter the twenty-first century, the Navy must accept new responsibilities to keep our friends friendly, to keep our adversaries deterred and quiescent, to draw uncommitted states closer to the United States, and to either restore stability to unstable regimes or mitigate the consequences of instability. Despite its reputation as a conservative organization, one of the great strengths of the Navy is its ability to adapt. It adapted to the dominance of the carrier in 1942. It adapted to the needs of inshore warfare in Vietnam. It adapted to the challenge of a seagoing Soviet superpower in the final decades of the Cold War. Now it must adapt to the need to use the tools of war to gain peacetime influence in an uncertain age.
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May 1, 1993
Despite current political and socio-economic uncertainties, the Russian leaders continue to develop new concepts regarding the role and capabilities of the future Russian Navy. This study examines three likely parameters of future Russian naval development: current implementation of the 'reasonable sufficiency' concept, the Russian image of future war, and Russia's new military doctrine. On both the nuclear and conventional levels, the application of 'reasonable sufficiency' to future naval development continues to generate a significant degree of civil-military divergence. On the other hand, a strong civil-military consensus underlies Russian views on the role of naval forces in future war. Like their Soviet predecessors, Russian military and civilian experts view Operation Desert Storm as the paradigm of future war in strategy, operational art, and tactics. Finally, Russia's new military doctrine and surrounding discussions provide evidence regarding Russia's 'vital' national interests, threats to these interests, and the role of the Russian Navy in Russian national security policy.
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April 1, 1993
This briefing concerns institutionalizing strategic change in the Navy. It focuses on the lessons of the 1945-47 era under Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal.
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March 1, 1993

In response to a request from the DCNO for Plans, Policy, and Operations, CNA (with the Hudson Institute and the Naval War College) conducted a study of the conditions under which multinational naval cooperation at sea could support U.S. interests in the decade ahead. The study considered the prospects and problems associated with coalition operations and combined exercises in the major areas of operation of the fleet commanders in chief. This memorandum summarizes the study approach and presents key findings. A series of supporting documents issued by CNA contains specialized regional and functional analyses.

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March 1, 1993
This research memorandum is one in a series of papers stemming from CNA's Future Russian Navy project, which was requested by the Director of Naval Intelligence. In this paper, we examine the evolving maritime interests of the former Soviet Union and those of Russia, its principal heir. Until the 1960s, the Soviet Union acted as a coastal state, protecting its own territorial waters. It then built up its forces and emerged as a significant global maritime power in the late 1960s. Now Russia is returning to a coastal focus. We look at the reasons for this latest shift in focus -- namely, problems in Russia's oil and fishing industries -- and the way in which the Russian Navy's missions will likely change to reflect the nation's new economic imperatives.
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March 1, 1991
This paper examines the curriculum of the Naval War College, focusing on adapting the current three-course program to provide a more appropriate education for the officers looking to meet the nation's needs through the tumultuous decade ahead.
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October 1, 1984
U.S. defense officials have often said that the Soviet Union expects Western Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) forces to attack its Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) and thus is prepared to defend them in war. These Soviet expectations may have been encouraged by U.S. declaratory policy on the subject--that is, the totality of official and other authoritative statements on strategic doctrine and policy, ASW technology and programs from which Soviet observers reach conclusions about U.S. intentions. This paper reviews U.S. declaratory policy between 1970 and 1985 to determine specifically what that policy has been and then to infer what it has probably meant to the Soviets. It concludes that throughout this period official U.S. declaratory policy has implied an intent to engage in strategic ASW and that the Soviets have had strong reasons to believe that their SSBNs have been and will continue to be targets of U.S. ASW forces.
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