Research for MANPOWER

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January 1, 2006
Career paths and compensation are ideally tailored to fit the requirements of specific occupational fields and individual workers. Different skills and occupations call for different pay as well as different amounts of in-house training, career lengths, and assignment patterns. In the military, however, career paths and the structure of compensation tend to be rigid and the basic outlines have persisted since before the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force. Most analysts and policy-makers agree that the future Navy will consist of more technologically advanced platforms organized to have a more agile fleet. This fleet will call for a smaller, more experienced workforce that spends more time in operational billets. If these predictions are correct, substantial changes must occur in manpower, personnel, and training systems. It will be necessary to have more innovative career paths. In this paper, we will first show that the Navy workforce is more junior than its nonmilitary counterpart. We will then review literature that shows that this has already created problems. Next, we argue that future changes will make it even more compelling to undertake reforms needed to create a more experienced force. Then we will explore some possible reforms to create innovative career paths.
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February 1, 2005

The Marine Corps's manpower costs—about $9.4 billion—represent 60 percent of its annual budget. Before this study, there was no institutionalized and documented methodology for forecasting losses and no systematic attempt to improve existing techniques. Personnel charged with developing plans to meet Marine Corps endstrength requirements relied on information gleaned during overlap with their predecessors and sometimes developed their own methods, which were susceptible to errors. The study's authors revamped the process to make it more systematic and recommended ways to accurately forecast endstrength losses and gains.

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June 1, 2003
To facilitate true military transformation, the naval research community must work more closely than ever with leadership so that it can inform, shape, and support this systemic change. To this end, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) hosted the Third Annual Navy Workforce Research and Analysis Conference on March 31 and April 1, 2003. The conference brought together Navy’s leadership and the research communities to discuss how to better integrate today’s research and development (R&D) efforts with leadership’s evolving manpower, personnel, and training vision. This document relates the conference presentations and discussions to aspects of the CNP’s FY03 guidance and the Navy’s R&D priorities—including efforts to shape the force, better establish manpower requirements, design Sailor-centric systems, leverage new technology, manage careers more effectively, provide service members with a positive Navy experience, and create a seamless military team.
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June 1, 2003
This report is a technical supplement to the report, Military Transformation as a Competitive Systemic Process: The Case of Japan and the United States Between the World Wars, by William D. O'Neil (CRM D0008616.A1, June 2003). It surveys available data on the economic resources of Japan and the United States in the period between the world wars and their allocation to defense purposes. Various comparative measures are derived. In general terms, the economy of the United States was roughly seven times as large as that of Japan. However, because Japan devoted a much greater proportion of its national product to defense, the amount it spent on defense between the wars was roughly equivalent to that of the U.S.
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October 1, 2001
CNA was tasked by N-81 as part of the Integrated Warfare Architectures (IWARS) program to examine and assess the process that determines the wartime medical manpower requirement. We examined the processes for staffing the Navy's hospital ships (T-AHs), fleet hospitals (FHs), and the OCONUS military medical treatment facility (MTF) augment. We also examined how the medical manpower requirements for the fleet and Fleet Marine Force (FMF) are determined.
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February 1, 2001
The purpose of N81's M&P IWAR (Manpower and Personnel Integrated Warfare Architecture) 2000 is to examine the alignment of the Navy's operational capabilities and requirements. The examination focuses on four areas: civilian staffing, medical manpower, reserves, and retention. This study supported that effort by addressing the medical manpower issue. Our specific tasks were: provide a comprehensive profile of all operational medical personnel assets by Navy fleet and Fleet Marine Force (FMF) organizational structure; identify capabilities provided by each medical unit by platform or related organizational entity; identify the medical manpower requirement determination process for both the Navy fleets and FMFs; assess the requirement determination process, examine differences and inconsistencies within and between Navy fleets and FMFs; and, identify opportunities to achieve balance and consistency in the distribution of medical manpower resources.
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January 1, 1999
The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Manpower, and Personnel asked CNA to analyze ways to transform the size and shape of the enlisted force to better meet the Navy's future requirements at an affordable cost. In this research, we analyze how the Sea Tour Extension Program (STEP) could improve sea/shore balance in the Navy. We discuss who would be eligible and how many sailors would likely extend their sea tours in response to STEP. We also examine how much STEP would improve sea manning, the cost of the program, and how large of a bonus would be effective. We found that a STEP bonus of about $250 per month would eliminate manning differential in the undermanned ratings and improve sea/shore rotation in ratings targeted solely for sea/shore ratio reasons. Such a STEP would have a program cost of about $23 million.
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June 1, 1998
The purpose of this study is to help the Navy identify the costs imposed on the Navy manpower system when military billets are outsourced. In particular, this paper examines how competition will affect the Navy's ability to achieve its objectives with respect to sea-shore rotation and homebasing. It provides, by community, estimates of how different outsourcing options would affect these military manpower decisions. The paper concludes that personnel policy constraints, especially the goal of providing an adequate base of shore billets for rotation, place significant limits on the number of military billets entered into A-76 competitions. Given the magnitude of manpower constraints, the Navy has two policy options: reduce the number of military billets to be competed or loosen the number of constraints. Loosening the constraints would involve: more carefully defining sea/shore ratios, allowing some A-76 competitions with high expected savings to be completed even if exceptions must be made to personnel policy goals, examining overseas shore billets that count as sea duty as good outsourcing candidates, and reexamining some of the IBR exclusions, especially for shore-intensive ratings. DTIC AD-B239314
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June 1, 1998
A primary tasking for this study was to build a permanent database integrating Navy recruiting, training, and manpower/personnel data which would follow recruits from street to fleet and use variables designed to capture the kinds of information needed by decision-makers. This paper summarizes our analyses and briefly describes the database. It begins with the different analyses we did of the bootcamp period, goes on to a discussion of rating attainment, and finishes with our analyses of trained sailors in the fleet. Findings and recommendations include coding separation reasons more consistently, revising the CNET monthly bootcamp attrition report, more careful screening of sailors with nonacademic course failures who are sent to the fleet, and supporting initiatives to provide a second chance at school for sailors who fail an A-school course.
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June 1, 1998
This study examines potential manpower costs of outsourcing Navy jobs that result from more Sailors having to work out-of-skill. To examine these costs, we estimated the effects on retention and advancement of working in billets related to one's skill and in instructor billets. Focusing on E5 and E6 billets, we then compare the quantifiable costs of outsourcing military billets to the expected savings. Currently, 49.6 percent of E5 and E6 Sailors are assigned to rating-specific NECs on their shore tours. The analysis finds that if more than 49.6 percent of the outsourced billets are rating-specific, there would be fewer opportunities to work in-skill and lower retention, which would lead to costs to offset. We recommend that, when determining what billets to compete, the Navy start with general skill billets and other out-of-skill billets. Furthermore, if the Navy were to compete in-skill billets, we recommend that it compete low-training billets before high-training and instructor billets.
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