Research for Manning

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SELRES Manning In Limited-Supply/High-Demand Skills
February 1, 2008
Increased requirements for the Navy Reserve in support of the Global War on Terror have not been distributed evenly across communities; some Limited-Supply/High-Demand (LS/HD) skills are experiencing difficulties in meeting mission requirements. We develop metrics to measure and monitor the Reserve Component’s capacity to meet LS/HD missions and suggest strategies to mitigate manning shortfalls. We construct a model that estimates the ratio of the number of mobilizable reservists that will be available for each mobilization requirement in each quarter for the next 3 years. Working with our sponsor, we established a threshold of 6 mobilizable reservists for each requirement to indicate when a skill is LS/HD. We predict the ratio for 42 enlisted ratings and 14 officer designators. According to our estimates, 31 enlisted ratings and 4 officer designators either already are, or will be, LS/HD within the next 3 years in one or more paygrades. We then illustrate with the Builder (BU) rating how to conduct sensitivity analyses to see the effect on capacity and help identify strategies for improvement. Specifically, we show what would happen to the ratio if continuation rates were increased, if recruiting were increased, or if the mission were decreased.
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Improving Navy's Buying Power Through Cost Savings
October 1, 2006

The Department of the Navy wants to recapitalize but finds that it does not have as much buying power as it used to. Last year, CNA examined the trends in the Navy's budgets and prices to understand why the Navy could not buy as many weapons platforms as it used to: the study found that the Navy had less to spend on procurement than before and that the Navy's mix of ships and aircraft cost more on average now than before. To reverse the trend and buy more platforms, the Navy needs to devote more money for procurement and/or buy less expensive platforms. This study examined various initiatives or savings opportunities (total of 17) that would allow the Navy to allocate more money for procurement. Taken together, the total savings from these initiatives are about $7 billion to $10 billion (or 5 to 8 percent of the Navy’s annual budget). We assessed the risk associated with these initiatives and deemed most to be minimal to moderate risk in terms of cost uncertainty, effects on readiness, or other effectiveness measures. Nonetheless, tough decisions must be made and cultural and other barriers must be overcome before the Navy may reap the savings.

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Manning Under AIP
June 1, 2006
The Navy began offering Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) for hard-to-fill billets in three geographic locations in June 2003. At that time, N13 asked CNA to analyze various components of the experiment. In this CNA report, we analyze different aspects of the experiment that are now possible because it is no longer in its initial stages. In particular, we conducted an analysis of (1) how overall manning has changed since AIP began, (2) how manning has changed in AIP locations that were selected early in the experiment, (3) differences in the quality, or other characteristics of Sailors in AIP locations, (4) changes in the rate at which Sailors selected for AIP jobs ultimately show up for those jobs, and (5) retention decisions of single-parent Sailors since AIP began.
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SelRes Attrition and the Selected Reserve Incentive Program in the Marine Corps Reserve
March 1, 2006

This study hopes to improve the Selected Reserve Incentive Program (SRIP) and to help the Marine Corps Reserve (MCR) to better understand Selected Reserve (SelRes) attrition. First, we document the legislative authorities for the payment of SelRes unit bonuses and bonus offerings across the Guard/Reserve components. Next, we document findings from focus groups held with Marines in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The study also describes recommended changes to the current SRIP that could help improve its ability to recruit and retain Marines in SMCR units. Finally, we present our analysis of SelRes attrition and the effect of SRIP bonuses on retention.

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Can Do No More? An Assessment of Seabee Compensation
May 1, 2002
In recent years, the Seabee community-the Navy's 'construction force'-has become concerned about its ability to retain skilled enlisted personnel. It fears that the Seabees' expanded mission, hectic deployment schedule, and harsh work environments have created retention and manning difficulties, which will worsen due to recent sea pay increases for seagoing personnel. In response to these concerns, NAVFAC asked CNA to assess whether an additional Seabee compensation is warranted and, if so, to recommend appropriate pay delivery vehicles. For mid- and senior-grades, the Seabee sea retention and manning environments are generally similar to or worse than those experienced by similarly skilled shipboard personnel. Yet recent sea pay enhancements are designed to address fleet recruiting, retention, and manning problems. As such, they will provide a "fix" for the problems facing the shipboard groups, but will not improve Seabee conditions since Seabees do not receive sea pays during sea tours. Providing the Seabees with a pay comparable in size to sea pay enhancement would cost $2.9 to $4.3 million annually, depending on whether it targets manning shortfalls or is equally distributed. The most promising near-term compensation vehicles for this pay would be an increase in the meals or incidental expenses portion of per diem for Seabees, whereas a long-term fix might require the implementation of a distribution incentive pay with targeted Selective Reenlistment Bonus.
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