Research for Lump-Sum

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February 1, 2012

An assessment of the costs and benefits that would result if the Navy were it to substitute lump-sum Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (LSSRBs) for its current program of anniversary payment SRBs (APSRBs). The principal argument in favor of this policy change is to capitalize on sailors’ preferences for receiving payment in the here and now: in front-loading payments, the Navy could offer smaller SRBs without reducing the value that Service member’s place on these bonuses. The principal argument against paying out lump-sum SRBs is that the prospect of receiving anniversary payments acts as an incentive for sailors to remain in the Navy during their term of reenlistment, and eliminating these would increase losses from the Service. Our analysis suggests that adopting LSSRBs would likely result in significant savings over the long term, even accounting for the possibility of increased losses (these savings would be especially great for smaller SRBs that are offered for shorter reenlistments). We also find that the policy change could have substantial non-monetary costs and benefits: adopting LSSRBs would result in the SRB program being easier to manage when the economy is contracting, but more difficult to manage when the economy is expanding.

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May 1, 2004
The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) program is the primary tool for shaping the career force. The first-term, or Zone A, SRB is key because it is the only point at which recommended and eligible Marines can be denied reenlistment in a skill area (PMOS) if their numbers would exceed requirements. In this paper, we find that SRB multiples have a large effect on reenlistment rates by occupation. Additionally, lump-sum SRBs have a larger effect on reenlistment rates than those paid in timed installments. We estimate a model that includes factors influencing the reenlistment decision separately for Zones A, B, and C. Results suggest that SRBs significantly raise reenlistment rates in all zones. Furthermore, the switch to lump-sum SRBs had fairly dramatic effects on program costs. We estimate the Marine Corps saved $8 million in Zone A and $10.4 to $25.7 million in Zone B by offering lump-sum rather than timed bonuses in FY03. We estimate predicted reenlistment rates by occupational field and bonus level and a decision model that strength planners can use to set Zone A SRB levels by PMOS. Finally, we compare the relative costs and benefits of SRBs versus lateral moves for filling boatspaces in undermanned areas.
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