Research for Logistics Requirements

The Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1992 directed the Secretary of the Navy to study 'the costs of improving the Port of Haifa, Israel, and facilities in the immediate vicinity, to accommodate the full complement of services required for the maintenance, repair and associated tasks needed to support a carrier battle group.' The Secretary of the Navy tasked the Center for Naval Analyses to conduct the study. He asked that we address the needs of rotationally deployed naval forces in the U.S. Sixth Fleet. We did not address homeporting in Haifa. We assumed that the Navy would continue to maintain self-sufficiency of its deployed forces. Providing support to visiting ships can be thought of in two dimensions: (1) the level of services each ship will demand; and (2) the number of ships that will simultaneously make such demands. Even more complicating is the fact that different types of ships request different levels and types of service. To cover the range of needs the port of Haifa may encounter in the future, we examined different levels of demand and support. Our analysis examines requirements generated by five notional task groups, comprising various numbers and types of ships. For each task group, we also analyze different degrees of support and provide assessments of the marginal benefits of a range of investment levels. This paper presents our research on logistics issues relevant to ship visits to Haifa and support of fleet operations in the general vicinity of Israel. We also address the flow

The Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1992 directed the Secretary of the Navy to study 'the costs of improving the Port of Haifa, Israel, and facilities in the immediate vicinity, to accommodate the full complement of services required for the maintenance, repairs, and associated tasks needed to support a carrier battle group.' The Secretary of the Navy tasked the Center for Naval Analyses to conduct the study. He asked that we address rotationally deployed naval forces to the U.S. Sixth Fleet. We did not address homeporting in Haifa. We assumed that the Navy would continue to maintain its self-sufficiency of deployed forces. We have published the results of our study in separate documents -- one each on harbor services, ship maintenance, and logistics support, plus a summary report. This research memorandum addresses the harbor services portion of the support provided to ships visiting Haifa. Our work was supported by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Atlantic Division. See also 27 930089.10 - 27 930092.10.

This research memorandum presents a means of calculating the expected length of 'awaiting-parts time' of weapon replaceable assemblies, which are needed to calculate aircraft readiness in a multi-indenture, readiness-based sparing model. The method presented is appropriate for any other level of indenture. Although full scale application of the model is not feasible at this time, the model aids in comparing and evaluating existing models.

Tanker tonnage and the numbers of tankers available to support U.S. forces in wartime are projected for 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2010. The key finding of the analysis is that the supply of tankers will fall far short of estimated Department of Defense (DOD) requirements. This rapid shrinkage of tankers is deemed likely because domestic crude oil production is projected to decline substantially, and because additional pipeline construction is underway. If DOD continues to rely on the Ready Reserve Force to fill the shortfall in numbers of available tankers, by the mid-1990s the fleet of reserve tankers would have to be expanded to about triple the size DOD currently anticipates. Accordingly, the study recommends that the Navy consider the alternative policy of outsourcing for delivering fuel to armed forces during wartime. rtime.