Research for Levels of Forces

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April 1, 1996
Since 1989, the Navy has decommissioned 165 ships, seen its endstrength fall by nearly a quarter, and had its budget reduced by $38 billion -- a net reduction of 32 percent. These cuts have raised fears that the Navy may once again be on the verge of a hollow force. Our review of the readiness literature suggests that hollowness is a condition that keeps ships from living up to their design potential. It is the general state that persists whenever maintenance problems dominate a force; when poor quality sailors seem the rule rather than the exception; and when meaningful training is both scarce and questionable. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Navy experienced all of these problems and more. This paper summarizes the stages of our work on this issue and discusses the insights and key findings we have made along the way.
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November 1, 1991
This paper analyzes 'the way ahead' for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps in view of recent events, in particular the dissolution of the Soviet threat, U.S. economic woes, and a vivid Southwest Asia experience. These events have led to three guiding themes for the Navy's future. First, naval forces should have a structure that continues to enable action in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans. Phrased another way, the nation needs a 'three-ocean Navy.' Second, the Navy should not only adapt to a joint approach to military presence, crisis response, and regional contingencies but also play a key leadership role. The nation needs a 'joint Navy' and the Navy should take heed. Third, the naval acquisition process needs to adjust to better harmonize military industry with new national priorities. The nation needs 'opportunistic acquisition,' and this is a message to the military-industrial complex.
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October 1, 1991
This volume of the Desert Storm Reconstruction Report addresses the role of the amphibious forces during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Specifically, the document discusses the tactics employed, the threats encountered, and the missions performed by the amphibious forces.
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November 1, 1984
This paper presents an illustration of a method that can be used to examine tradoffs in force levels (aircraft) and the logistic support required for these aircraft.
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February 1, 1981
This paper emphasizes that U.S. military presence in the Pacific has not changed in its fundamental intent over the past years.
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June 1, 1974
In an environment characterized by austere budgets and changing force levels, the need to provide estimates of support requirements corresponding to force alternatives has become acute. The procedure described here meets this challenge by incorporating Leontief's input-output analysis into a force cost model. One advantage to this technique is that it allocates support resources to the forces, thus giving insight into the utilization of support by forces. However, its real power is in capturing the existing implicit support relationships and using them to project support resources consistent with specified forces. This approach does not attempt to find optimal support policies; it does predict the marginal impact of force changes based on a given set of support policies. It can also, if desired, estimate the resource impact if support policies are varied. The input-output model described here was developed for the U.S. Navy but the method has applicability to any large interrelated system.
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June 1, 1974
This paper describes two types of cost analyses - procurement costing and force level costing - and discusses how the inception of Fiscal Guidance and Defense Systems Acquisition Review Committee have strengthened both types.
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December 1, 1966
This study presents data and OEG analyses relevant to MARKET TIME operations as of the early spring of 1966, and describes the infiltration threat, the forces involved, and their method of operation. Estimates of the Viet Cong infiltration rate and their significance are discussed. Barrier design and effectiveness estimates, when a few inflitrators must be distinguished from many innocent ships, are considered. The probability of detecting and identifying steel infiltrators is determined to be high because their presence near the South Vietnamese coast is conspicuous. Steel hull ships within 3 miles of the coast are generally boarded, inspected from close aboard, or kept under surveillance. Viet Cong junks transship small quantities of arms, supplies, and people between points within South Vietnam and present tactics are capturing many such transshipments. With present MARKET TIME tactics, using 3 offshore patrol rings, infiltration by sea appears to be quite low, although present tactics are not the most efficient ones for the specific purpose of preventing infiltration by junk from outside South Vietnam.
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