Research for Labor Legislation

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Retention Costs of the GI Bill and the Draft: New Evidence from the Navy's Enlisted Force
May 1, 1987
Drawing upon new data from the Navy's enlisted force, this study estimates the effect on military reenlistment rates of several major policy variables: eligibility for the Vietnam-era G.I. Bill, draft-pressure at the original enlistment point, and the amount of formal training given to enlistees in their first term. These specific effects are all shown to be substantially adverse, even after statistic controls have been established for other key determinants of military retention.
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A Methodology for Estimating the Effects of Department of Labor Programs on Productivity in the Private Sector
February 1, 1985
In this paper, a methodology is described and applied for evaluating the effects of individual government programs on aggregate private-sector productivity. Methodological development was needed to allow use of data from the existing professional literature. Earlier studies estimated the effects of the programs on price and quantity. CNA's contribution was to develop methods for translating these price and quantity effects into productivity estimates. The productivity effects of the following programs, all administered by the Department of Labor, were examined: training programs such as CETA and MDTA, minimum-wage laws, the Davis-Bacon Act, unemployment insurance, and OSHA and MSHA legislation on occupational safety.
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Regulation and Productivity in the Auto and Steel Industries
July 1, 1984
The rate of productivity growth in the U.S. economy and the extent and effects of government regulation have been matters of great concern in recent years. This study is an empirical investigation of the effect of regulation on productivity in the auto and steel industries during the period 1958-1980. The first step in the study was to develop numerical measures of regulation. These measures were then employed in two empirical models. In the single-equation model, the level or rate of growth of productivity was estimated as a function of output, technology, regulation, and other variables. In the multiequation model, cost and input cost shares were jointly estimated as a function of input prices, output, technology, and regulation. The estimated effect of regulation on productivity varied, depending on the model and the measure of regulation used. For example, the multiequation model indicated a positive effect of regulation on productivity in the steel industry. For the auto industry, however, it indicated that regulation generally had the expected negative effect on productivity. Over the period 1973-1980, regulation was estimated to have lowered the annual rate of productivity growth in the auto industry by 0.55 to 2.00 percentage points, depending on the measures of output and regulation. For Additional Information See 02 052701 00.
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OLDER WORKERS IN THE MARKET FOR PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT
March 1, 1984
This paper examines the sources and policy implications of the sparsity of part-time work among older workers. See also 55 000397 and appendices to 55 000396.
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DOES LICENSING IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF SERVICE, THE CASE OF DENTISTS
February 1, 1984
This research contribution considers the question of whether or not government should interfere in the practice of skilled professions, and, if interference is called for, the form that it should take. The question arises, because some professions involve the delivery of services so complex, and require so much specialized knowledge, that buyers are generally unable to judge the qualifications of the practitioner or the quality of the services rendered. An examination of the licensing of one profession--dentistry--and measurement of the extent to which licensing improves the quality of care is provided.
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APPENDICES TO PP 396: OLDER WORKERS IN THE MARKET FOR PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT
September 1, 1983
This paper examines the sources and policy implications of the sparsity of part-time work among older workers. See also 55 000396.
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Why Regulation Doesn't Work
February 1, 1981

This paper takes a metaphysical look at the 'working' of regulation.

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CAN POLICY CHANGES BE MADE ACCEPTABLE TO LABOR?
February 1, 1981

This paper focuses on some of the practical problems of unemployment compensation: who should receive it, how much should be paid, and how it should be paid.

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THE ECONOMICS OF DENTAL LICENSING
January 1, 1979
With few exceptions, occupational licensing has been viewed by economists as a conspiracy of suppliers; they have focused attention almost exclusively on its costs, such as higher prices and restricted opportunities to practice. In this study, an attempt is made to define and test for benefits that might flow from dental licensing. In addition, hypotheses about the determinants of licensing stringency are examined and effects of licensing on the distribution of dentists are investigated. The benefits consumers might realize from the licensing of dentists are: (1) reduced risk of adverse outcomes, (2) reduced costs of acquiring information and (3) greater satisfaction. Whether these benefits are in fact realized by consumers is subjected to several empirical tests. These tests are based on variation between states in the stringency of licensing. Regression analysis is used to distinguish the effects of licensing from other factors. The study concludes that dental licensing may have certain beneficial effects, and that variation in licensing stringency does not appear to create problems of unequal access to care. Since costs are not estimated, however, or even all benefits, judgment as to whether consumers achieve higher levels of welfare because of licensing must await further research.
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