Research for Iraq

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January 10, 2013

This book seeks to answer two questions: Why is irregular conflict so hard? Can we do it better? The concept of “strategic realities” applies to both questions. Problems arise in the irregular conflict arena that generally do not arise in either conventional conflict or classic development, yet irregular conflict also requires understanding each of those domains—and something more besides. When we undertake responses to an irregular conflict, we do so with organizations that are designed, educated, and trained for other purposes. Jerry-rigged solutions can work and sometimes have, but success usually comes only because of stellar ad hoc efforts, and not because of a focused systemic approach.

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February 28, 2009

This paper highlights 9 major differences between Al Anbar and Afghanistan (particularly southern Afghanistan) and considers their implications for the Marine Corps.

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October 1, 2008
The Global War on Terror has become the Long War, and the increase in operational tempo that enlisted Marines and Marine officers have experienced since 9/11 is expected to continue. Although the Corps exceeded its aggressive FY07 endstrength goal, we continue to monitor the relationship between deployment tempo and retention. We analyze how deployment tempo, measured by deployed days and number of deployments, influences reenlistment and retention. We look at the reenlistment decisions of enlisted Marines between FY04 and FY07 and the retention decisions of Marine officers between December 2006 and December 2007. We find that additional deployments to the Iraq/Afghanistan country groups decreased first-term reenlistments during the FY04-FY07 period. Focusing just on FY07, we find that additional deployments to the Iraq/Afghanistan country groups are predicted to increase reenlistment for Marines with dependents and decrease reenlistments for Marines without dependents. For FY04-FY07 and just FY07, we find that an additional 100 days deployed in non-crisis areas has no statistically significant effect on reenlistments for first-term Marines with dependents but decreases reenlistments for Marines without dependents. Among career Marines and Marine officers, we find that additional deployed days have either no effect or a small positive effect on retention.
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January 1, 2008
This study, sponsored by Commander, US Naval Forces Central Command, identifies the future missions, concepts of operations, and capability requirements for the Iraqi Navy, and recommends a force structure for 2015 and beyond. We found that the Iraqi Navy will need two patrol boats; six fast, armed shallow-draft boats; three harbor patrol craft; three armed helicopters; coastal artillery; fixed radar; automatic identification systems; forward-looking infrared equipment; specialized units for diving, mine countermeasures, and explosive ordnance disposal; and equipment to provide flexible and secure command, control, and communications. This study was well received by the sponsor and the Iraqi Navy, and the Iraqi Minister of Defense has incorporated our recommendations into the navy’s force structure plan for 2008-2020.
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December 1, 2006

This study assessed soldier perspectives on the reliability and durability of their weapons in combat. The study found that most soldiers indicate satisfaction and confidence in the reliability and durability of their weapons.

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October 1, 2003
Dr. Sergey Rogov, Director of the Institute for USA and Canada Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ISKRAN) and his colleagues from Moscow met with Mr. Robert Murray, President of CNAC, and others from CNAC and the Washington area. The subject of the mini-seminar was the changed strategic situation following the U.S. conquest and occupation of Iraq in early 2003. The fact that the U.S. would be preoccupied with Iraq for some time to come was noted, but the Russians believed that the opportunities for U.S.-Russian collaboration remained open.
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April 1, 2003
This paper was the basis for remarks by the author at the Army War College's Annual Conference on the American Way of War, 9-10 April 2003. An "American Way of War" emerged after the end of the Cold War, in successive combat experiences. We at the CNA Corporation examined the eight main cases of combat from 1989 through 2002 to discern its characteristics. The U.S. has now successfully undertaken a ninth combat case-Operation Iraqi Freedom-in which the characteristics have generally been confirmed, but with some new twists. War-fighting is, of course, the core of what U.S. forces do. Around that core, we speak of some larger strategic functions, like deterrence, presence, interaction with allies, and, of course, preparing for the future, currently referred to as transformation. The paper discusses the effects on the strategic environment of the American Way of War."
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June 1, 1974
This paper suggests ways of relating crisis studies to the study of regions. In particular, the Near East is discussed as a focus for the study of crises.
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June 1, 1974
This paper analyzes the objectives and implications of the Soviet naval visit to Iraq during the 1973 Iraq-Kuwaiti border dispute. Events which occurred prior to the arrival of the Soviets are also reviewed. Supersedes 05 740233.20
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