Research for Intelligence

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February 1, 1996
The Commander, Seventh Fleet, asked CNA to assess the security environment of the Asia-Pacific Region between now and 2010. This research memorandum focuses on the most probable evolutionary trends for Korea during this period. For Korea the development of an Asian nation-state system comes at a time of historic power relative to anything of the past century. The problem for the Korean people, historically, was that Korea was a weak state surrounded by strong empires in China, Russia, and Japan. The economic development of Korea over the past 30 years is a remarkable success story, although this development took place in a peaceful stable environment. The problem facing Korea is whether it can successfully continue its economic progress in a world that is more competitive, more wary of exploitative economic practices, any more dominated by large countries who have in the past been enemies.
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October 1, 1991
This volume of the Desert Storm Reconstruction Report addresses the U.S. Navy's contribution to the air campaign in strike warfare during Operation Desert Storm. The volume begins with a brief overview of the war to place the discussion of strike warfare issues in perspective. The major analytical findings are grouped in the following categories: (1) strike campaign planning; (2) intelligence support to strike; (3) carrier mission planning; (4) strike employment; (5) ordnance; (6) joint operations; (7) TLAM employment and performance; and (8) generation and allocation of CVN-71 sorties. See also 27 910179 through 27 910190, and 27 910219.
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April 1, 1978

This paper discusses useful techniques for intelligence analysis.

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April 1, 1954
Examination of the War Diary of the German Communication Submarines (ComSubs) has made it possible to estimate the character and extent of intelligence obtained by the decryption of Allied radio messages pertaining to convoy operations in the North Atlantic during World War II, and to determine the effect of such intelligence on the capability of the U-Boats to contact convoys and sink ships. It is estimated that the availability of timely usable decryption intelligence increased the contact rate twofold over that which they would have obtained without it; probably over 60 sinkings in excess of the expected number if they had been deprived of decryption intelligence. These calculations help in estimating a valid measure of effectiveness of current and future submarines in anti-convoy operations when decryption intelligence is not available.
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