Research for Governmental Regulations

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June 1, 1995
In this paper, we compare the in-house cost of conducting Department of the Navy program management and oversight in accordance with Department of Defense regulations and requirements, to the cost of conducting those same functions in accordance with commercial practice.
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June 1, 1994
Gaming is a tool that the military has used with great success to gain insights into the feasibility of alternative strategies or tactics before actually putting one into practice. Although gaming does not provide real answers, it can provide insights into strategic 'what if' questions. The validity of the insights gained is largely a function of the reality designed into the game and the willingness of the players to immerse themselves in the play. The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) asked CNA to design a game based on a business sector undergoing change in response to the defense drawdown. The shipbuilding industry was chosen because (1) it is a critical business sector for U.S. economic and military security, (2) it is facing major near-term strategic and tactical decisions that will define its future, and (3) it could be gamed with a high degree of realism. The purpose of the game was to bring together important leaders from government and industry to exchange information and gain insights. Specifically, we wanted to help industry and government leaders answer the following questions: (a) How can the U.S. shipbuilding industry compete in the global market? and (b) What technologies enhance or promote U.S. competitiveness in this market? The game was designed with these objectives in mind. This research memorandum describes the game design and the game play, and provides a summary of the panel discussions, the shipyard play, and the lessons learned.
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July 1, 1984
The rate of productivity growth in the U.S. economy and the extent and effects of government regulation have been matters of great concern in recent years. This study is an empirical investigation of the effect of regulation on productivity in the auto and steel industries during the period 1958-1980. The first step in the study was to develop numerical measures of regulations. These measures were then employed in two empirical models. In the single-equation model, the level or rate of growth of productivity was estimated as a function of output, technology, regulation, and other variables. In the multiequation model, cost and input cost shares were jointly estimated as a function of input prices, output, technology, and regulation. The estimate effect of regulation on productivity varied, depending on the model and the measure of regulation used. For example, the multiequation model indicated a positive effect of regulation on productivity in the steel industry. For the auto industry, however, it indicated that regulation generally had the expected negative effect on productivity. Over the period 1973-1980, regulation was estimated to have lowered the annual rate of productivity growth in the auto industry by 0.55 to 2.00 percentage points, depending on the measures of output and regulation. For Additional Information See 02 052702 00.
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July 1, 1984
The rate of productivity growth in the U.S. economy and the extent and effects of government regulation have been matters of great concern in recent years. This study is an empirical investigation of the effect of regulation on productivity in the auto and steel industries during the period 1958-1980. The first step in the study was to develop numerical measures of regulation. These measures were then employed in two empirical models. In the single-equation model, the level or rate of growth of productivity was estimated as a function of output, technology, regulation, and other variables. In the multiequation model, cost and input cost shares were jointly estimated as a function of input prices, output, technology, and regulation. The estimated effect of regulation on productivity varied, depending on the model and the measure of regulation used. For example, the multiequation model indicated a positive effect of regulation on productivity in the steel industry. For the auto industry, however, it indicated that regulation generally had the expected negative effect on productivity. Over the period 1973-1980, regulation was estimated to have lowered the annual rate of productivity growth in the auto industry by 0.55 to 2.00 percentage points, depending on the measures of output and regulation. For Additional Information See 02 052701 00.
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March 1, 1984
This paper examines the sources and policy implications of the sparsity of part-time work among older workers. See also 55 000397 and appendices to 55 000396.
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February 1, 1984
This research contribution considers the question of whether or not government should interfere in the practice of skilled professions, and, if interference is called for, the form that it should take. The question arises, because some professions involve the delivery of services so complex, and require so much specialized knowledge, that buyers are generally unable to judge the qualifications of the practitioner or the quality of the services rendered. An examination of the licensing of one profession--dentistry--and measurement of the extent to which licensing improves the quality of care is provided.
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September 1, 1983
This paper examines the sources and policy implications of the sparsity of part-time work among older workers. See also 55 000396.
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February 1, 1981

This paper takes a metaphysical look at the 'working' of regulation.

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February 1, 1981

This paper focuses on some of the practical problems of unemployment compensation: who should receive it, how much should be paid, and how it should be paid.

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January 1, 1979
With few exceptions, occupational licensing has been viewed by economists as a conspiracy of suppliers; they have focused attention almost exclusively on its costs, such as higher prices and restricted opportunities to practice. In this study, an attempt is made to define and test for benefits that might flow from dental licensing. In addition, hypotheses about the determinants of licensing stringency are examined and effects of licensing on the distribution of dentists are investigated. The benefits consumers might realize from the licensing of dentists are: (1) reduced risk of adverse outcomes, (2) reduced costs of acquiring information and (3) greater satisfaction. Whether these benefits are in fact realized by consumers is subjected to several empirical tests. These tests are based on variation between states in the stringency of licensing. Regression analysis is used to distinguish the effects of licensing from other factors. The study concludes that dental licensing may have certain beneficial effects, and that variation in licensing stringency does not appear to create problems of unequal access to care. Since costs are not estimated, however, or even all benefits, judgment as to whether consumers achieve higher levels of welfare because of licensing must await further research.
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