Research for Doctrine
April 1, 1996
The Marine Corps Combat Development Command asked the Center for Naval Analyses to analyze how the Marine Cops could improve its ability to conduct humanitarian assistance operations. We identified changes to doctrine, equipment, organization and training that would support Marine Corps commanders and troops tasked to perform these missions. This research memorandum identifies issues, requirements, and alternatives in the area of command and control. The focus is on command relationships and coordination.
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April 1, 1996
This briefing presents results from a study undertaken by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) at the request of Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). The primary objective of the study is to identify and analyze some alternatives the Marine Corps might consider in order to improve its ability to conduct humanitarian assistance operations (HAOs). To meet this objective, we have been (1) examining ways of conducting HAOs; (2) identifying changes in organization, training and education, doctrine, and equipment and supplies that will help the marine Corps better prepare for HAOs; and (3) assessing the relative costs of these changes. This briefing focuses on identifying and analyzing the training and education requirements for Marines assigned to HAOs and suggests ways the Marine Corps might meet those requirements.
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April 1, 1996
In this paper we summarize the results of a study conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses that identifies and analyzes how the Marine Corps might improve its ability to conduct Humanitarian Assistance Operations (HAOs). To achieve this objective, we (1) examined how the military has conducted HAOs in the past; (2) identified alternative ways the military can conduct these operations; and (3) assessed the relative costs of these alternatives in terms of changes in organization, training and education, doctrine and documentation, and equipment and supplies. This study is co-sponsored by the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and I Marine Expeditionary Force. We developed this summary from earlier analyses which present detailed discussions of HAO requirements and alternatives in the areas of planning, training, civil affairs and psychological operations, legal affairs, and logistics and engineering. This summary presents key results from these analyses, and integrates them into a greater whole.
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September 1, 1995
Since May 1994, a research study team at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) has been providing the U.S. Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) with analysis on Multinational Maritime Operations (MMOPS) and Operations Other Than War (OOTW). One of the several MMOPS efforts, conducted from February to June 1995, analytically supported an NDC effort designed to provide documents for eventual release universally to maritime forces of any nation that can be expected to work with the U.S. Navy in the future. This briefing is divided into two sections. The first covers NDC's publication development program. It provides background for the second section on CNA's analytical support.
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September 1, 1994
The Naval Doctrine Command asked the Center for Naval Analyses to examine the command and control doctrine and practice of U.S. naval forces. The purpose of this effort is to help the Command (1) refine naval doctrine and (2) participate more effectively in the development of joint doctrine. CNA's Naval Command and Control for Joint Operations project examines how current Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) and Amphibious Warfare concepts can better integrate with the command and control of joint and combined operations. One of the objectives of this study is to understand how the dynamics that drive command and control for joint and combined operations differ from those that drive the Navy's use of the CWC structure. To do this, we need to examine the following questions: (1) How did our current joint and combined command structures evolve? (2) Why did these structures take the forms that they have? and (3) What are the implications for naval forces? This research memorandum focuses on the origins and evolution of U.S. doctrine for joint, combined, and amphibious warfare. First, we discuss how doctrine developed from the initial U.S. experience at modern coalition warfare in World War I, and then through the development of techniques and doctrine for operations between the wars. Second, we examine how current doctrine arose out of World War II. Finally, we discuss some of the implications for today's naval forces.
May 1, 1993
Despite current political and socio-economic uncertainties, the Russian leaders continue to develop new concepts regarding the role and capabilities of the future Russian Navy. This study examines three likely parameters of future Russian naval development: current implementation of the 'reasonable sufficiency' concept, the Russian image of future war, and Russia's new military doctrine. On both the nuclear and conventional levels, the application of 'reasonable sufficiency' to future naval development continues to generate a significant degree of civil-military divergence. On the other hand, a strong civil-military consensus underlies Russian views on the role of naval forces in future war. Like their Soviet predecessors, Russian military and civilian experts view Operation Desert Storm as the paradigm of future war in strategy, operational art, and tactics. Finally, Russia's new military doctrine and surrounding discussions provide evidence regarding Russia's 'vital' national interests, threats to these interests, and the role of the Russian Navy in Russian national security policy.
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May 1, 1993
At the core of decision-making about U.S. military forces lies the question of what roles and function are assigned to each component of the national defense structure. In theory, resources are then distributed to reflect mission requirements. Today, the nation is in the midst of a review of mission requirements and resource allocations to national defense. This paper provides a backdrop to today's debate by examining the historical debate over 'who will do what with what.' This examination briefly reviews the debates over the U.S. military services' roles, functions, and missions. In addition to a chronological discussion, the paper highlights factors that drive roles and missions debates and relates these factors to today's debate. The discussion emphasizes the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps perspective. The intent is to provide a sense of how the U.S. military structure arrived at where it is today, thus laying a framework for examining potential alternative future structures and assignments of roles, functions, and missions.
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April 1, 1993
This briefing concerns institutionalizing strategic change in the Navy. It focuses on the lessons of the 1945-47 era under Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal.
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October 1, 1991
The 1990 CNA Sea Power Forum panel, 'Beyond Afghanistan: Changing Soviet Perspectives on Regional Conflicts,' focused on how the war in Afghanistan has affected Soviet policy on involvement in regional conflicts. This summary documents the Soviet commentators' own perceptions and analyses of the lessons learned and experiences gained in Afghanistan. This emphasis is intended to provide insight into how the Soviet Union might respond to regional conflicts in the future.
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March 1, 1991
This paper examines the curriculum of the Naval War College, focusing on adapting the current three-course program to provide a more appropriate education for the officers looking to meet the nation's needs through the tumultuous decade ahead.
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