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Navy Military, Government Civilians, and Contract Support by Missions and Tasks: A Corporate Production Sensitivity Analysis
May 1, 2007
This paper examines labor use trends for the Navy, with the objective of identifying support functions that are potential candidates for labor adjustments. The authors calculate total labor for Navy IGCA inventory based functions each year from FY 2002 through FY 2005 as the sum of military, civil service, and contractor work-years. The latter are estimated from annual contracting dollars and cost per contractor for the federal supply classification (FSC) codes that are associated with each of the IGCA functions. They sought output measures for the functions, but found that useable output measures could not be found for about half of the functions. They develop and use a system for ranking the potential of functions as candidates for labor adjustments and recommend 14 candidate functions for further detailed examination. They also provide a conceptual model of how these functional output measures might be used as inputs to a Leonteif input-output business interaction model which could link shore function outputs to warfighter requirements and capabilities.
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Transforming the Assignment System: Will Incentives Reduce Critical Shortages?
December 1, 2002
Abstract:D7147 The Navy has long faced difficulties in manning certain billets. To alleviate its problems, it has used a patchwork of assignment incentives. Then, if all else fails, the Navy orders sailors involuntarily into hard-to-fill billets. In this study, we consider the costs of the current system and determine how the Navy might encourage sailors to volunteer for hard-to-fill billets cost-efficiently. We find that an incentive pay for hard-to-fill billets (such as Assignment Incentive Pay) is a promising way of moving the Navy toward a more voluntary, efficient assignment system if designed as a flexible, market-based pay. For overseas shore billets that currently use sea-duty credit as an incentive, AIP will almost certainly be cost-effective. The cost of getting volunteers for OCONUS billets would probably be below $25 million annually using an efficiently designed AIP. Sea duty credit is at least three times more costly. AIP, however, may not be cost-effective for CONUS shore billets. Our best estimate is that sailors may volunteer for traditionally difficult-to-fill billets for an AIP of about $125 per month on average-about the same cost as the savings generated from AIP. For these billets, great care must be taken in designing a cost-effective bonus.
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