Research for Deterrence

The role of the Pacific theater in a NATO-Warsaw Pact War is considered. The paper argues that the Pacific theater has been neglected in such a conflict because most war scenarios envision a struggle lasting no more than 30 to 60 days. As a result, the conflict is over too quickly in most scenarios for the interrelationships between the NATO and Pacific theaters to develop conceptually. However, in a long-war scenario, the Pacific theater's importance in the course and outcome of such a conflict becomes apparent. The military, industrial, and technological potential of the Pacific nations, especially China and Japan, combined with the U.S., constitute a reserve of strength capable of containing or reversing any Soviet success in a conventional conflict in Europe. This paper concludes that (a) current strategy or doctrine based on the refusal to repudiate the 'first use' of nuclear weapons has lost much of its credibility as a deterrent, and (b) the tacit or explicit adoption of a long-war strategy to counter Soviet capabilities in a short war should be considered.

This paper identifies a basic strategic dilemma for France - on the one hand, French leaders identify the political purpose of nuclear weapons as the defense of French territory; on the other hand, a number of external pressures are inducing a need for France to provide a more explicit definition of the role of French nuclear weapons in the West European security system.

Examines shifts in the Soviet perspective on long-term military development, and discusses the doctrinal realization of these shifting perspectives in the course of successive five-year plans.

This paper examines the question of whether or not it is sensible to plan U.S. naval forces for a short war with the USSR.