Research for Deterrence

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March 1, 2010

This paper was a quick response to an OPNAV Quadrennial Integration Group (QIG) question as to how Navy could be postured, deployed and structured to maintain dominance and influence (the ability to deter and reassure on a global scale) as a "global navy."

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March 1, 2009

Deterrence and Influence: The Navy's Role in Preventing War

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August 1, 1998
This report is the product of a CNA self-initiated project to explore the evolution of the notions of military deterrence and influence in the new era after the Cold War. Deterrence during the Cold War was global, focused on the Soviet Union and on nuclear balances and threats; however, a new perspective on deterrence is needed in this new era. The report concludes that the task of military deterrence and influence in the post-Cold War period is to contribute to a stable world system so that the economic world can function and prosper. The role of military forces is to foster the stability in which economies can thrive. U.S. military forces do this by organizing and extending both bilateral relations with key countries and sustaining and extending broad collective security arrangements, and by walling off the few rogues that aspire to mount aggressions against their neighbors.
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July 1, 1995
This CNA-sponsored study identifies implications of nuclear possession between 1994 and 2003 in distant Third World areas. It identifies policies and programs affecting the design, organization, location, and employment of future U.S. forces. After exploring potential paths for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, we examined how five notional political crises (North Korea, Iran, Syria/Libya, India/Pakistan, and Algeria) evolved into nuclear confrontations. Then we analyzed what U.S. interests were relevant for each case, what political and military instruments were available, and how well they worked. Also highlighted are what the successes and failures in these cases imply for policy, strategy, and force development. We analyzed the following questions: (1) Why would some state or other party want nuclear weapons, how would it acquire them, and how fast? (2) What U.S. interests were at stake in each crisis? (3) Could nuclear use or threat of use be deterred, and how? (4) Was preemption possible, and did it make sense? (5) What kind of retaliation was feasible and justifiable? (6) How, and to what extent, did third parties participate? (7) How does the prospect of nuclear use (the nuclear shadow) affect military operations? and (8) What was the relative importance of various force components in the notional crises.
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February 1, 1995
With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new era, many of the overarching concepts behind U.S. defense policy are open to questioning. In the Cold War, deterrence was perhaps the key concept. The thinking about deterrence--both theoretical and policy-related consideration--focused on nuclear deterrence issues. In the new era, deterrence remains a key issue but the focus turns to 'conventional' deterrence. Key associated concepts in this emerging new world order are compulsion and reassurance. This paper provides some perspectives on the role of naval forces in deterrence, compulsion, and reassurance in the post-Cold War era. In addition to a brief overview of some of the theoretical issues surrounding deterrence, this paper focuses on some concrete examples of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps actions in response to or amidst international crises over the past 40 years. It discusses the ways these actions might have compelled an opponent to stop or reverse some action, deterred a potential adversary from taking some action, and/or reassured an ally to take some type of action.
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March 1, 1994
The post-Cold War national security strategy engages U.S. power in all its form to shape a more secure world. Overseas presence--operating forces forward to influence what foreign governments think and do--is the most important and challenging of the tasks this strategy assigns the Armed Forces. This paper looks at the political and strategic case for presence and discusses some of its costs and risks. It draws conclusions about: (1) what presence means in our use of the forces we have now; and (2) what forces to buy for the future. It also suggests ways to make presence operations more efficient and issues deserving study in that regard.
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May 1, 1993
Despite current political and socio-economic uncertainties, the Russian leaders continue to develop new concepts regarding the role and capabilities of the future Russian Navy. This study examines three likely parameters of future Russian naval development: current implementation of the 'reasonable sufficiency' concept, the Russian image of future war, and Russia's new military doctrine. On both the nuclear and conventional levels, the application of 'reasonable sufficiency' to future naval development continues to generate a significant degree of civil-military divergence. On the other hand, a strong civil-military consensus underlies Russian views on the role of naval forces in future war. Like their Soviet predecessors, Russian military and civilian experts view Operation Desert Storm as the paradigm of future war in strategy, operational art, and tactics. Finally, Russia's new military doctrine and surrounding discussions provide evidence regarding Russia's 'vital' national interests, threats to these interests, and the role of the Russian Navy in Russian national security policy.
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April 1, 1991
This research memorandum explores the political effects of U.S. military presence in the Asian-Pacific region. It proposes a framework that outlines the goals of presence and the process through which political effects develop. It then uses this conceptual framework to examine the political effects of presence in the region. This paper surveys U.S. policy objectives in the future security environment in Asia and explores the direct contribution of presence to U.S. policy objectives and the indirect support it gives through bolstering stability. Finally, it notes some implications of the analysis for future U.S. force options in the region. See also 96 005100, 96 005200, and 55 000506.
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November 1, 1989
The body of this research memorandum was written before the Baker-Shevardnadze meeting in Wyoming. It presented evidence suggesting that the Soviet Union might agree to a compromise at the Wyoming meeting that defers the issue of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) negotiations to a later stage in arms reductions, thus facilitating a first-stage cut in offensive arms without an explicit Soviet endorsement of the Strategic Defense Initiative. In this approach, Wyoming, then, was expected to be only a first move in the Soviet negotiating strategy for a grand compromise on strategic defense. As explained in the afterword added to this paper, the actual events at Wyoming seem consistent with this interpretation.
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September 1, 1986
In January 1977, General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev delivered an address in the city of Tula whose impact on Soviet doctrine and capabilities continues to this day. By rejecting the possibility of a means of defense against nuclear weapons, or a damage-limiting capacity in nuclear war, Brezhnev closed the door on a debate that had lasted over a decade in Soviet military thought. Since Tula, the Soviet politico-military leadership has presented a consensus on the reality of 'Mutual Assured Destruction' in present-day conditions. The Soviet debate on the viability of nuclear war as an instrument of policy was likewise resolved by a consensus: nuclear war is so unpromising and dangerous that it remains an instrument of policy only in theory, an instrument of policy that cannot be used. While the Soviet consensus on the diminishing military utility of nuclear weapons represents a ground-breaking shift in doctrine since the heyday of Marshal Solokovskiy, there is scant evidence of any dispute on the new correlation of war and policy in a nuclear age. Marshal N.V. Ogarkov and other hard-minded military figures have themselves emerged as the architects of the Soviet shift away from a nuclear war-fighting and war-winning strategy, while General Secretary Gorbachev has fashioned a corresponding arms control agenda.
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