Research for deployment
November 1, 2007
This CRM summarizes 37 Air Force servicemembers’ perceptions of the role of group diversity in determining group performance in the combat environment. The summary is based analyses of interview transcripts that were coded to separately analyze respondents' perceptions about the impact of diversity and the skills, knowledge, and experience needed to manage it. According to our analysis, the two main ways diversity was perceived to affect mission capability were in terms of group dynamics and mission accomplishment. Discussions about group dynamics related to communication, group cohesion, and trust. Discussions about mission accomplishment related to having the right people or skills to perform the tasks at hand and/or having a wide enough range of perspectives to generate creative, appropriate solutions to problems. Respondents’ perceptions about diversity management indicated that the required skills can and should be purposefully developed with training and through career experience. In general, the training should provide tools to both leverage diversity for benefits and manage it to avoid costs. Some training should provide information about relevant other groups and emphasize respect for differences. Most training, however, should focus on concrete aspects of process management.
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May 1, 2006
We examine the relationship between sea duty and first-term reenlistment decisions from FY95 through FY04. Once we control for other factors, we find that Sailors with 4 and 5-year initial obligations are more likely to reenlist if they are rotating to shore rather than rotating to sea over the entire time period examined. Recently, however, there has been a convergence between these reenlistment rate trends that is not explained by any factors in our model. From FY99 to FY03, Sailors with 6-year initial obligations going to sea duty had higher first-term reenlistment than those going to shore duty even controlling for other factors. For Sailors with 4, 5, or 6-year initial obligations we find that a marginal increase in the amount of time expected to be spent on sea duty in the second term does not have a large negative effect on reenlistment. Finally, we find that increasing deployment spells reduces retention, especially since FY00. While we find that marginal changes in sea duty or deployments will not have large negative retention effects, significant changes may. Thus, we discuss how different compensation tools could be used to address any negative retention effects related to sea duty.
March 1, 2006
Despite high deployment tempo in FY05, the Marine Corps successfully met its FY05 enlisted reenlistment goals and the retention rate for officers was even higher than predicted. But as the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) continues, there is concern as to how increasing deployment time (DEPTEMPO) will affect Marines’ continuation in the Corps. This study statistically analyzes this issue.
January 1, 2006
The paper focuses on the post-9/11 relationship between deployment tempo and retention, especially on differences in responses for Marines with and with dependents. The main text describes major findings; the statistical work is found in the appendices. We found that, at least for career Marines and officers, high deployment tempo had little negative effect of reenlistment/continuation decisions. In fact, we found that officer retention increased with total days deployed or deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. On the other hand, we found that increases in deployed days lowered reenlistment rates for first-term Marines—particularly those without dependents. First-term Marines without dependents also averaged more deployed days than their counterparts with dependents. We focused mainly on retention in FY04, but we also looked at retention patterns in FY02 an FY03.
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October 1, 2005
The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps asked CNA to examine the effects of current deployment tempo on retention. This study, which was sponsored by the Deputy Commandant, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, reports on the relationship between deployment tempo and reenlistment. It draws on information gathered through a series of focus groups with Marines on the east and west coasts as well as statistical analysis of deployed-day data matched with Marines’ personnel records. The study recommends several measures that could be adopted to ease the stress caused by deployments, including facilitating local exchanges between heavy deployers and nondeployers, providing forward-deployed mobile education vans, considering a wartime regular reenlistment bonus, and offering BAH/BAS for outstanding first-term NCOs.
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October 1, 2005
The goal of this study is to provide the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Manpower and Personnel) with empirical information on loss patterns in the Selected Reserves (SelRes) since September 11, 2001. Of particular interest is how activation affected the loss behavior of SelRes members. We created a longitudinal database that follows SelRes members from September 2001 to January 2005. The database consists of records from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) Reserve Component Common Personnel Data System (RCCPDS) merged with extracts from DMDC’s Contingency Tracking System. We use the database to compare the loss behavior of recently deactivated SelRes members with that of other SelRes members. For Reserve officers, we found that post-9/11 officer loss rates were higher than SelRes loss rates in FY 2000, a year with a low number of activations. Loss rates are higher for those who were activated but not deployed (remained in CONUS) compared with those who deployed (outside CONUS). However, SelRes officer loss rates are the lowest among the never activated. Finally, for some components, loss rates increase with the length of activation.
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June 1, 2005
The goal of this study is to provide the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Manpower and Personnel) with empirical information on loss patterns in the Selected Reserves (SelRes) since September 11, 2001. Of particular interest is how activation affected the loss behavior of SelRes members. We created a longitudinal database that follows SelRes members from September 2001 to January 2005. The database consists of records from the Defense Manpower Data Center’s (DMDC) Reserve Component Common Personnel Data System (RCCPDS) merged with extracts from DMDC’s Contingency Tracking System. We use the database to compare the loss behavior of recently deactivated SelRes members with that of other SelRes members. For the enlisted force, we found that post-9/11 SelRes loss rates were higher than SelRes loss rates in FY 2000, a year with a low number of activations. Loss rates are higher for those who were activated but not deployed (remained in CONUS) compared with those who deployed (outside CONUS). For some components, loss rates increase with the length of activation. We also found that those with multiple activations had loss rates similar to those with one.
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July 1, 2004
In the pre-1986 period, long deployments were not necessarily associated with crises, whereas the extra-long deployments from the post-1986 period were typically associated with crises. Anecdotally, Sailors identified such deployments as important and worth the extra hardships. Because of this, we expect that high PERSTEMPO in the 1990s has not been associated with lower reenlistments. This paper investigates this hypothesis. We conclude, in the post-1986 period, deployment lengths have not been a driver of reenlistment rates. However, quick turnarounds (length of time between deployments) do have negative consequences on reenlistments. Non-deployed time underway and extended periods of ship maintenance also decrease reenlistments. The longer deployments are not likely to lower reenlistments unless the missions continue for so long that the morale-boosting effect of the mission fades. If the extra-long deployments begin to appear routine, long deployments may adversely affect reenlistment rates. We suggest that the Navy monitor Sailors’ quality of life and reenlistments carefully and be prepared to compensate them if retention does slip.
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May 1, 2002
In recent years, the Seabee community-the Navy's 'construction force'-has become concerned about its ability to retain skilled enlisted personnel. It fears that the Seabees' expanded mission, hectic deployment schedule, and harsh work environments have created retention and manning difficulties, which will worsen due to recent sea pay increases for seagoing personnel. In response to these concerns, NAVFAC asked CNA to assess whether an additional Seabee compensation is warranted and, if so, to recommend appropriate pay delivery vehicles. For mid- and senior-grades, the Seabee sea retention and manning environments are generally similar to or worse than those experienced by similarly skilled shipboard personnel. Yet recent sea pay enhancements are designed to address fleet recruiting, retention, and manning problems. As such, they will provide a "fix" for the problems facing the shipboard groups, but will not improve Seabee conditions since Seabees do not receive sea pays during sea tours. Providing the Seabees with a pay comparable in size to sea pay enhancement would cost $2.9 to $4.3 million annually, depending on whether it targets manning shortfalls or is equally distributed. The most promising near-term compensation vehicles for this pay would be an increase in the meals or incidental expenses portion of per diem for Seabees, whereas a long-term fix might require the implementation of a distribution incentive pay with targeted Selective Reenlistment Bonus.
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December 1, 2001
The 9th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) is seeking ways to better structure military compensation to alleviate current recruiting, manning, and retention shortfalls. Structured correctly. Basic pay and special pays should provide incentives to stay in the military, to gain experience and skills valuable to the services, and to move into critical skill areas or jobs where they are most needed. No existing pays fully answer the need to provide incentives to take on jobs that require serving alone, away from home. For this reason, the 9th QRMC is considering the creation of a new pay that would compensate service members for the hardships associated with deployments. The difficulty in creating such a pay, however, is establishing consistent definitions and measures of many of the key concepts related to time away from home. Relevant issues include: identifying the goals of any new deployment pay and the hardships for which people should be compensated; defining deployments and time away; and developing a deployment pay structure. Taken together or separately, these definitional and conceptual issues must be considered when determining the structure or use of a new pay and how it would relate to existing military pays. In a companion paper, we examine in detail the largest "away" pay, sea pay. Here we summarize that paper's conclusions regarding sea pay and examine several of the other special and incentive pays that historically have been used too compensate people for hardships associated with deployments. We then examine the availability of these pays to date and assess the adequacy of these pays in meeting the military 's goals. Finally, we conclude by outlining policy options and recommending compensation changes that would better align existing pays with any newly created pays and with the military's primary goals and objectives.
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