Research for CRM

As part of CNA's reconstruction of Operation RESTORE HOPE, this paper examines the rules of engagement for U.S. Marine Corps and Army ground forces during the operation, and discusses eight issues surrounding their writing, implementation, and effects. The paper concludes with a discussion of the overall lessons learned from the experience. See also CRMs 93-96, 93-114, 93-126, 93-140, 93-148, and 93-152.

Using a two-phase approach, the Future Russian Navy study -- commissioned by the Director of Naval Intelligence -- examined the individual factors that will compete with one another to drive the force posture and capabilities of the 21st-century Russian Navy. Phase I evaluated as discrete entities historical, economic, security, and foreign policy interests as well as politico-sociological and economic constraints. Phase II then evaluated these competing interests and constraints, and derived a range of potential force postures and capabilities for the Russian Navy of the year 2013. The result describes a Russian Navy dependent principally on the success or failure of Russian national economic reform.

This paper considers the role of the United Nations (UN) in facilitating, sponsoring, coordinating, and/or executing multinational cooperation on the seas. It identifies and discusses nine potential UN naval missions and their supporting naval tasks. These are mission areas in which the UN has or may become involved, independent of the form of cooperation. It then analyzes four different options for organizing UN naval cooperation: UN authorization, UN designation, UN direction of designated national contingents, and UN standing naval forces. Finally, the paper suggests conditions under which particular combinations of mission and organizing options should be pursued, and proposes some courses of action independent of mission or organizing option. Appendixes discuss the UN system for collective security and provide historical lessons learned or precedents for each UN naval cooperation organizing option.

The Marine Corps recruits and screens about 2,000 officer candidates annually. Recruiting minority candidates who meet its stringent standards, however, is not easy. Recruiting qualified minorities is especially difficult because of stiff competition from other services, industry, government, and the academic arena. Consider these statistics: (1) of male college graduates in 1990-1991, five percent were African-Americans, and three percent were Hispanics; (2) only two percent of males with Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores meeting USMC standards were African-American, and four percent Hispanic. It is clear that the Marine Corps must recruit more than a proportionate share of the qualified minority pool. Can the Marine Corps improve the way it allocates recruiting goals and resources to take advantage of regional variations in race/ethnicity. Headquarters Marine Corps asked CNA to help with this problem as part of its study of Successful Recruiting and Training of Marine Corps Officers. In this study, we also explored the relationship between officer candidate characteristics and success in Officer Candidate School, commissioning, and The Basic School. In addition, we looked at officer characteristics and promotions to captain and major.