Research for Crisis Response

Amid the debate over roles and missions in recent years, claims of land-based airpower's capacity to match the contributions of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers have been a prominent theme. As part of that argument, some land-based aviation advocates have argued that basing and other constraints have little relevance to the debate--that basing constraints have not prevented land-based airpower from contributing to U.S. military operations. This argument masks a far more complicated history of U.S. access to facilities and airspace in the midst of international incidents and crises. Land-based airpower has contributed, in some manner, to every significant U.S. military operation since World War II. But basing constraints have often made this contribution more difficult or, more important, have seriously limited the capabilities that land-based airpower could bring to contingency operations. In light of the potential confusion about this issue, this paper examines the history of limitations on land-based aviation activities during U.S. contingency operations.

This paper considers the role of the United Nations (UN) in facilitating, sponsoring, coordinating, and/or executing multinational cooperation on the seas. It identifies and discusses nine potential UN naval missions and their supporting naval tasks. These are mission areas in which the UN has or may become involved, independent of the form of cooperation. It then analyzes four different options for organizing UN naval cooperation: UN authorization, UN designation, UN direction of designated national contingents, and UN standing naval forces. Finally, the paper suggests conditions under which particular combinations of mission and organizing options should be pursued, and proposes some courses of action independent of mission or organizing option. Appendixes discuss the UN system for collective security and provide historical lessons learned or precedents for each UN naval cooperation organizing option.