Research for Crises

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February 1, 1995
With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new era, many of the overarching concepts behind U.S. defense policy are open to questioning. In the Cold War, deterrence was perhaps the key concept. The thinking about deterrence--both theoretical and policy-related consideration--focused on nuclear deterrence issues. In the new era, deterrence remains a key issue but the focus turns to 'conventional' deterrence. Key associated concepts in this emerging new world order are compulsion and reassurance. This paper provides some perspectives on the role of naval forces in deterrence, compulsion, and reassurance in the post-Cold War era. In addition to a brief overview of some of the theoretical issues surrounding deterrence, this paper focuses on some concrete examples of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps actions in response to or amidst international crises over the past 40 years. It discusses the ways these actions might have compelled an opponent to stop or reverse some action, deterred a potential adversary from taking some action, and/or reassured an ally to take some type of action.
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February 1, 1991
Since the end of World War II, U.S. Naval forces have played a major role in at least 207 U.S. responses to international incidents and crises, exclusive of the Korean and Vietnam wars. This research memorandum summarizes these U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps crisis management operations. Updates 27 890315.
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November 1, 1989
Since the end of World War II, the U.S. Navy has played a major role in at least 187 U.S. responses to international incidents and crises. This research memorandum provides a summary of these Navy crisis management operations.
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April 1, 1986
One seldom considered dimension in examinations of active-reserve force tradeoffs is our historical experience in calling up and using Naval Reserve Forces in circumstances and crises short of general war. The fact that Naval Reserve Forces have not been called in a host of conceivable recall situations, coupled with the sparse but mostly troubled experience when reserve forces were in fact recalled involuntarily, add useful perspective to the ongoing debate about the active-reserve force mix in the Navy. This memorandum examines that experience from the early days of the Korean War to the present. It includes a discussion of lessons from past experience which seem germane to current considerations.
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September 1, 1981
This paper analyzes the role of the U.S. and the USSR in recent Mediterranean crises and estimates ability of the U.S. Navy to continue to fulfill its crisis role there in the future.
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February 1, 1981

This paper discusses the Shanghai incident of 1932 and how it marked the end of a form of naval activity, the protection and promotion of trade in peacetime, that had predominated in the Far East.

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November 1, 1977
Over the period 1955-1975 the Navy and Marine Corps played an active role in U.S. crisis management diplomacy, responding to 99 international incidents and crises, exclusive of the Vietnam War. This paper provides a summary history of these operations, focusing upon major trends in the Navy's operations over the 21-year period. Particular emphasis is given to the employment of major projection forces (aircraft carriers and amphibious units) in these responses. Brief descriptions of the 99 incidents and responses are also presented. Volume II is a classified volume containing the following: Appendix C - Summaries of Incidents and Responses, 1955-1975, Appendix D - Additional Events Which are not Included in the Main List of Responses, Appendix E - Projection Operations, Appendix F - USN and USMC Responses to International Events, 1919-1939. See also CNA Research Contribution 429 and CNA Research Memorandum 85-71.
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June 1, 1974
This paper suggests ways of relating crisis studies to the study of regions. In particular, the Near East is discussed as a focus for the study of crises.
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June 1, 1974
This paper discusses the objectives and implications of both the U.S. and Soviet naval presence during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani Crisis.
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