Research for Cost Analyses

In early August 1992, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Surface Warfare) asked the Center for Naval Analyses to conduct a study on homeport options for collocation of Mine Countermeasures (MCM) forces. This report documents the findings of the study. The MCM homeport issue dates back to May 1991 when the Navy announced a plan for consolidating MCM ships at Ingleside, Texas. That first step grew into a plan for consolidating not just ships, but headquarters staff, training activities, and possibly explosive ordnance disposal and air MCM forces as well.

The Job Performance Measurement project will attempt to measure the first-term costs and performance of enlisted Marines in several occupations. The primary types of costs are those incurred to recruit, train, and pay personnel. This paper focuses on training costs. It provides a discussion on the concept of training costs and some of the types of training data available for enlisted Marines. It also presents estimates of the costs per student for courses needed for the Military Occupational Specialties studied in the project.

This research memorandum evaluates the use of Video Teletraining (VTT) to deliver Navy F-school instruction to students at remote sites. Using data collected from a four-site, fully interactive audio-video network, the analysis focuses on system utilization, training effectiveness, downtime, and savings to the Navy.

Because savings are usually expected when responsibilities are transferred from Active to Reserve units, Congress directed the services in 1984 to prepare annual reports outlining how they would provide the Reserve with new missions, more modern equipment, and greater integration with the active forces. The purpose of the Active/Reserve Force Mix Study was to provide analytical assistance to the Navy in preparing its annual report. This research memorandum summarizes the analyses conducted for the study. The availability of personnel to man missions being transferred to the Reserve forces is studied. In particular, this paper examines which homeports will be most able to support the Naval Reserve Force, what determines whether Navy veterans will affiliate with the Selected Reserves, and what the supply will be of aviation officers leaving active duty. Better techniques for estimating the cost savings of Reserve units are developed, and the operating and support costs of aviation units, especially personnel costs, are discussed.