Research for COP

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June 1, 1998
The purpose of this paper is to document the chronological account of the air operation, Operation Deliberate Force, for the historical record. This was NATO's first extended air operation. From August 30 until September 19, 1995, allied forces flew a total of 3,515 sorties by nine countries, with losses of only one aircraft and no crew. This chronological account demonstrates the process required to shift from a UN military peacekeeping operation to a NATO peace-enforcement operation and offers a lesson for the future.
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February 1, 1998
As part of JTFEX 97-2, USS Nimitz with Commander, Carrier Group Seven and Carrier Airwing Nine completed a four day flight operation known as Surge. The Surge demonstrated the entire process required to put bombs on target in littoral warfare scenario; it incorporated all facets of strike warfare - form weapons buildup in the magazines to bombs on target. In the post-Vietnam era, no other carrier and embarked airwing have ever generated as much firepower in 98 hours. This report provides data and an assessment of the Surge, examining the preparation, personnel, maintenance and supply needed for the operation.
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November 1, 1994
In 1991, the Department of Defense revised its instructions governing defense acquisition management. The role of Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analyses (COEAs) was spelled out at length. COEAs must be completed and presented to the acquisition decision executives at key decision milestones. For major acquisition programs, the analyses undergo extensive review within the military departments and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Thus, COEAs are primary--although not the only--means by which the decision authorities become informed about a program's advantages and disadvantages. Since 1991, CNA has provided leadership and staffing for a number of COEAs for the Navy and Marine Corps. Moreover, CNA has conducted COEA-like studies for various components of the Department of the Navy for many years. This paper, which draws from the collective experience of that work as well as from longer-standing principles of defense systems analysis, identifies and discusses certain issues that appear to be common to all COEAs. Each issue relates in some way to the use or misuse of cost information in the analysis. We begin with an overview of the role of COEAs in the acquisition process and a general discussion of the objectives of these studies and how they are put together. We then focus on the following issues: system versus decision alternatives; integrating cost and effectiveness results; wartime costs; discounting; risk and uncertainty analysis; and affordability.
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October 1, 1993
The Navy, like any military organization, exists to employ force in the service of national policy--in short, to wage war. Peacetime operations have influence precisely because they carry with them a constant reminder of the ability of the Navy and the nation to use force to compel or protect. The Navy must not neglect its warfighting heritage. But the demands of the post-Cold War world require greater attention to the use of the Navy to influence other nations in conditions short of war or crisis. As we enter the twenty-first century, the Navy must accept new responsibilities to keep our friends friendly, to keep our adversaries deterred and quiescent, to draw uncommitted states closer to the United States, and to either restore stability to unstable regimes or mitigate the consequences of instability. Despite its reputation as a conservative organization, one of the great strengths of the Navy is its ability to adapt. It adapted to the dominance of the carrier in 1942. It adapted to the needs of inshore warfare in Vietnam. It adapted to the challenge of a seagoing Soviet superpower in the final decades of the Cold War. Now it must adapt to the need to use the tools of war to gain peacetime influence in an uncertain age.
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May 1, 1993
At the core of decision-making about U.S. military forces lies the question of what roles and function are assigned to each component of the national defense structure. In theory, resources are then distributed to reflect mission requirements. Today, the nation is in the midst of a review of mission requirements and resource allocations to national defense. This paper provides a backdrop to today's debate by examining the historical debate over 'who will do what with what.' This examination briefly reviews the debates over the U.S. military services' roles, functions, and missions. In addition to a chronological discussion, the paper highlights factors that drive roles and missions debates and relates these factors to today's debate. The discussion emphasizes the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps perspective. The intent is to provide a sense of how the U.S. military structure arrived at where it is today, thus laying a framework for examining potential alternative future structures and assignments of roles, functions, and missions.
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April 1, 1993
The Gulf War was an impressive demonstration of air power in action. Coalition air forces seized control of the air in the first hours, then devastated military facilities in Iraq and Iraqi forces in the field -- paving the way for the remarkable 100-hour victory by coalition ground forces. Airpower did not win the war by itself, but it was the foundation for projecting U.S. military power and overcoming numerical disadvantages on the ground. Airpower is likely to play a similar key role in the next major regional conflict. Thus, the U.S. must maintain its superiority in airpower despite rising costs and declining budgets. The issues are complex and controversial, but ignoring issues will not make them go away. This paper discusses policy and concept issues that need debate and examines two broad strategies for dealing with affordability problems.
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June 1, 1992
This paper is the first in a series jointly sponsored by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and Russia's Institute for USA and Canada (ISKAN). This particular paper, by Sergei Rogov and his staff at ISKAN, provides an extensive overview of the complex relations within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Rogov focuses specifically on military issues and the emergence of republican Armed Forces. The CIS arrangement is clearly not suitable for encouraging political cooperation; Rogov et al. suggests that it cannot even forge a military union. Yet, a new security structure has clearly emerged following the May summit in Tashkent. This paper discusses the implications of the Tashkent agreement as well as predicts a framework for Russia's future security relations.
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